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Abstract
This Note discusses current consumer arbitration policies and analyzes whether traditional
arbitration is adequate to address consumer disputes in the new cross-border shopping environ-
ment. Part I discusses the importance of consumer protection and reviews the consumer arbi-
tration regimes of the United States and the European Union. Part II discusses the criticisms of
the current policies toward consumer arbitration in the United States and the European Union.
Part II also highlights the unique problems of consumer dispute resolution in cross-border trans-
actions and raises some concerns unique to dispute resolution on the Internet. Part III concludes
that traditional arbitration systems are not appropriate for cross-border consumer transactions, and
proposes that the most prudent solution is to leave arbitration to commercial parties involved in
B2B transactions.
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INTRODUCTION
Consumer transactions drive many national economies, and
with the advent of the Internet and e-commerce,' consumer
shopping has taken on a cross-border flavor.2 The growth in
transactional traffic increases the need for effective dispute reso-
lution mechanisms. Litigation, especially in international trans-
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1. See NUA Internet, How Many Online, at http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how-many_
online/index.html (2004) [hereinafter How Many Online] (reporting there are 605.6
million people on Internet worldwide). See also Karen Stewart & Joseph Matthews, On-
line Arbitration of Cross-Border, Business to Consumer Disputes, 56 U. MiAmi L. REv. 1111,
1111 (2002) (predicting revenue generated by business-to-consumer ("B2C") com-
merce will approach that generated by business-to-business ("B2B") commerce); Llewel-
lyn Joseph Gibbons, Creating a Market for Justice; a Market Incentive Solution to Regulating
the Playing Field: Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process, and Fair Play in Online
Consumer Arbitration, 23 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 2 (2002) [hereinafter Gibbons 1]
(stating B2C commerce will be worth estimated USD 250 billion by end of 2003).
2. See Commission Press Release, IP/01/1423 (Oct. 16, 2001), available at http://
europa.eu.int [hereinafter Commission Press Release IP/01/1423] (discussing how for-
eign travel, accessibility of the Internet, and introduction of Euro make consumers
more aware of cross-border shopping opportunities). Increased cross-border shopping,
however, may increase cross-border disputes. Id. See also NUA Internet, Nielsen NetRat-
ings: Online Spending Reaches New High in United States, at http://www.nua.ie/surveys
(Jan. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Online Spending Reaches New High in United States] (reporting
that U.S. consumers spent nearly USD 13.7 billion online during holiday season, rising
more than twenty-four percent); NUA Internet, Nielsen NetRatings: Over GBP 1 Billion
Spent Online in January, at http://www.nua.ie/surveys (Feb. 21, 2003) (reporting e-com-
merce revenues in United Kingdom ("U.K-") during January totaled GBP I billion
(USD 1.59 billion)). Online shopping also grew nineteen times faster than traditional
brick-and-mortar retailing in December 2002 and increased another five percent in Jan-
uary 2003, representing six percent of all U.K. retail. Id.
3. See Commission Press Release IP/01/1423, supra note 2 (announcing establish-
ment of European Extra-Judicial Network ("EEJ-Net")). See also Lucille M. Ponte, Boost-
ing Consumer Confidence in E-business: Recommendations for Establishing Fair and Effective
Dispute Resolution Programsfor B2C Online Transactions, 12 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 441,442-
43 (2002) (stating that lack of well-established and credible online conflict resolution
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actions, may not be the most desirable choice for the parties due
to unique problems in the international setting.4 Further, fail-
ure to instill confidence in a viable dispute resolution system
may discourage consumers from participating in the market.'
U.S. consumer protection concerns are not unique.6 The
increase in business-to-consumer ("B2C") transactions, as op-
posed to business-to-business ("B2B") transactions, makes it
mechanisms dampens consumer confidence in online marketplace and hurts e-tailers
involved in cross-border transactions).
4. See Commission Press Release IP/01/1423, supra note 2 (stating that if things go
wrong in cross-border purchase, traditional litigation is neither practical nor cost-effec-
tive for both consumers and business). The length and technical complexity of legal
procedures, linguistic and cultural differences, and their expense, generally deter con-
sumers from taking court action. Id. See also William W. Park, In Support ofInternational
Commercial Arbitration and Litigation: The Need for Federal Legislation: Bridging the Gap in
Forum Selection: Harmonizing the Law of Arbitration and Court Selection, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 26-27 (1998) (noting concerns over litigation bias against foreign-
ers inevitably chills international transactions unless relatively neutral alternative to ju-
dicial system of potential adversary exists and arbitration law already recognizes interna-
tional business manager's special need for reliability in dispute resolution); GARY B.
BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 7
(2001) [hereinafter BoRN 1] (stating that popularity of arbitration as means for resolv-
ing international commercial disputes has increased significantly over past several de-
cades and citing International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") statistics demonstrating
increase).
5. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMMENTS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ("DOC")/
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ("FrC"), ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR CONSUMER
TRANSACTIONS IN THE BoRDERLESS ONLINE MARKETPLACE 1 8, at http://www.ftc.gov/
bcp/altdisresolution/comments/index.htm (May 30, 2000) [hereinafter FTC Work-
shop Comments] (stating that current level of consumer trust is far too low to allow
B2C commerce to deliver its potential, especially in cross-border trade). See also Com-
mission Press Release IP/01/1423, supra note 2 (stating that consumers' perception
that legal action is only means of redress can be major disincentive to cross-border
shopping); Committee on Consumer Policy, OECD, Consumers in the Online Market-
place: The OECD Guidelines Three Years later, DSTI /CP (2002) 4 Final, at 4 (Feb. 3,
2003), available at www.oecd.org [hereinafter OECD Guidelines] (indicating that much
of potential for B2C e-commerce has yet to be realized due to consumers' concerns
about shopping online).
6. See NICHOLAS LOCKETr & MANUS EGAN, UNFAIR TERMS IN CONSUMER AGREE-
MENTS: THE NEW RULES EXPLAINED 9 (1995) (discussing development of consumer pro-
tection programs in European Union ("E.U.")). The first consumer protection pro-
gram of 1974 recognized that there were widespread abuses arising from the growing
marketplace, increasing diversity, and complex goods and services offered to customers.
Id. Consumers had gradually failed to maintain a balanced position with suppliers and
most contractual terms had become heavily slanted toward the supplier. Id. See also
David Byrne, Consumer Protection - Past and Future, Speech at the Belgian Presi-
dency Conference, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/speeches.htm
(Oct. 4, 2001) (discussing changing context of consumer protection in European
Union and stressing importance of consumer policy).
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likely that disputes will arise between parties from different Na-
tions.7 Efforts have been made to address arbitration's viability
as an Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") method in con-
sumer transactions, but a consensus over how great the risks are
and how to address them remains evasive.8
This Note discusses current consumer arbitration policies
and analyzes whether traditional arbitration is adequate to ad-
dress consumer disputes in the new cross-border shopping envi-
ronment. Part I discusses the importance of consumer protec-
tion and reviews the consumer arbitration regimes of the United
States and the European Union. Part II discusses the criticisms
of the current policies toward consumer arbitration in the
United States and the European Union. Part II also highlights
the unique problems of consumer dispute resolution in cross-
border transactions and raises some concerns unique to dispute
resolution on the Internet. Part III concludes that traditional
arbitration systems are not appropriate for cross-border con-
sumer transactions, and proposes that the most prudent solution
is to leave arbitration to commercial parties involved in B2B
transactions.
7. See, e.g., FTC, E-consumer Complaints: Top Consumer and Company Loca-
tions, available at http://www.econsumer.gov (Jan. 1 -June 30, 2003) (providing list of
countries with largest consumer complaints). The five nations with the largest number
of consumer complaints were Australia, Belgium, Canada, United Kingdom, and the
United States. Id. The largest number of consumer complaints was against companies
in Canada, Nigeria, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. See also
Ponte, supra note 3, at 461 (stating that e-businesses must take into account "global
electronic marketplace" when deciding online dispute resolution options); Gibbons 1,
supra note 1, at 3 (stating that reality is B2C e-commerce is growing at phenomenal rate
and that fastest area of growth in e-commerce is brick and mortar merchants with
strong trademarks who create equivalent e-commerce site which provides e-consumers
with illusion, if not reality, of dispute resolution process).
8. See, e.g., Ponte, supra note 3 (suggesting revision of current Consumer Protocol
to meet unique needs and challenges of online B2C environment); Christopher R.
Drahozal & RaymondJ. Friel, 28 N.C.J. I-rN'L L. & CoM. REG. 357, 384 (2002) (propos-
ing Internet merchants vary standard form contracts and dispute resolution procedures
based on differing regulatory schemes and legal rules); Mary Shannon Martin, Keep it
Online: The Hague Convention and the Need for Online Alternative Dispute Resolution in Inter-
national Business-to-Consumer E-commerce, 20 B.U. INT'L L.J. 125, 130-31 (advocating vari-
ous methods of online Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR")); Stewart & Matthews,
supra note 1 (concluding that there is no uniform system in place for international
online B2C disputes and development of independent, self-regulating, and enforceable
online process would provide stability needed for cross-border B2C commerce to flour-
ish).
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I. ARBITRATION AND THE CONSUMER
A. National Government Interests in Protecting Consumers
National governments generally take steps to protect con-
sumers,9 either through legislation such as the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act ("MMWA"),' Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 1
the European Directive Against Unfair Terms in Consumer Con-
tracts ("Consumer Directive"), 12 or consumer education and as-
sistance for filing claims. 3 Entities such as the Better Business
9. See, e.g., A. Brooke Overby, An Institutional Analysis of Consumer Law, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1219 (2001) (exploring revival of interest in consumer protection in
United States and European Union and its impact on consumer movement). The cur-
rent revival in consumer protection seeks to build upon and reinterpret issues raised
and resolved decades earlier. Id. at 1220. Many of the principal consumer protection
statutes in the United States were enacted during the 1960s and 1970s. Id. at 1220-21.
Consumer protection concerns are prevalent in E.U. legislation. See also Commission of
the European Communities, Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection,
COM (2001) 531 Final (Oct. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Green Paper] (discussing various
E.U. legislation aimed at protecting consumers). See, e.g., Council Directive No. 93/13,
O.J. L 95/29 (1993) [hereinafter Consumer Directive] (establishing Directive on unfair
terms in consumer contracts); Council Directive No. 97/7, O.J. L 144/19 (1997) [here-
inafter Distance Selling Directive] (establishing Directive on protection of consumers in
distance contracts); Commission Recommendation, O.J. L 115/31 (1998) [hereinafter
1998 Commission Recommendation] (establishing principles applicable to bodies re-
sponsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes); Commission Recommen-
dation, O.J. L 109/56 (2001) (establishing principles for out-of-court bodies involved in
the consensual resolution of consumer disputes).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000) (establishing Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
("MMWA") that provides U.S. consumer protections relating to product warranties).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2000) (establishing Truth in Lending Act ("TILA")
that provides U.S. consumer protections for consumer credit transactions).
12. See Consumer Directive, supra note 9 (establishing Council Directive No. 93/
13, O.J. L 95/29 (1993)). See also LocmKErr & EGAN, supra note 6 (discussing details of
Consumer Directive); Green Paper, supra note 9, at 2.1 (evaluating E.U. Consumer
Directive and discussing origin of E.U. consumer protection laws). The Green Paper
states:
The goals of consumer protection are to deliver a system of regulation
that: achieves as high as possible a level of consumer protection whilst also
keeping costs to business to a minimum; is as simple as possible and is suffi-
ciently flexible to respond quickly to the market, and which involves stake-
holders as much as possible; and provides legal certainty and ensures its effi-
cient and effective enforcement, especially in cross-border cases. Id.
13. See, e.g., EEJ-Net Gears Up to Take on Cross-Border Consumer Disputes, Oct.
2001, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/healthconsumer/newsletter/200110/
02_en.htm [hereinafter EEJ-Net Article] (discussing establishment of EEJ-Net on Oct.
16, 2002). The EEJ-Net was established to make it easier for consumers to seek redress
in conflicts with suppliers from other E.U. countries, as well as Norway and Iceland. Id.
Each E.U. country sets up a "clearing house" where consumers can obtain information
and access existing ADR systems. Id.; Commission Press Release IP/01/1423, supra note
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Bureau ("BBB") in the United States and Frontier Centers in the
United Kingdom may provide assistance to consumers.1 4 More
formal redress is usually provided by legislation enforced
through agencies such as the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") and the U.K. Office of Fair Trading ("OFT"). 5 Con-
sumer arbitration is criticized as possibly displacing the govern-
ment's role in consumer protection, 6 resulting in unconsciona-
ble transactions and dispute resolution methods.1 7  In the
2 (explaining reasons why EEJ-Net was established and protections it offers to E.U. con-
sumers). See also, Econsumer.gov website, at http://www.econsumer.gov (providing
general information about consumer protection in all countries in International Con-
sumer Protection Enforcement Network ("ICPEN"), contact information for authorities
in those countries, and online complaint forms); FTC, For Consumers: Consumer In-
formation, at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/consumer.htm (offering general information and
links to additional avenues of information to consumers who have concerns about un-
fair, deceptive, or fraudulent practices).
14. See Overby, supra note 9, at 1276 (discussing that both United States and Euro-
pean Union rely on informal consumer complaint mechanisms such as U.S. Better Busi-
ness Bureau ("BBB") and U.K_ Consumer Advise Centers and trade associations). The
European Union has also opened "frontier centers" in European cities to provide infor-
mation on consumer issues and consumer law. Id. See, e.g., EEJ-Net Article, supra note
13 (explaining how EEJ-Net allows each E.U. country to set up a "clearing house" where
consumers can obtain information and access existing ADR systems); Better Business
Bureau website, at http://www.dr.bbb.org/comsensealt/index.asp (offering informal
dispute settlement options for businesses and their customers).
15. See Overby, supra note 9, at 1276-77 (stating that formal methods include em-
ploying agencies, such as FTC and OFT to enforce consumer rights, using primarily
injunctions or cease and desist orders as remedies). See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312
(2000) (establishing MMWA for consumer product warranty protections); §§ 1601-1667
(2000) (establishing TILA for protections for consumer credit transactions); Consumer
Directive, supra note 9 (establishing E.U. Consumer Directive on unfair terms in con-
sumer contracts).
16. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 37 (1997)
(stating that concerns that rigorous enforcement of adhesive pre-dispute arbitration
clauses gives large firms power to displace judiciary from its role in enforcing common
law claims and statutory rights). See also Justin Kelly, ABA Litigation Section to Examine
Arbitration Complaints, Nov. 5, 2002, available at http://www.adrworld.com (stating
American Bar Association's ("ABA") Litigation Section has received complaints that ar-
bitration has moved into regulatory and statutory cases and expressing concerns that
arbitrators fail to grasp underlying law); Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory
Arbitration In Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REv. 1237, 1263 (2001)
(asserting that strategic use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements creates incentive for
organizations subject to federal or state regulation to use arbitration as device to break
social legislation). Pre-dispute mandatory arbitration precludes access to the courts
and frustrates the implementation of existing consumer rights and effectively precludes
the development of new ones. Id. at 1264.
17. See Alderman, supra note 16, at 1263 (stating strategic use of pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration agreements seriously impedes assertion of legal rights and elimi-
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United States, arbitration of consumer statutory claims is allowed
under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"),"8 as long as the con-
sumer can vindicate his statutory rights."9 Some suggest, how-
ever, that arbitration agreements instead serve as prospective
waivers of statutory rights20 and therefore courts should reject
them because they allow commercial parties to "legislate" at the
expense of the consumer.2 1
nates potential for precedent-setting case law). See also Amer. Safety Equip. Corp. v.J.P.
Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968) (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,
438 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)) (pointing out that American courts have expressed con-
sumer concerns as conflict between federal statutory protection of large segment of
public, frequently in inferior bargaining position, and encouragement of arbitration as
prompt, economical, and adequate solution for disputes). Similar concerns exist in the
European Union. See, e.g., Consumer Directive, supra note 9, at 9 (stating that eco-
nomic interests of consumers should be protected against abuse of power by seller or
supplier, in particular against one-sided standard contracts and unfair exclusion of es-
sential rights in contracts).
18. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000)
(reaffirming that federal statutory claims can be appropriately resolved through arbitra-
tion and upholding arbitration agreement for consumer's TILA and Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act ("ECOA") claims against lender). See generally Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) (establishing principal that stream-
lined procedures of arbitration do not entail consequential restriction on substantive
rights). See also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, ME-
DIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 245 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing further Supreme Court
cases that established enforceability of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims).
19. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 (holding that statute serves its functions so long as
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate his statutory cause of action in arbitral fo-
rum); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (holding arbi-
tration of Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") claims appropriate). But
see Schwartz, supra note 16, at 110 (criticizing Supreme Court's enforcement of pre-
dispute arbitration clauses and its presumption that arbitration clauses substitute one
procedurally fair forum for another).
20. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 110 (criticizing Supreme Court's ruling that
there is no prospective waiver of statutory rights). Lower courts have adopted the Su-
preme Court's reasoning, even though there seems to be no explanation for it other
than a prospective waiver would "nullify the purposes" of a statute. Id. at 1111. See also
PUBLIC CITIZEN'S CONGRESS WATCH, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION 52 (Apr. 2002) [herein-
after PUBLIC CITIZEN] (determining that arbitration prevents vindication of statutory
rights in four ways). Arbitration prevents vindication of statutory rights by (1) the cost
barrier; (2) uncertainty about costs; (3) costs of companion cases and satellite litigation;
and (4) information costs arising from arbitration. Id. at 52-58.
21. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 60 (suggesting pre-dispute arbitration clauses
are particularly troubling where regulated relationships are involved). Where the legis-
lature has already deemed it necessary to restrict the drafting party's power to "legis-
late" at the expense of the adherent, an arbitration clause allows the drafting party to
change the fundamental background rule set up by the legislature. Id. See also Kelly,
supra note 16 (stating ABA Litigation Section has received complaints that arbitration
has moved into regulatory and statutory cases and expressing concerns that arbitrators
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B. The Importance of Accessible Consumer Dispute Resolution
Technology has opened up a new landscape where transac-
tions are possible between parties that probably would not have
done business together before.2 2 Studies in the United States
and Europe indicate consumer trust is far too low to allow B2C e-
commerce to deliver its potential. 23  Furthermore, consumers
have genuine concerns about purchasing in a cross-border mar-
ketplace.24 Inconsistent methods of handling consumer disputes
may encourage an uneven playing field and disadvantage con-
sumers who already have difficulties navigating the legal termi-
nology and allocating responsibilities in B2C contracts. 2 Busi-
fail to grasp underlying law); Alderman, supra note 16, at 1263 (asserting that strategic
use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements creates incentive for organizations subject to
federal or State regulation to use arbitration as device to break social legislation).
22. See How Many Online, supra note 1 (reporting there are 605.60 million people
on Internet worldwide); Stewart & Matthews, supra note 1, at 1111 (predicting revenue
generated by B2C commerce will approach that generated by B2B commerce). See also
Drahozal & Friel, supra note 8, at 357 (discussing how arbitration is increasingly being
used between businesses and consumers); Caroline E. Mayer, No Suits Allowed; Increas-
ingly, Arbitration Is the Only Recourse, WASH. PosT, July 14, 2002, at H01 (stating that until
one decade ago most arbitrations pitted two businesses against each other in contract
dispute, and then it spread to disagreements between companies and their customers).
23. See, e.g., FTC Workshop Comments, supra note 5, at 8 (stating current level
of consumer trust is far too low to allow B2C commerce to deliver its potential, espe-
cially in cross-border trade); Commission Press Release IP/01/1423, supra note 2 (stat-
ing that consumers' perception that legal action is only means of redress can be major
disincentive to cross-border shopping); OECD Guidelines, supra note 5, at 4 (indicating
that much of potential for B2C e-commerce has yet to be realized due to consumers'
concerns about shopping online).
24. See FTC Workshop Comments, supra note 5, at 8 (stating consumer concerns
include (1) concerns over contract fulfillment, (2) uncertainty about how to complain
and seek redress, (3) consumer usually bears all transaction risk because payment tends
to be made before receipt, (4) security risk of transmitting financial and personal de-
tails, (5) e-commerce sites are less tangible than "bricks and mortar" shops, and (6)
poor design and lack of transparency on websites); Ponte, supra note 3, at 442 (stating
that lack of uniform laws or court system leaves e-consumers with no real means of
redress and dampens consumer confidence in online marketplace). The global nature
of the Internet challenges national sovereignty and traditional court authority and am-
plifies concerns about choice of law and enforceability ofjudgments. Id. See also Karen
Alboukrek, Adapting to a New World of E-Commerce: The Need for Uniform Consumer Protec-
tion in the International Electronic Marketplace, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 425, 434
(2003) (explaining that legal questions raised by consumer's e-commerce purchase
from foreign company are particularly difficult to address because not certain which
laws apply). The consumer risks the probability of losing home country protections
and having to travel to a foreign forum and an unfamiliar legal system to resolve the
dispute. Id. Businesses are also potentially subjected to complying with hundreds of
different consumer protection laws in each country they do business in. Id.
25. See, e.g., Consumer Directive, supra note 9, at 2 (stating that laws of Member
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nesses may also desire to structure contracts and dispute resolu-
tion clauses differently to accommodate local rules, adding to
commercial inefficiency and legal uncertainty. 26
C. Consumer Arbitration Is Not Welcome Everywhere:
U.S. v. E. U. Policy
There are many ways consumer disputes may be addressed,
including negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.27 The focus
of this Note is arbitration that includes binding pre-dispute
agreements to adjudicate a dispute in a nonjudicial forum, a
States relating to contract terms between sellers or suppliers of goods and services on
the one hand, and consumers on the other show many disparities). This results in
national markets differing from each other, and distortions of competition may arise
amongst the sellers and suppliers, notably when they sell and supply in other Member
States. Id. Consumers in the global online marketplace also face different legal systems
and even more uncertain territory in cyberspace. See, e.g., Ponte, supra note 3, at 442
(stating there are no uniform laws or unified court systems in cyberspace and lack of
well-established and credible dispute resolution systems can dampen consumer confi-
dence in online marketplace).
26. See, e.g., Drahozal & Friel, supra note 8, at 378 (noting top computer manufac-
turers modify arbitration clauses in consumer purchase agreements based on con-
sumer's locality). For sales in the United States, Dell and Gateway computer companies
included binding arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts. Id. For sales in the
United Kingdom, none of the three companies included a binding arbitration clause in
its consumer contracts. Id. Instead, the contract provided for settlement of disputes in
court. Id. Gateway expressly provided for arbitration if both parties agreed after a dis-
pute arose and had a pre-dispute arbitration clause in its contracts with business cus-
tomers. Id. Drahozal and Friel concluded that Gateway may have included such a
clause in its consumer contracts if it were permitted to by law. Id. See also Alboukrek,
supra note 24, at 434 (stating that uncertainty of dispute resolution procedures between
international buyers and sellers subjects businesses to possibility of complying with hun-
dreds of different consumer protection laws in countries that seek to regulate business
activities).
27. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 3 (describing forms of ADR including
negotiation and third-party processes such as mediation and arbitration). The critical
distinguishing factor between mediation and arbitration is that in mediation the neu-
tral assists the disputants in arriving at their own solution, and in arbitration or adjudi-
cation the neutral has the power to impose a solution. Id. See alsoJean R. Sternlight, Is
Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument That the Term "ADR" Has Begun to Outlive
its Usefulness, 2000J. Disp. RESOL. 97, 100 (2000) (stating that when ADR movement was
in its infancy made great deal of sense to group together non-litigation processes as
binding arbitration, mediation, and early neutral evaluation and emphasize their joint
differences from litigation); ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAw AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 32 (3d ed. 1999) (describing that wide defini-
tion of ADR could include any method of resolving disputes other than those adopted
by courts of law as part of system ofjustice established and administered by States, but
recognizing that ADR term is not always used so broadly, and suggesting arbitration be
excluded from ADR).
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process very different from non-binding mediation.21 Commer-
cially active Nations, such as the United States and Member
States of the European Union, use the ADR methods available
very differently in the resolution of consumer disputes.29
1. United States
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") governs federal U.S.
arbitration."0 State statutes such as the Revised Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act ("RUAA") 3' or Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA") 32 gov-
28. See Sternlight, supra note 27, at 102 (stating ADR conferences often highlight
visceral disconnect between arbitration and mediation); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note
18, at 123 (describing mediation as negotiation carried out with assistance of third party
and stating that in contrast to arbitrator or judge, mediator has no power to impose
outcome on disputing parties); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, at 32 (suggesting
that arbitration not be included as example of ADR because it presents alternative to
judicial process in offering privacy to parties and procedural flexibility but is nonethe-
less fundamentally same in that role of arbitrator is judgmental and his function is not
to decide how problem resulting in dispute can most easily be resolved so much as to
apportion responsibility for that problem).
29. See Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to
Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 831, 843 (2002) [hereinafter Sternlight 2] (noting treatment of mandatory con-
sumer and employment arbitration is quite different in countries outside United
States). The E.U. position on consumer arbitration is fairly clear. Id. This does not
mean that mandatory consumer arbitration occurs in no other jurisdictions, but it is
difficult to track mandatory consumer arbitration, which appears to not occur in other
countries, especially those that are non-English-speaking. Id. See also Stewart & Mat-
thews, supra note 1, at 1115 (stating European Union is prolific in drafting laws de-
signed to protect online consumers); Drahozal & Friel, supra note 8, at 384 (comparing
different U.S. and E.U. policies on consumer arbitration).
30. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2002) (establishing Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")).
The FAA applies to:
commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Terri-
tory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such
Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign
nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or for-
eign nation.
9 U.S.C. § 1. See also 5 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw: AGREEMENTS,
AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER FAA 5-6 (1999 supp.) (discussing FAA enactment in 1925
and application of section 2 which establishes federal nature of act). If a dispute is in
federal court under diversity, the respective State arbitration statute may apply if inter-
state commerce is not involved. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S.
198 (1956) (holding arbitration provisions in employment agreement made in New
York between New York residents but performable in Vermont not interstate com-
merce).
31. See Uniform Arbitration Act (2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/ulc/ulc frame.htm [hereinafter Revised Uniform Arbitration Act ("RUAA")] (es-
tablishing RUAA that was enacted in 2000 to update previously enacted Uniform Arbi-
tration Act ("UAA"). The RUAA was enacted in response to the increased use of arbi-
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ern state arbitration. Sections 2 and 3 of the FAA apply to inter-
national arbitration. 3
The FAA was enacted to reverse a historical hostility toward
arbitration in the United States. 4 Courts repeatedly emphasize
that states cannot restrict the parties' ability to enter into arbitra-
tion agreements3 5 and state legislation is frequently preempted
for conflicting with the FAA's goals. 36 Therefore, any state con-
tration, greater complexity of disputes resolved by arbitration, and legal developments
in the area. Id. at prefatory note 1. See also Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act: Is it the Wrong Cure?, 8 DisP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2002, at 10 n.1 [here-
inafter Cole 1] (stating that Hawaii, Nevada, New Mexico and Utah have adopted
RUAA). The RUAA has been introduced as legislation in many other States. Id. at 10
n.2; Uniform Law Commissioners, Uniform Arbitration Act, at http://www.nccusl.org/
nccusl/DesktopDefault.aspx (listing legislative status of RUAA implementation for vari-
ous States).
32. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 627 (stating UAA is uniform law gov-
erning State arbitration procedures). The UAA was adopted by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1955. Id. Thirty-five jurisdictions
adopted the UAA, and fourteen others adopted similar legislation. Id.
33. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2000) (codifying New York Convention); 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-
307 (2000) (codifying Inter-American Convention).
34. See BORN 1, supra note 4, at 35 (stating that well into twentieth century, U.S.
courts were hostile towards arbitration and judges refused to grant specific enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements). See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (stating FAA was enacted in 1925 to help promote arbitration as
alternative to litigation). The FAA's purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had
been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same
footing as other contracts. Id.; Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (citing FAA's goals asjustification for instituting "liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements").
35. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995) (hold-
ing that words "involving commerce" are interpreted broadly, and are functional
equivalent of "affecting" commerce, so broader reading of FAA is correct); Volt Info.
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (holding State law pre-
empted if it actually conflicts with federal law to extent it stands as obstacle to accom-
plishment and execution of full purposes and objectives of Congress); Basura v. U.S.
Home Corp., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328, 333 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding FAA preempted
state law that allowed purchaser to pursue construction and design defect action against
developer in court despite signed arbitration agreement). See also GOLDBERG ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 235 (stating that FAA displaces State law in State courts to extent State
law conflicts with goals or policies of FAA).
36. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 235 (discussing when FAA displaces
State law governing arbitration). See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 268 (holding
void Alabama statute that made written and pre-dispute arbitration agreements invalid
and unenforceable because State statute directly conflicted with section 2 of FAA);
Basura, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 333 (holding FAA preempted State law that allowed purchaser
to pursue construction and design defect action against developer in court despite
signed arbitration agreement). See generally Cole 1, supra note 31, at 10-13 (discussing
FAA preemption problem in relation to RUAA). See also Volt Info. Sciences, 489 U.S. at
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sumer law aimed at singling out arbitration will not be en-
forced.37 New federal legislation recently proposed in Congress
may institute consumer protections in arbitration, but attempts
have so far proved unsuccessful.38
477 (holding State law preempted to extent it actually conflicts with federal law, and
stands as obstacle to accomplishment, execution of full purposes, and objectives of Con-
gress). To ensure private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms,
the FAA preempts State laws that require judicial forum for resolution of claims when
parties agreed to resolve them by arbitration. Id. But see BORN 1, supra note 4, at 335
(discussing interpretation of Volt Info. Sciences decision as requiring application of State
law rules governing arbitration agreements where parties have agreed to choice-of-law
clause selecting State law).
37. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (stating written arbitration provision shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract); Stephen L. Hayford & Carroll E. Neesemann, A Response to RUAA
Critics: Codifying Modern Arbitration Law, Without Preemption, 8 Disp. RESOL. MAG., No. 4,
Summer 2000, at 15-16 (stating any effort by States to level playing field in employment,
consumer or other area, by establishing rule of law per se invalidating adhesion arbitra-
tion agreements, is doomed to failure, and any legislation that places arbitration agree-
ment (adhesion or otherwise) on unequal footing vis-;I-vis other contracts will be pre-
empted by FAA); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 252 (recognizing that Supreme
Court has held that States may not enact legislation aimed at protecting unwary party
from unknowingly surrendering right to sue). See, e.g., Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarott,
517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (concerning Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-114(4) that declared
arbitration clause unenforceable unless notice that contract is subject to arbitration is
typed in underlined capital letters on first page of contract);Joder Bldg. Corp. v. Lewis,
569 A.2d 471, 473 (Vt. 1989) (refusing to enforce Vermont statute 12 V.S.A. § 5652(b)
that required arbitration agreement to clearly state signing agreement forecloses any
court remedies concerning any dispute and statement be displayed prominently).
38. See, e.g., H.R. 2258, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing but failing to pass Con-
sumer Fairness Act of 1999 which would treat unilaterally imposed arbitration clauses
on consumers as unfair and deceptive trade practices and would prohibit them in con-
sumer transactions); H.R. 1296, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing but failing to pass in
Senate, Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act which provides for
use of arbitration to resolve dispute only after parties to controversy consent in writing
to use arbitration after dispute arises); S. 192, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing but fail-
ing to pass Consumer Credit Fair Dispute Resolution Act of 2001 that makes unenforce-
able and invalid written provisions in consumer credit contracts that involve settlement
of disputes to arise under contract by arbitration). See also Robert S. Bennett & David
M. Medearis, Mandatory Arbitration Hits Home, 17 TExAs LAWYER, No. 50, June 3, 2001, at
15 (stating New Mexico recently adopted Fair Bargain Act, which applies to all standard
form contracts or leases). The Act is an attempt to make arbitration fairer to consum-
ers, and since it applies across-the-board to form contracts, whether they include a
mandatory arbitration clause, the act is not anti-arbitration, but pro-fair-arbitration,
which is consistent with the philosophy of the Federal Arbitration Act, and should sur-
vive pre-emption challenges. Id.; Marcia Coyle, Anti-Arbitration Bills Set off A Classic
Brawl, 24 NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 2002, at A8 (stating that there are several arbitration bills
currently proposed to Congress). Bills S. 1140 and H.R. 1296 say that arbitration may
be used to settle controversies stemming from motor vehicle franchise contracts only if
both parties consent after the dispute arises. Id. Bills H.R. 1051 and H.R. 2531 deal
with high-cost mortgage transactions by amending the TILA and Home Ownership and
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U.S. courts were traditionally reluctant to enforce pre-dis-
pute agreements to arbitrate statutory claims, 39 but in 1985, the
Supreme Court ruled that parties do not forgo substantive rights
in arbitration, but rather trade a judicial forum for arbitration.40
U.S. Courts have since upheld arbitration agreements involving
various statutory claims,4t and generally enforce binding pre-dis-
Equity Protection Act to prohibit arbitration clauses that limit the right of borrowers to
seek relief in court. Id. H.R. 2053 would not allow home builders to consent to
mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition to entering into a home building con-
tract. Id.; Sarah E. Larson, Current Public Law and Policy Issue: An Examination of the Broad
Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act and Binding Mandatory Consumer Arbitration Agreements:
Not The Answer To Racial Bias In the U.S. Legal System, 24 HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'Y 293,
323-25 (2003) (discussing that federal lawmakers are introducing legislation to protect
consumers such as H.R. 2258, H.R. 1296, and S. 192 against unknowingly giving up
right to court and jury in arbitration agreements).
39. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 244 (explaining that reluctance to en-
force arbitration agreements involving statutory claims rested on court's view that legis-
lative intent in creating statutory right would be frustrated if that right were not effec-
tively enforced, and on belief that effective enforcement in arbitration was doubtful).
This was also due to the belief that arbitration enforcement conflicted with the legisla-
tive intent to enforce the statutes. Id. The uneasiness centered on the arbitrators' in-
ability to properly apply the law to disputes, highlighting the constitutional concerns of
arbitration's procedural differences. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953)
(holding that arbitration agreement unenforceable for Securities Act claims), rev'd,
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). The
Wilko Court reasoned that the effectiveness of the Securities Act was lessened in arbitra-
tion as compared to judicial proceedings. Id. at 435. The case required subjective find-
ings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged violator of the Act, and they must be
determined and applied by the arbitrators without judicial instruction on the law. Id. at
435-36. Because the award may be made without explanation and without a complete
record of proceedings, the arbitrators' conception of the legal meaning of such statu-
tory requirement as "burden of proof," "reasonable care," or "material fact," cannot be
examined, and power to vacate an award is limited. Id. at 436. See also Amer. Safety
Equip. Corp. v.J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding perva-
sive public interest in enforcement of antitrust laws, and nature of claims that arise in
such cases, combine to make antitrust claims inappropriate for arbitration).
40. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymoth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985) (holding that by agreeing to arbitrate statutory claim, a party does not forgo
substantive rights afforded by statute; it only submits to their resolution in arbitral,
rather than judicial forum, trading court procedures and opportunity for review for
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration); Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (holding that Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("SEA") and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO")
claims were arbitrable). See also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 245 (discussing
series of Supreme Court cases beginning in 1985 that took strong pro-arbitration stance
in statutory claims cases); Schwartz, supra note 16, at 98-99 (discussing Court's decision
in McMahon that held arbitration agreement of statutory claims enforceable).
41. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(holding Title VII claims subject to arbitration); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 20 (1991) (dealing with Age Discrimination in Employment Act);
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pute arbitration clauses.
4 2
In response to recent court decisions regarding prohibitive
arbitration costs to consumers,43 the primary U.S. arbitration
providers recently instituted separate consumer arbitration pro-
tocols.4 4 The new protocols are meant to accommodate consum-
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 220 (dealing with RICO claims); Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at
477 (holding SEA claims arbitrable); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531
U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (enforcing agreement to arbitrate TILA claims); Davis v. S. Energy
Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1268 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding claims under MMWA arbi-
trable).
42. See Drahozal & Friel supra note 8, at 374 (discussing enforceability of pre-dis-
pute arbitration agreements); Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 835 (discussing U.S. policy
enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements with consumers and employees). See also
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (holding consumer
arbitration agreement for termite extermination services valid, reasoning that when
Congress enacted FAA, it had needs of consumers as well as others in mind).
43. See, e.g., Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 (holding existence of large arbitration costs
could preclude litigant from effectively vindicating federal statutory rights in arbitral
forum); Camacho v. Holiday Homes, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 892, 897 (W.D. Va. 2001)
(holding arbitration clause in contract for purchase of manufactured home unenforce-
able because arbitral forum was financially inaccessible to purchaser and prevented vin-
dication of statutory rights under TI[A); Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, 45 P.3d 594
(Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (declining to compel arbitration of mobile homeowner's claim
because filing and administrative costs of American Arbitration Association ("AAA")
arbitration would be prohibitively high); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S. 2d
569 (1st Dept. 1998) (holding cost of $4,000 for consumer arbitration through ICC
unconscionable given cost of dispute, and $500 filing fee through AAA also likely un-
conscionable). See also National Arbitration Forum ("NAF"), In Order for Arbitration With
Consumers to Comply with the Law, The Process Must be Fundamentally Fair (on file with
author) [hereinafter NAF Article] (stating that given several recent decisions, cost of
arbitration to consumers will be major issue). NAF analyzed the issue and determined
that the consumer's cost of arbitration may some day become the deciding factor in
whether a court determines an agreement fair or unconscionable and confirms or in-
validates the arbitration clause. Id.
44. See, e.g., AAA Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related Disputes (July
1, 2003) [hereinafter AAA Consumer Rules], at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPss
id=15747&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\RulesProcedures\NationalInternational.\.\focus
Area\consumer\AAA236current.htm (applying consumer rules when agreement stipu-
lates AAA rules apply and agreement is between consumer and business); NAF Code of
Procedure (July 1, 2003), at http://www.arb-forum.com/code/070103.pdf [hereinafter
NAF Consumer Rules]; Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services ('JAMS") Policy on
Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses: Minimum Standards of Proce-
dural Fairness (Apr. 2003), at http://www.jamsadr.com/images/PDF/ConsumerArbi
tration_MinStd-2003.pdf [hereinafter JAMS Consumer Rules] (stating JAMS will only
administer arbitrations between companies and individual consumers if arbitration
clause and specified rules comply with minimum standards of fairness). See generally
Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 842-43 (discussing recent self-regulation by some arbitra-
tion organizations with employment and consumer protocols). Neither protocol, how-
ever, contains an enforcement mechanism, and it is not clear what response a con-
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ers on items such as costs,4 5 remedies, 46 and award procedures. 47
It should be noted, however, that the new consumer protocols
only apply to arbitrations conducted under organizational rules,
such as those of the AAA.
48
The AAA changed its fee structure for consumers, 49 and ex-
panded the authority of the arbitrator to grant any remedy, re-
sumer will receive if he raises an objection with the administering organization, or arbi-
trators, that the arbitration process does not meet the consumer protocols. Id. at 842.
45. See, e.g., AAA Consumer Rules, supra note 44, at § C-8 (setting out AAA policy
on consumer arbitration costs conducted under AAA Consumer Rules); NAF Consumer
Rules, supra note 44, at app. C (setting out NAF policy on consumer arbitration costs
conducted under NAF Consumer Rules); JAMS Consumer Rules, supra note 44, at 1 7
(setting out JAMS policy on consumer arbitration costs conducted under JAMS Con-
sumer Rules).
46. See, e.g., AAA Consumer Rules, supra note 44, at §§ C-(d), C-7(c) (stating par-
ties can still take their claim to court); NAF Consumer Rules, supra note 44, at R. 5(I)
(stating arbitrator shall follow applicable substantive law and grant any remedy or relief
provided by law); JAMS Consumer Rules, supra note 44, at 3 (stating remedies to
consumer under applicable laws must remain available under arbitration clause unless
consumer maintains right to pursue such remedies in court).
47. See, e.g., AAA Consumer Rules, supra note 44, at § C-7(c) (stating award is final
and binding and subject to review in accordance with applicable statutes governing
arbitration awards, but noting that arbitrator should apply any pertinent contract terms,
statutes, and legal precedents); JAMS Consumer Rules, supra note 44, at 1 10 (stating
arbitration award will consist of concise written statement of essential findings and con-
clusions on which award is based).
48. See, e.g., AAA Consumer Rules, supra note 44 (citing AAA Consumer Protocol);
NAF Consumer Rules, supra note 44 (citing NAF Consumer Protocol); JAMS Consumer
Rules supra note 44 (citing JAMS Consumer Protocol). Businesses are still free to con-
duct arbitration proceedings ad hoc or under different institutional rules where the
consumer protocols previously mentioned do not apply. See also Drahozal & Friel, supra
note 8, at 376-77 (discussing AAA's efforts to promote fairness in consumer arbitration
and stating use of such protocols by businesses might enhance enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements and awards).
49. See, e.g., AAA Consumer Rules, supra note 44, at § C-8 (establishing that
amount consumer pays under Consumer Rules varies based on size and nature of
claim). Arbitrator's fees are a USD 250 deposit for a desk arbitration or telephone
hearing, and USD 750 per day for an in-person hearing. Id. Consumers pay half of the
arbitrator's fees up to a maximum of USD 125 for a claim that does not exceed USD
10,000 and half the arbitrator's fees up to a maximum of USD 375 for claims greater
than USD 10,000 but not exceeding USD 75,000. Id. If a claim exceeds USD 75,000,
then consumers must pay an administrative fee in accordance with the Commercial Fee
Schedule. Id. The consumer must also deposit half of the arbitrator's compensation.
Id. The arbitrator's compensation rate is set forth in the panel biography provided to
the parties when the arbitrator is appointed. Id. Consumer claims under USD 10,000
are resolved on a document basis, and if a hearing is requested, then the Expedited
Procedures of the Commercial Dispute Resolution Procedures apply. Id. at §§ C-5, C-6.
See also PUBLIC CITIZEN supra note 20, at 4247, 50-51 (comparing costs of court adjudica-
tion and arbitration for three hypothetical consumer claims by three major arbitration
organizations, including AAA).
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lief or outcome available in court.5" There is a fee waiver provi-
sion,51 and parties have the option to use small claims court. 2
The National Arbitration Forum ("NAF") changes also lower
fees to consumers, 3 and contain an indigency rule that allows a
waiver of arbitration fees.54
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services ('JAMS") does
not administer arbitrations between consumers and companies
unless the arbitration agreement complies with certain mini-
50. See AAA Consumer Rules, supra note 44, at § C-7 (addressing trend for arbitra-
tion agreements in consumer cases to preclude remedies such as damages, attorney's
fees and punitive damages, even though statute allows such remedies). See, e.g.,
Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (refus-
ing to compel arbitration where arbitration agreement limited Tide VII plaintiff to con-
tract damages, thereby drastically restricting relief to which plaintiff was otherwise enti-
tled under Tide VII); Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 732 (Ala. 2002) (holding unen-
forceable arbitration provision that immunized party from liability for punitive damages
because failure to allow such damages violated State public policy).
51. See AAA Administrative Fees Waiver/Deferral/Hardship Provisions (July 1,
2003), at http:// http://www.adr.org/index2.1 .jsp?JSPssid=1571 1&JSPsrc=uploadLIVE
SITE'focusArea\consumer\Administrative%2OFee%20Waivers%20and%20Pro%
20Bono%20Arbitrators%20Services.htm#AAAAdminFeesWaiverDeferralHardship
(stating there are waiver/deferral/hardship provisions in cases where AAA administra-
tive fees apply). Parties are eligible for consideration for a waiver or deferral if their
annual gross income falls below 200 percent of the federal poverty guidelines. Id. But
see PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 20, at 75 (questioning effectiveness of such waivers, point-
ing out that under AAA fee waiver provisions, single person earning more than USD
17,720 would not qualify for waiver).
52. See AAA Consumer Rules, supra note 44, at introduction 2 (providing option
to either party only if amount of money sought falls within limits set for small claims
courts in state in which they live or operate). See also AAA Consumer Rules, Questions
and Answers [hereinafter AAA Questions and Answers], at http://www.adr.org/index2.
I .jsp?JSPssid=1571 1&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITEsfocusArea\consumer\Consumer%20QA.
htm (discussing small claims court option).
53. See, e.g., NAF Consumer Rules, supra note 44, R. 5(F), app. C (separating fee
schedule into common claims of USD 15,000 or less, common claims of USD 15,001-
74,999, large claims of USD 75,000 and above). See also NAF Article, supra note 43
(giving examples of filing fees such as USD 49 for disputes less than USD 1,000, and
USD 150 for disputes less than USD 15,000). See also PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 20
(comparing costs of court adjudication and arbitration for three hypothetical consumer
claims by three major arbitration organizations).
54. See NAF Consumer Rules, supra note 44, R. 5(H), 45 (establishing alternative
procedures where consumer indigent). See also AAA Administrative Fees Waiver/Defer-
ral/Hardship Provisions, supra note 51 (stating there are waiver/deferral/hardship pro-
visions in cases where AAA administrative fees apply). But see PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra
note 20, at 75-76 (arguing that fee waivers are inadequate because the only fees waived
are filing fees, and consumer still has to pay for half of cost of arbitrator's hourly fees
and expenses). Public Citizen also argues that the fee waivers only shift the fees to
more frequent users of arbitration, like labor unions. Id. at 76.
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mum standards.55 Consumer arbitration costs are based on a
fixed fee, and costs shift to the company involved in the dis-
pute." Arbitrators must also provide a written statement of the
findings and conclusions on which the award is based.57 Similar
to the AAA, remedies available to the consumer under applica-
ble law must remain available under the arbitration clause,5" and
special notice and small claims court procedures apply.59
2. European Union
In 1993, the Council of the European Union issued a Direc-
tive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (the "Consumer
Directive") .6o It applies to contracts between sellers or suppliers
and consumers, and only deals with terms that are not individu-
55. See JAMS Consumer Rules, supra note 44 (stating JAMS will only administer
arbitrations between companies and individual consumers if arbitration clause and
specified rules comply with minimum standards of fairness).
56. See id., at 7 (setting consumer's fee at USD 175 when consumer is initiating
party and all other costs are borne by company). When the company is the initiating
party, the company pays all arbitration costs. Id. See also PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 20
(comparing costs of court adjudication and arbitration for three hypothetical consumer
claims by three major arbitration organizations); Press Release, Public Citizen's Report
of JAMS Arbitration Costs Corrected (Aug. 12, 2002), at http://www.jamsadr.com/dis-
play-press.asp?id=300 (correcting JAMS fee charged to consumers from USD 7,950
claimed in report to USD 125 fee with balance of costs paid by company).
57. SeeJAMS Consumer Rules, supra note 44, at 10 (requiring arbitrators to pro-
vide reasoning for award).
58. See id. at 3 (establishing that consumers must retain statutory remedies in
JAMS consumer arbitration). The JAMS standards do not require the availability of
remedies if the consumer retains the right to pursue the unavailable remedies in court.
Id. See also Press Release, JAMS, Mandatory Consumer Arbitration Must Be Fair For
Partries-Nation's Largest Private Provider of Dispute Resolution Services Testifies
Before Committee on the Judiciary (Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter JAMS Press Release],
available at http://www.jamsadr.com/display-press.asp?id=240 (discussing testimony of
JAMS Vice President and General Counsel before California State Assembly Committee
defending JAMS policies on consumer arbitration).
59. See id. at 2 (establishing notice provisions and requiring that consumers be
given notice of arbitration clause and its existence, terms, conditions and implications
must be clear); id. at 1 (establishing parties cannot be precluded from seeking reme-
dies in small claims court for disputes or claims within scope of court's jurisdiction). See
also JAMS Press Release, supra note 58 (stating consumers have absolute right to go to
court on claims below USD 5000).
60. See Consumer Directive, supra note 9 (establishing E.U. consumer protection
legislation). See also Sternlight 2, supra note 29 at 844-48 (discussing Consumer Direc-
tive and consumer arbitration in European Union). See generally LocKETT & EGAN,
supra note 6 (explaining history and application of Directive). Lockett and Egan tout
the Directive as arguably the most important piece of E.U. legislation passed in the field
of contract law. Id. at 7. The authors, however, admit that there remain a number of
glaring loopholes, primarily for large numbers of people classified by the Commission
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ally negotiated by the parties.6 Unfair terms under the Con-
sumer Directive are not binding on consumers.62 Unfairness
looks to the requirements of good faith 63 and whether an arbi-
tration clause causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights
64and obligations that acts to the detriment of the consumer.
Terms must also be drafted in plain, intelligible language 65 and
consumers must have the opportunity to examine all contract
as underprivileged consumers who remain largely ignorant of their rights or are vulner-
able to abuse. Id. at 18.
61. See Drahozal & Friel, supra note 8, at 363-64 (discussing transactions between
sellers and consumers where Consumer Directive applies and stating that the Con-
sumer Directive would probably cover standard form contracts with consumers). See,
e.g., Consumer Directive, supra note 9 (excluding contracts in employment, succession
rights, rights under family law, incorporation and organization of companies, and part-
nership agreements). The Consumer Directive only applies to contract terms that have
not been individually negotiated. Id. See also LocKE-rr & EGAN, supra note 6, at 21-22
(stating contract terms drafted in advance, especially if part of pre-formulated contract,
may be non-negotiated). If a contract contains both negotiated and non-negotiated
terms, the Directive still applies to the contract if it appears that the contract as a whole
is pre-formulated. Id.
62. See LocKErr & EGAN, supra note 6, at 21-26 (discussing test of fairness and
stating Member States are required to provide under national law that unfair terms in
consumer contracts not be binding on consumers). This does not mean that the entire
contract is void. Id. Consumers or the consumer organization generally makes an asser-
tion that a term was not individually negotiated, and the seller or supplier will have to
demonstrate otherwise. Id. The burden of proof is on the seller or supplier to demon-
strate that a term was individually negotiated with the consumer. Id. at 22. See also
Consumer Directive, supra note 9 (providing annex of potentially unfair terms refer-
enced in art. 3(3) of Consumer Directive); Sternlight 2, supra note 29 at 844-45 (stating
that Consumer Directive provided that unfair terms in consumer contracts are not
valid).
63. See Consumer Directive, supra note 9, art. 3(1) (establishing that contractual
term not individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to requirement
of good faith, it causes significant imbalance in parties' rights and obligations arising
under the contract to detriment of the consumer). See also LocKETr & EcAN, supra note
6, at 22-23 (pointing out that preamble provides definition of good faith which is fur-
ther supported by list of potentially unfair terms indicated in Consumer Directive an-
nex). The good faith test does not seem to be affected by the honesty or dishonesty of
the supplier or seller, but rather measures unfairness by whether the contractual term
causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations. Id.; Drahozal &
Friel, supra note 8, at 364 (stating concept of unfairness is nebulous but is detailed
further in regulations and in Consumer Directive).
64. See Consumer Directive, supra note 9, art. 3 (using "significant imbalance" in
parties' rights and obligations to determine unfairness). See also LocKrr & EGAN, supra
note 6, at 23 (stating "significant imbalance" is not defined in Consumer Directive, but
indications are that cases involving minor detriment to consumer would not be con-
strued as unfair); Drahozal & Friel, supra note 8, at 364 (discussing application of signif-
icant imbalance in rights of consumer to his or her detriment in Consumer Directive).
65. See Consumer Directive, supra note 9, art. 5 (stating that terms in writing must
be drafted in plain and intelligible language). Any doubt as to meaning is construed in
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terms.66
Member States must ensure consumers do not lose the Di-
rective's protections where a non-Member State's law is applica-
ble to the contract.6 7 There is also a requirement to prevent
continued use of unfair terms, for example by allowing con-
sumer protection organizations to bring actions on behalf of the
consumer.68 The Consumer Directive also allows Member States
to adopt national legislation providing more stringent protec-
tions than those of the Directive.69
Most notable to arbitration, the Consumer Directive con-
tains a non-exhaustive list of potentially unfair terms such as un-
favor of the consumer. Id. See also LocKErr & EGAN, supra note 6, at 25 (providing
discussion of Consumer Directive's requirement of intelligibility).
66. See Consumer Directive, supra note 9, pmbl. (stating that consumer should ac-
tually be given an opportunity to examine all terms). See also, LocKrr & EGAN, supra
note 6, at 25 (stating that it could be construed as requiring seller or supplier to pro-
vide copies of all contract terms, or ensuring that consumer actually understands effect
of relevant terms).
67. See Consumer Directive, supra note 9, art. 6(2) (requiring Member States to
ensure consumer does not lose protections granted by Consumer Directive where
choice of law of non-Member State applies to contract if latter has close connection
with territory of Member States). See also LocKEtrr & EGc N, supra note 6, at 27-28
(describing how Consumer Directive handles consumer contracts in non-E.U. States).
The Consumer Directive contemplated a non-Member State possibly circumventing the
fairness requirements by including provisions in the contract that placed it under a
non-E.U. country's jurisdiction. Id.
68. See Consumer Directive, supra note 9, art. 7 (stating Member States must make
provisions available for persons or organizations having legitimate interests in protect-
ing consumers to bring action). See also LocKETr & EGAN, supra note 6, at 28-29
(describing Consumer Directive requirements to prevent unfair terms in consumer
contracts and stating action must be brought before a court or administrative body that
determines whether consumer contract provision is unfair, and then that body is em-
powered to apply appropriate and effective means to prevent continued use of such
terms). Actions may also be brought against trade associations that recommend unfair
terms. Id. at 29; Drahozal & Friel, supra note 8, at 372-73 (stating U.K. Office of Fair
Trading ("OFT") consistently requires businesses to delete pre-dispute binding arbitra-
tion clauses or give consumers option to arbitrate after dispute arises in cases involving
even sellers of high-priced goods such as automobiles).
69. See Consumer Directive, supra note 9, art. 8 (providing that Member States may
adopt or retain most stringent provisions compatible with Treaty in area covered by
Consumer Directive, to ensure maximum degree of protection for consumer). This is
combined with the preamble that allows Member States to continue or introduce na-
tional legislation which affords consumers a higher level of protection than that stipu-
lated in the Directive. Id. at pmbl. See also LocKrr & EcAN, supra note 6, at 31 (discuss-
ing that Consumer Directive permits more stringent national legislation and addressing
potential problem of allowing individual Member States to develop more stringent re-
quirements).
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seen terms70 and restrictions on legal remedies. 7 Even though
the Directive does not ban mandatory arbitration of consumer
disputes outright, the practice has effectively been adopted.72
National legislation in each Member State, such as the En-
glish Arbitration Act, 1996 ("English Arbitration Act") in the
United Kingdom, implements the Consumer Directive and gov-
erns consumer arbitration. 7' The English Arbitration Act incor-
70. See Consumer Directive, supra note 9, annex (i) (referring to binding terms
consumer had no real opportunity of becoming acquainted with before conclusion of
contract). See also LocKE-rr & EGAN, supra note 6, at 40-42 (discussing unseen terms and
stating consumer must have real opportunity of becoming acquainted with terms, which
may require terms to be explained by seller or supplier, or at least consumer be given
opportunity to get independent legal advice).
71. See Consumer Directive, supra note 9, annex (q) (referring to exclusion or
hindrance of consumer's right to take legal action or exercise other legal remedies).
See also LocioETT & EGAN, supra note 6, at 48-49 (stating restrictions on legal remedies
provision is most applicable to arbitration agreements and provision does not prohibit
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, but places restrictions on their use); Ster-
nlight 2, supra note 29, at 844-48 (stating Consumer Directive includes non-enforce-
ment of contractual provision excluding or hindering consumers' right to take legal
action or other legal remedy, particularly by requiring consumer to take disputes exclu-
sively to arbitration). It appears that if an arbitration agreement refers to a body not
governed by legal provisions, or restricts the use of evidence normally available to the
consumer, it might be deemed unfair. Id. at 845. Unfair clauses could also be where
sellers or suppliers seek to reverse the legal burden of proof to their own advantage,
even where sellers or suppliers attempt to argue such clauses were individually negoti-
ated. Id.
72. See Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 845-46 (describing Consumer Directive's re-
strictions on consumer arbitration agreements). See also 1998 Commission Recommen-
dation, supra note 9 (establishing Recommendation on principles applicable to bodies
responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes and taking position that it
is inherently unfair for company to require consumer to resolve future disputes
through binding arbitration); Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 846 (stating that 1998 Com-
mission Recommendation takes same position as many mandatory arbitration critics in
United States that inherently unfair for company to require consumer to resolve future
disputes through binding arbitration rather than in court); Ponte, supra note 3, at 461-
62 (discussing how national laws in countries such as England do not allow binding pre-
dispute consumer arbitration). See, e.g., European Database on Case Law about Unfair
Contractual Terms ("CLAB database"), at http://europa.eu.int/clab/index.htm (pro-
viding database that contains examples of rulings on consumer disputes and unfair
terms under Consumer Directive).
73. See English Arbitration Act 1996 (1996), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/
acts/acts1996/96023-a.htm [hereinafter English Arbitration Act]. The English Arbi-
tration Act applies when the seat of arbitration is in England, Wales, or Northern Ire-
land. See also BoRN 1, supra note 4, at 31 (stating there were previously three Arbitra-
tion Acts in England, enacted in 1950, 1975, and 1979); Drahozal & Friel, supra note 8,
at 371-72 (discussing consumer arbitration in United Kingdom under English Arbitra-
tion Act).
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porates the Consumer Directive7 ' and makes pre-dispute arbitra-
tion clauses ineffective against consumers when the amount of a
potential claim is less than GBP 5,000 (approximately USD
9,068) 7 5 but the practice seems to be that binding pre-dispute
arbitration clauses are prohibited in consumer transactions.76
3. Primary Differences
Unlike the United States, the European Union does not al-
low binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements with consum-
ers. 7 7 U.S. consumer arbitration is instituted mostly through
binding pre-dispute arbitration clauses78 and the burden rests on
74. See English Arbitration Act, supra note 73, at § 89 (extending Consumer Direc-
tive to English Arbitration Act). See also Drahozal & Friel, supra note 8, at 371-72 (dis-
cussing Consumer Directive's incorporation into English Arbitration Act); Ponte, supra
note 3, at 461-62 (discussing how national laws in countries such as England do not
allow consumers to agree to use ADR until after conflict arises).
75. See English Arbitration Act, supra note 73, at § 91 (establishing that compul-
sory arbitration clause that applies to amount less than certain pecuniary amount is
automatically unfair); Unfair Arbitration Agreements (Specified Amount) Order 1999,
SI 2167, s. 33 (specifying that arbitration agreement is unfair where less than amount of
GBP 5,000 is involved); The Universal Currency Converter, at http://www.xe.com (of-
fering monetary conversion amounts). See also Drahozal & Friel, supra note 8, at 372
(stating that OFT guidance explains that such term is always unfair regardless of cir-
cumstances, and is both legally ineffective and open to regulatory sanctions in all
cases); Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 847 (stating that arbitration agreements invalid for
amounts less than GBP 5,000 and validity of arbitration clauses for claims above that
amount are judged on case-by-case basis); Ponte, supra note 3, at 461-62 (discussing how
national laws in countries such as England do not allow consumers to agree to use ADR
until after conflict arises).
76. See Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 847-48 (stating that as practical matter ap-
pears mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses prohibited in consumer transactions in
Britian). See also Drahozal & Friel, supra note 8, at 372-73 (discussing cumulative effect
of English Arbitration Act on consumer arbitration and stating that if pre-dispute bind-
ing arbitration clause is not deleted, has to be revised to give consumers option to
arbitrate after dispute arises); Ponte, supra note 3, at 456-57 (discussing how European
Union requires complete transparency as to terms and conditions of consumer con-
tracts).
77. See Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 846 (comparing 1998 Commission Recom-
mendation prohibiting arbitration of future disputes with position of many U.S. critics
and stating practical effect is disallowance of pre-dispute arbitration agreements with
consumers). See also Ponte, supra note 3, at 461-62 (discussing how national laws in
E.U. Member States do not allow consumers to agree to use ADR until after conflict has
arisen); 1998 Commission Recommendation, supra note 9 (establishing Recommenda-
tion on principles applicable to bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of con-
sumer disputes and taking position that it is inherently unfair for company to require
consumer to resolve future disputes through binding arbitration).
78. See Drahozal & Friel supra note 8, at 374 (discussing enforceability of pre-dis-
pute arbitration agreements in United States); Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 835 (dis-
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consumers to demonstrate a recognized ground for non-en-
forcement of the agreement or award.79 In contrast, it appears
that the European Union will not enforce such clauses."0 Mem-
ber States utilize extensive consumer protection laws and poli-
cies to level the playing field in commercial activity.81 Under the
Consumer Directive, a business maintains the burden of proving
the agreement was individually negotiated.82 Further, Member
States rely heavily on government agencies, such as the U.K.
OFT to protect consumer rights, and allows such agencies to
cussing U.S. policy enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements with consumers and
employees). See also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995)
(holding consumer arbitration agreement for termite extermination services valid, rea-
soning that when Congress enacted FAA, it had needs of consumers as well as others in
mind).
79. See Ponte, supra note 3, at 456 (stating U.S. system emphasizes efficiency and
costs and places burdens of discovering terms of contract on consumers). See also Gil-
mer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (holding party resisting
arbitration bears burden of proving claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration). See,
e.g., Green Tree Financial Corp-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (holding
consumer bears burden of showing likelihood of incurring excessive arbitration costs to
have arbitration agreement invalidated); 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) (setting out statutory
grounds under FAA for vacation of arbitration awards).
80. See FTC Workshop Comments, supra note 5 (expressing E.U. opposition to
binding consumer arbitration in on-line disputes in response to June 2000 FTC work-
shop). See also Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 846-47 (discussing E.U. response to FTC
workshop that binding pre-dispute consumer arbitration is disfavored). See generally
CLAB Database, supra note 72, at card no. GB000492 (on file with author) (providing
examples of consumer cases where terms found unfair under Consumer Directive).
Terms in consumer contracts have been found unfair where it was difficult for the con-
sumer to complain of defective goods. Id. Misleading terms that possibly deprived con-
sumers of fair access to remedies in the event of a dispute have also been deleted from
consumer contracts. Id. at card no. GB000298 (on file with author).
81. See Ponte, supra note 3, at 456 (stating European Union requires complete
transparency of terms and conditions in consumer contracts throughout entire con-
tracting process). Id. at 457. This standard requires disclosure of hidden terms in the
fine print or in materials subsequently delivered with the goods. Id. See also Sternlight
2, supra note 29 at 844-48 (discussing Consumer Directive and consumer arbitration in
European Union). See generally LocKETr & EGAN, supra note 6 (discussing requirements
of Consumer Directive).
82. See Consumer Directive, supra note 9, art. 3(2) (establishing that where any
seller or supplier claims standard term has been individually negotiated, burden of
proof in this respect shall be incumbent on him, but term shall always be regarded as
not individually negotiated where drafted in advance and consumer has therefore not
been able to influence substance of term, particularly in context of a pre-formulated
standard contract). See also Drahozal & Friel, supra note 8, at 363 (discussing that trans-
actions between sellers and consumers where terms not individually negotiated are cov-
ered under Consumer Directive); LocKETrr & EGAN, supra note 6, at 21-22 (stating con-
tract terms drafted in advance, especially if part of pre-formulated contract, may be
non-negotiated).
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bring actions on behalf of consumers.83 In contrast, the United
States relies on private individual legal enforcement actions.84
Finally, in the United States, state attempts to pass consumer
protection legislation regarding arbitration are preempted by
the FAA. 85  The European Union, in comparison, sets out a
broad policy of consumer protection in the Consumer Directive
and explicitly allows passage of more stringent national legisla-
86tion.
83. See Drahozal & Friel, supra note 8, at 372-73 (stating OFT consistently requires
business to either delete pre-dispute binding arbitration clauses or give option of arbi-
tration after dispute arises). See also CLAB Database, supra note 72 (proving examples
of consumer cases where terms found unfair under Consumer Directive and demon-
strating that OFT frequently handles complaints made by consumers, with result that
unfair terms are deleted from contracts).
84. See Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 844 (stating that where many other countries
rely heavily on government agencies to protect rights of consumers, United States tends
to rely on individual legal enforcement actions). See, e.k., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312
(2000) (establishing MMWA for consumer product warranty protections); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1667 (2000) (establishing TILA for protections for consumer credit transac-
tions). But see Overby, supra note 9, at 1276 (discussing that United States does rely on
informal consumer complaint mechanisms such as BBB to resolve disputes).
85. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 235 (discussing when FAA displaces
State law governing arbitration). See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 268 (1995) (holding void Alabama statute that made written, pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreements invalid and unenforceable because state statute directly conflicted
with section 2 of FAA); Basura v. U.S. Home Corp., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328, 333 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) (holding FAA preempted state law that allowed purchaser to pursue con-
struction and design defect action against developer in court despite signed arbitration
agreement). See generally Cole 1, supra note 31, at 10-13 (discussing FAA preemption
problem in relation to RUAA). See also Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees,
489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (holding State law preempted to extent it actually conflicts
with federal law to extent it stands as obstacle to accomplishment and execution of full
purposes and objectives of Congress). To ensure private arbitration agreements are
enforced according to their terms, the FAA preempts state laws that require judicial
forum for resolution of claims when parties agreed to resolve them by arbitration. Id.
But see BORN 1, supra note 4, at 335 (discussing interpretation of Volt Info. Sciences deci-
sion as requiring application of State law rules governing arbitration agreements where
parties have agreed to choice-of-law clause selecting State law).
86. See Consumer Directive, supra note 9, art. 8 (providing that Member States may
adopt or retain most stringent provisions compatible with Treaty in area covered by
Consumer Directive, to ensure maximum degree of protection for consumer). This is
combined with the preamble that allows Member States to continue or introduce na-
tional legislation which affords consumers a higher level of protection than that stipu-
lated in the Directive. Id. at pmbl. See also LocKErr & EGAN, supra note 6, at 31 (discuss-
ing that Consumer Directive permits more stringent national legislation and addressing
potential problem of allowing individual Member States to develop more stringent re-
quirements).
2004] A CONSUMER'S DREAM OR PANDORA'S BOX?
II. CRITICISMS OF CONSUMER ARBITRATION SYSTEMS
A. Consumer Arbitration is Very Different Than
Commercial Arbitration
The vision of arbitration as a speedy, informal, and inexpen-
sive alternative to formal adjudication has lured disputants for
centuries.8 7 Arbitration offered claimants and congested courts
promising alternatives to litigation s8 and many parties seized the
opportunity.89 It was particularly helpful to commercial parties
as preferential to litigation in foreign courts and offered some
guarantee of enforceability and finality.9 ° In time, non-commer-
87. See Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United
States, 12 MINN. L. REv. 240, 242-43 (1928) (stating historians have suggested arbitration
was used in ancient Athens and Rome). See also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 233
(stating arbitration was used as early as thirteenth century by English merchants who
preferred to have disputes resolved according to own customs rather than public law).
See also Stewart & Matthews, supra note 1, at 1112 (pointing out international arbitra-
tion of B2B disputes developed early in history of global trade). But see Alderman supra
note 16, at 1237-38 (noting that ADR only began to dominate discussions of American
legal system approximately twenty-five years ago).
88. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 16, at 123 (discussing how court congestion and
crowded dockets helped make argument for "federal judicial policy favoring arbitration
agreements"); Bryant G. Garthy, Symposium: Ethics in a World of Mandatory Arbitration, 18
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927, 929 (2002) (stating that early idea was that arbitration allowed
individuals to tell their stories and allowed litigants to perceive more legitimate form of
justice). See also Dr. Ljiljana Biukovic, International Commercial Arbitration in Cyberspace:
Recent Developments, 22 NW. J. Irr'L L. & Bus. 319, 331 (2002) (stating that arbitration is
typically favored by business people because it allows almost total control of dispute
resolution proceedings and awards are enforceable with assistance of national courts).
89. See, e.g., AAA Questions and Answers, supra note 52 (stating AAA had more
than 230,000 cases filed with it in 2002). Areas of dispute included finance, construc-
tion, labor and employment, insurance, and technology. Id. See also Cameron L. Sabin,
The Adjudicatory Boat Without a Keel: Private Arbitration and the Need for Public Oversight of
Arbitrators, 87 IOWA L. REv. 1337, 1339 (2002) (noting that over five year period, AAA
arbitrations increased approximately 145 percent, from roughly 55,800 in 1995 to
136,673 in 1999). JAMS caseload increased more than 2,300 percent from 1987 to
1993, averaging 1,200 cases per month in 1993. Id.; BORN 1, supra note 4, at 13 (stating
popularity of arbitration as means for resolving international commercial disputes has
increased significantly over past several decades and citing ICC statistics that caseloasd
now exceeds 500 cases per year to demonstrate increase).
90. See, e.g., Stewart & Matthews, supra note 1, at 1112 (stating that early in global
trade history, international business parties to dispute faced possibility that one party
would be subject to laws and jurisdiction of foreign courts). Preference developed for
arbitration of international disputes as a way to avoid concerns about the parochial
nature of national courts. Id. See also BORN 1, supra note 4, at 7 (stating international
arbitration is perceived as ensuring genuinely neutral decision-maker, where interna-
tional disputes inevitably involve risk of litigation before national court of one of parties
which may be biased, parochial, or unattractive for some other reason); Biukovic, supra
note 88, at 331 (stating that arbitration is typically favored by business people because it
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cial participants became commonplace, 9 ' and control of the pro-
cess shifted from the parties themselves to attorneys and law
firms.9 2 This new pro-arbitration landscape9" raises doubts as to
allows almost total control of dispute resolution proceedings and awards are enforcea-
ble with assistance of National courts); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND
FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS 2 (1999) [hereinafter BORN 2] (stating arbitration pro-
duces definitive and binding award generally capable of enforcement through national
court proceedings); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, at 7 (stating importance that
agreement to arbitrate is capable of enforcement at law or else would only be statement
of intention and not legally binding). It would be of little use to enforce an obligation
to arbitrate in one country if it could be evaded by litigation in another. Id. Therefore,
as far as possible, the agreement to arbitrate is given effect internationally. Id. See also
PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra, note 20 (recognizing arbitration eliminates protracted appellate
litigation); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 234 (discussing that courts will nearly
always respect provision that arbitrator's decision is final and binding, which discour-
ages appeals to courts and makes provisions for finality meaningful).
91. See Drahozal & Friel, supra note 8, at 357 (stating that arbitration is increas-
ingly used to resolve disputes between businesses and consumers). In the U.K., the
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators administers a number of consumer arbitration
schemes for various businesses. Id. at 358. See, e.g., Chartered Institute of Arbitrators
Website, at http://www.arbitrators.org (last visited Jan. 21, 2004) (offering information
for arbitrators, mediators, and adjudicators, and providing rules and additional infor-
mation for those involved in ADR). See also Mayer, supra note 22 (stating that until one
decade ago most arbitrations pitted two businesses against each other in a contract
dispute, and then it spread to disagreements between companies and their customers).
92. See Garthy, supra note 88, at 930 (discussing how arbitration process moved out
of hands of parties and into law firms and attorneys that specialize in arbitration). The
process is now controlled by an elite group ofjudges, retired judges, commercial courts,
mediators, and arbitrators who provide tailor-made justice geared specifically to large
business disputes. Id. See, e.g., Faye A. Silas, McJustice: Mediation Franchising Begins, 71
A.B.A.J. 17 (1986) (describing franchised offices of United States Arbitration, Inc. and
explaining that ADR is growing field where many flowers will grow). United States Arbi-
tration, Inc.joins other providers such as Chicago-based EnDispute, Philadelphia-based
Judicate, and Phoenix-based Civicourt to provide such services. Id. See also William C.
Smith, Much To Do About ADR: Alternative Dispute Resolution Has Found A Place In The U.S.
Justice System and In Most Practices. But To Use ADR Effectively, Lawyers Must Be Aware of Its
Problems As WellAs Its Promise, 86 A.B.A.J.,June 2000, at 62 (stating that lawyers have put
their indelible mark on ADR, and now ADR mechanisms entail more rules, more delay
and more expense even though ADR was designed to avoid such problems).
93. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-
25 (1983) (ruling that section 2 of FAA creates body of federal substantive law applica-
ble to any arbitration agreement under FAA which requires that questions of arbi-
trability be addressed with healthy regard for federal policy favoring arbitration and
that any doubts concerning scope of arbitrable issues be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985) (holding that in construing arbitration agreement under FAA, parties' inten-
tions control, but those intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability);
Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1989) (holding due
regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to
scope of arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration). See also GOLDBERG ET
AL., supra note 18, at 235 (stating that both FAA and UAA) make agreements to arbi-
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fairness, efficiency, and legal due process,94 values normally pro-
tected by consumer legislation.95
In today's market, consumers, knowingly or not, accept arbi-
tration agreements in retail transactions for computer software96
and home purchases.9 7 They also agree to arbitrate disputes
over telephone service98 and on-line auction transactions.99  In
trate specifically enforceable and there is strong public policy in favor of arbitration).
Both federal and State courts will interpret agreements to arbitrate broadly and excep-
tions narrowly. Id.
94. See Gibbons 1, supra note 1, at 15-16 (stating that there are already signs of
dangers of unchecked arbitration in domestic context, including arbitration clauses
that through choice of arbitral forum, arbitral institution, cost, or other substantive or
procedural rules render right to arbitration nugatory while denying consumers effective
access to courts). See also Garthy, supra note 88, at 927 (noting major concerns in litera-
ture include fairness of processes and relationship of processes to consumer protection
and enforcement of various statutory rights in such areas as securities, anti-discrimina-
tion, and antitrust laws). Such concerns also apply to consumer statutory arbitration.
See, e.g., Ponte, supra note 3, at 449-50 (noting how State and federal court challenges to
widespread use of ADR clauses in wide range of commercial agreements has raised
issues of fundamental fairness, particularly in consumer disputes). Such concerns
center on whether a party knowingly and voluntarily waived its right to seek redress in
the courts and whether the ADR process adequately protected the parties' procedural
and substantive rights. Id. at 449.
95. See Alderman, supra note 16, at 1263 (stating developments in mandatory arbi-
tration create incentive for organizations subject to regulation to use arbitration as de-
vice to blunt or break social legislation). The limited capacity of arbitration in disputes
over statutory rights coupled with the finality of the award could water down the protec-
tion provided for the other party, if not undermine the public policies underlying the
regulatory legislation. Id. See, e.g., Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268 (11th
Cir. 2002) (dealing with arbitration of written warranty claim on manufactured home
under MMWA); Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002)
(dealing with claims against provider of computer software programs for violation of
federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") and Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act ("CFAA")).
96. See, e.g., Specht, 306 F.3d at 21 (dealing with claims against provider of com-
puter software programs for violation of ECPA and CFAA); Brower v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 570 (1st Dept. 1998) (dealing with consumer claims for com-
puters and software products purchased from Gateway 2000).
97. See, e.g., Green Tree Financial Corp-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000)
(dealing with arbitration of claim by mobile home purchaser under TILA and Equal
Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA")); Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes L.L.C., 298 F.3d
470, 478-79 (5th Cir. 2002) (dealing with claims by mobile home purchaser under
MMWAA); Davis v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 1633 (2003) (dealing with mobile home purchaser's claims under
MMWA).
98. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S.
Ct. 53 (2003) (dealing with contract provisions phone service provider sought to im-
pose on customers through arbitration for long distance service); Lozano v. AT&T
Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (dealing with consumer class action
claim against cellular service provider regarding arbitration agreement). See also Paul
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the United States, attempts to limit consumer arbitration have
resulted in unenforceable state statutes, such as those in Mon-
tana1°° and Vermont.'' Inconsistent judicial application of fed-
eral consumer statutes such as the MMWA has also resulted. 10 2
This apparent conflict in policy and legislation has spurred an
D. Carrington, Perspectives on Dispute Resolution in the Twenty-First Centuy: Self-Deregula-
tion, the "National Policy'of the Supreme Court, 3 NEv. L.J. 259, 285 (2002) (discussing Ting
case and stating AT&T was attempting to make it very difficult for anyone to effectively
vindicate rights in arbitration forum).
99. See, e.g., Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (ruling
arbitration clause between subscribers and electronic disbursement service procedur-
ally and substantively unconscionable); Evans v. Matlock, No. M2001-02631-COA-R9-
CV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 906, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2002) (holding arbitra-
tion agreement between E-Bay online auction website and its users does not apply to
controversies between users).
100. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-14(4) (1995) (declaring arbitration clause unen-
forceable unless notice that contract is subject to arbitration is typed in underlined
capital letters on first page of contract). The Montana statute, however, was held pre-
empted by the FAA. See, e.g., Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarott, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996)
(refusing to enforce Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-114(4) that made enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements conditional on compliance with the statute). See also Sternlight 2,
supra note 29, at 840-41 (referring to unsuccessful legislative attempts to prohibit
mandatory consumer and employee arbitration agreements).
101. See 12 V.S.A. § 5652(b) (1985) (requiring arbitration agreement to clearly
state that signing agreement forecloses any court remedies concerning any dispute and
that statement be displayed prominently). The Vermont statute, however, was held pre-
empted by the FAA. See, e.g.,Joder Bldg. Corp. v. Lewis, 569 A.2d 471, 473 (Vt. 1989)
(refusing to enforce Vermont statute 12 V.S.A. § 5652(b) that made enforceability of
arbitration agreements conditional on compliance with the statute). See also Stermlight
2, supra note 29, at 840-41 (referring to unsuccessful legislative attempts to prohibit
mandatory consumer and employee arbitration agreements).
102. See Stemlight 2, supra note 29, at 840-41 (stating that even federal legislation
such as MMWA, that seems to clearly limit mandatory consumer arbitration, has been
inconsistently interpreted). See, e.g., Davis v. S. Energy Homes, 305 F.3d 1268, 1274
(11th Cir. 2002) (ruling Congress did not intend to bar binding arbitration agreements
in language, legislative history, or underlying purposes of MMWA); Walton v. Rose Mo-
bile Homes L.L.C., 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that MMWA does not pre-
clude binding arbitration of claims pursuant to valid binding arbitration agreement,
which courts must enforce pursuant to FAA and binding purchasers of mobile home
arbitrate their claims). But see Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1530 (M.D.
Ala. 1997), rev'd, Davis v. S. Energy Homes, 305 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding
binding arbitration clause for mobile homeowner claims asserted under MMWA unen-
forceable because conflicted with MMWA); Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 981 F.
Supp. 1423 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (holding Congress intended MMWA to preclude binding
arbitration of written warranties); In re Van Blarcum, 19 S.W.3d. 484 (Tex. App. 2000)
(holding FAA superseded by MMWA's specific provisions prohibiting use of binding
arbitration clauses in written warranties); Raesly v. Grand Housing, Inc., 105 F. Supp.
2d 562 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (denying motion to compel arbitration on claim for breach of
written express warranty on mobile home).
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outcry for reform.10 3
B2C transactions have evolved from traditional brick-and-
mortar retailing to cross-border international shopping. 10 4 This
raises new concerns over the resolution of disputes in such an
environment. 0 5 Arbitration's ability to resolve international dis-
putes is well-established 0 6 but such disputes were traditionally in
the B2B context. 0 7 In contrast, the success of arbitration in B2C
103. See, e.g., Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 837-38 (discussing how commentators
in legal academy and popular press have criticized mandatory arbitration); Alderman,
supra note 16 (discussing how use of mandatory arbitration in consumer transactions
precludes effective redress for consumers); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Con-
tract and Jurisdiction, SUP. CT. REv. 331, 363 (1996) (discussing problems with FAA and
advocates non-contractualist approach to consumer arbitration). But see Stephen J.
Ware, Coasumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (with a Contractualist Reply to Car-
rington &Haagan), 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 195 (1998) (advocating arbitration, including
consumer arbitration, should be contractual); Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair"Arbitra-
tion Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 695 (2001) (advocating unfair pre-dispute arbitration
agreements are less prevalent than literature suggests and even unfair arbitration
clauses may be beneficial to parties).
104. See Stewart & Matthews, supra note 1, at 1111 (stating that especially in areas
with large consumer markets, such as India, where number of people online is ex-
pected to reach 50 million by 2004, revenue generated by B2C commerce may ap-
proach that of B2B commerce). See also Commission Press Release IP/01/1423, supra
note 2 (indicating reasons for increased consumer cross-border transactions); Christo-
pher William Pappas, Comparative U.S. & E. U. Approaches to E-Commerce Regulation: Juris-
diction, Electronic Contracts, Electronic Signatures and Taxation, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
325, 325 (2002) (stating that consumers are no longer restricted to products available
in one store, one town, or one country because Internet transcends boundaries and is
accessible anywhere in world).
105. See Martin, supra note 8, at 130-31 (discussing importance of developing on-
line remedy to e-commerce disputes involving consumers). There exists a great poten-
tial for defrauding cross-border consumers, and because of little regulation of the elec-
tronic commercial medium, a substantial governmental interest in protecting the rights
of its citizens is justified. Id. The risks are further magnified by the potential that par-
ties to the dispute are in different countries. Id. See also William W. Park, Duty and
Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM.J. INT'L L. 805, 820 (1999) [hereinafter Park
2] (suggesting international arbitration statute for commercial parties that removes
consumer and employment arbitration). Explicitly excluding such contracts from the
statute's scope would reduce the conflict that has arisen abroad when international
arbitration statutes were not clear about their coverage. Id. at 821.
106. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 233 (stating arbitration was used as
early as thirteenth century by English merchants who preferred to have disputes re-
solved according to own customs rather than public law). See also Stewart & Matthews,
supra note 1, at 1112 (pointing out international arbitration of B2B disputes developed
early in history of global trade). See also BORN 1, supra note 4, at 7-11 (discussing advan-
tages of international arbitration such as neutral decision-maker, results in agreement
to settle dispute that is enforceable by treaty, procedural informalities, less discovery,
more confidentiality, and prompt and efficient means of dispute resolution).
107. See BORN 1, supra note 4, at 7 (stating popularity of arbitration as means for
resolving international commercial disputes has increased significantly over past several
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cross-border claims is largely untested. °8
1. Consumers' Needs Are Different Than Those of Business
Arbitration traditionally addressed the drawbacks of litiga-
tion to business parties.'0 9 It offered alternatives such as expert
decision-making," 0 procedural simplicity and flexibility," 1 final-
decades and citing International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") statistics demonstrat-
ing increase). See also Biukovic, supra note 88, at 319 (stating that international com-
mercial arbitration has resolved disputes arising from commercial agreements such as
sales of goods, transportation agreements, distributorship and agency agreements, con-
struction contracts, joint ventures, licensing, patents, and technology transfers); Stewart
& Matthews supra note 1, at 1112-13 (stating that when parties to international business
transactions had disputes, at least one of them had to subject itself to laws and jurisdic-
tion of foreign courts and preference developed for arbitration as way to avoid paro-
chial nature of national courts). The treaties and conventions that resulted allowed
enforcement of international arbitration awards and demonstrated a preference for ar-
bitration. Id.
108. See Stewart & Matthews, supra note 1, at 1113 (stating that before Internet
international B2C commerce was rare). International B2C disputes are governed by a
patchwork of national laws, and it is difficult for consumers and businesses to predict
which law will govern the transaction. Id. The concern over B2C dispute resolution
prompted efforts by governments to discover a solution. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 8,
at 153-54 (discussing U.S. and E.U. endorsement of ADR or Online Dispute Resolution
("ODR") for resolution of B2C disputes). The FTC has instituted public workshops to
explore the current state of ADR in the online community. Id. at 154; Cheri M. Ganeles,
Cybermediation: A New Twist on an Old Concept, 12 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 715, 740-44
(2002) (discussing recent attempts at online arbitration services).
109. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 16, at 80 (stating FAA was drafted to address
three "evils" of litigation from vantage point of "businessmen": delay, expense, and lack
of business expertise). A fourth core purpose, that arbitration served as a means of
enforcing group discipline within business organizations was added by commentators
shortly after the FAA's enactment. Id. The failure of litigation to reach a just decision
when measured by the standards of the business world resulted from the judicial sys-
tem's unfamiliarity with business practice or the unsuitability of general principles of
law for resolving commercial disputes. Id. Business organizations included such groups
as trade associations and merchantile exchanges. Id. See also BoRN 1, supra note 4, at 7-
10 (discussing advantages of arbitration to international commercial parties); Stewart &
Matthews supra note 1, at 1112-13 (stating that when parties to international business
transactions had disputes, at least one of them had to subject itself to laws and jurisdic-
tion of foreign courts and preference developed for arbitration as way to avoid paro-
chial nature of national courts).
110. See BoRN 2, supra note 90, at 4 (discussing that parties can select court with
significant commercial or other expertise relevant to transaction). The agreement can
also provide for appointment of arbitrators with particular qualifications or the parties
can make the appointments themselves. Id. See also PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 20, at 59-
60 (stating businesses would rather have disagreements decided by experts chosen for
their experience). One of the biggest disadvantages of litigation, especially in complex
commercial cases, is that a judge and jury may not have the knowledge or understand-
ing to grasp the dispute. Id. To compensate, expert witnesses and reams of complicated
diagrams and calculations are needed to explain the issues, and even then the average
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ity,"12 confidentiality,' and cost-savings.' 1 4 Arbitration also ad-
juror may not fully understand the dispute. Id.; Biukovic, supra note 88, at 344 (stating
that it has always been emphasized that one of greatest advantages of arbitration over
litigation is that parties can opt for individuals who are highly experienced and knowl-
edgeable in subject matter of their dispute); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18 at 234
(stating that expertise of decision-maker is one theoretical advantage of arbitration over
court adjudication).
111. See, e.g., BORN 2, supra note 90, at 8-9 (stating parties have greater freedom to
agree on neutral and appropriate procedural rules, realistic timetables, and expert and
neutral decision-makers). See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 20 (noting procedural flexibil-
ity allows quick dispute resolution in private and informal atmosphere that makes busi-
ness people feel comfortable). See also Schwartz, supra note 16, at 60 (noting arbitra-
tion generally eliminates pretrial motion and discovery practice, and informality of arbi-
tration means less time preparing for hearings and presenting evidence). Particular
industries can also choose proceedings commensurate with members' needs. See, e.g.,
AAA, Construction Industry Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, at http://
www.adr.org/index2.1 .jsp?JSPssid=1 5747&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\RulesProce-
dures\NationalInternationaN.\ XfocusArea\construction\AAA047current.htm (revised
July 1, 2003) [hereinafter AAA Construction Rules] (establishing arbitration rules for
construction disputes). Many industries also use standard arbitration clauses and rules
in their documents. See, e.g., American Institute of Architects ("AIA") Document A201,
§ 4.6.2 (1997) (on file with author) (containing standard arbitration agreements that
incorporate AAA Construction Industry Rules).
112. See BORN 2, supra note 90, at 2 (stating arbitration produces definitive and
binding award generally capable of enforcement through national court proceedings).
See also PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 20 (recognizing arbitration eliminates protracted
appellate litigation); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 234 (discussing that courts will
nearly always respect provision that arbitrator's decision is final and binding, which
discourages appeals to courts and make provisions for finality meaningful).
113. See, e.g., BORN 1, supra note 4, at 13 (noting arbitral hearings are usually
closed to press and public, and submissions and awards generally remain confidential).
See also Schwartz, supra note 16, at 61 (recognizing that papers filed with arbitrators are
not part of any public record; proceedings take place in private offices rather than in
public courtrooms; and they tend to be less interesting to media); Biukovic, supra note
88, at 334 (stating that as private and consensual institution, arbitration is option for
parties who do not want their proceedings to be open to public as they would be in
standard civil litigation). Depending upon national laws, however, the right to privacy
in arbitration may not be automatic, and parties may need to expressly contract for it.
Id. at 334-35.
114. See BORN 2, supra note 90, at 8-9 (stating that even though costs in interna-
tional commercial arbitration are rarely cheap because parties have to pay arbitrator
fees and institution fees, logistical expenses of renting hearing rooms, travel to arbitra-
tion situs, lodging, etc., additional costs of arbitration can pale in comparison to legal
costs in parallel or multiplicitous proceedings in national courts). Costly, scorched-
earth discovery and other procedural tactics, such as those of the United States, are also
not usually found in arbitration. Id. at 9. Even though complex arbitration cases can
rival the costs of litigation, they can still be cheaper, especially where jury awards are
involved. See also, Schwartz, supra note 16, at 60-61 (stating there is perception that
arbitrators give smaller awards than juries because corporate defendants may believe
they are likely to get sympathy from arbitrators, since arbitrators are usually drawn from
the business community); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 234 (stating simplified
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dressed the unique concerns of cross-border commercial trans-
actions, such as forum selection and litigation bias.1 5 Defenders
of binding pre-dispute arbitration in the consumer context as-
sert that arbitration may similarly favor individual claimants, the
public, and the companies that use such agreements.116 In the-
ory, this results from the reduced litigation costs that plague
businesses in disputes with consumers.1 7 Scholars argue it is
questionable whether any of these advantages actually transfer to
consumers l1 8 and argue arbitral informalities may actually be
procedures, absence of discovery, and lack of opportunity to appeal tend to reduce
costs of dispute resolution as compared to litigation).
115. See, e.g., BORN 2, supra note 90, at 2-3 (addressing that forum selection is im-
portant to international parties because it may offer one party favorable forum for reso-
lution of future disputes, or at least preclude litigation in undesirable forum). It can
also preclude parallel or multiplicitous litigation of the same dispute in several different
forums. Id. at 4. See also Park, supra note 4, at 26 (stating concerns over litigation bias
against foreigners may chill international transactions unless neutral alternatives to ad-
versary's judicial system exist). Failed forum selection agreements can subject a party to
unfamiliar procedures, a foreign language, and sometimes ajudge in a country without
a tradition ofjudicial independence. Id.; Biukovic, supra note 88, at 331 (stating inter-
national commercial arbitration is favored over litigation because it can be closely tai-
lored to needs of parties and allow them to avoid uncertainties related to application of
foreign laws with which they are unfamiliar and unpredictable outcome of litigation in
foreign courts and under foreign legal procedures).
116. See Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 839 (discussing position of defenders of
mandatory arbitration in consumer context and stating that consumers, public, and
companies who use mandatory arbitration all benefit); Drahozal, supra note 103, at 641
(suggesting that individuals may be better off agreeing even to one-sided arbitration
clauses instead of retaining their right to go to court if resulting cost savings are passed
on to consumer through reductions in price of goods and services). But see Anne Braf-
ford, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: Fair Play or Trap for the Weak
and Unwary?, 21 IowAJ. Cornu. L. 331, 360 (1996) (stating that contracting parties need
to be bound to their arbitration clauses to make arbitration cost efficient).
117. See Sterulight 2, supra note 29, at 839 (discussing position of defenders of
mandatory arbitration in consumer context and stating that consumers, public, and
companies who use mandatory arbitration all benefit); Drahozal, supra note 103, at 756
(stating that unfair provisions, on their face, disadvantage individual at expense of cor-
poration, but if corporation's benefit from arbitration exceeds individual's loss, corpo-
ration compensates individual for disadvantage suffered and both parties are made bet-
ter off); Brafford, supra note 116, at 355 (stating that consumer benefits from time and
money savings provided by standardized contract, as well as litigation costs saved by
businesses from using arbitration agreement, and if transaction costs increased for busi-
ness, business would pass those costs on to consumer).
118. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 60 (stating disputes involving fraud, negli-
gence, and consumer contract actions do not necessarily require experts to decipher
dispute, and can be decided by juries under "reasonable person" standard). Protracted
litigation is also not the norm, as courts have developed techniques that involve the
judge using his or her authority to set early discovery deadlines and early, firm trial
dates. Id. See also Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, RusticumJudicium? Private "Courts" Enforc-
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detrimental. 1 9
2. Criticisms of U.S. Consumer Arbitration
Consumer arbitration and the controversy surrounding it
are not as prevalent outside the United States. 120 Competing na-
tional policies regarding consumer arbitration, however, greatly
affect how consumers and companies interact in cross-border
commerce.12 1  The following highlight concerns about arbitra-
tion's ability to deal with consumer cross-border complaints.
ing Private Law and Public Rights: Regulating Virtual Arbitration in Cyberspace, 24 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 769, 775 (1998) [hereinafter Gibbons 2] (advocating consumer arbitration
requires abandoning elegant simplicity of traditional commercial arbitration and re-
quiring it to develop something akin to due process and fair play); Biukovic, supra note
88, at 338 (stating that for individuals and for disputes involving small amounts, interna-
tional commercial arbitration is not as affordable as ADR). But see Drahozal, supra note
103 (advocating consumer arbitration critics' typical arguments about unfairness of
consumer arbitration are misplaced).
119. See BORN 2, supra note 90, at 9 (stating lack of detailed procedural code or
decision-maker with direct coercive authority may allow party misconduct and create
opportunities for greater range of procedural disputes); PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 20,
at 65 (stating consumers are unlikely to benefit from informal discovery process where
evidentiary burden shifts to consumer). The claimant is more likely than the defendant
to need information obtainable only through formal discovery, and saving legal fees
and expenses through reduced discovery is not a tradeoff that a consumer or employee
claimant is likely to find appealing. Id.; Schwartz, supra note 16, at 61 (stating plaintiff
has burden of production of evidence, much of which defendant may well possess,
which sharply curtails plaintiffs ability to develop evidence through informal investiga-
tion rather than discovery).
120. See Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 831 (stating companies rarely employ
mandatory consumer arbitration outside United States and noting no evidence that
practice of mandatory private arbitration exists outside U.S. borders); Overby, supra
note 9, at 1280-81 (stating that pro-FAA case law from Supreme Court coupled with
judicial interpretations of State contract law regarding fundamental fairness and con-
sent that often disfavor consumers has resulted in presumption that favors enforcement
of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts). Europe, in contrast, has a somewhat op-
posite attitude toward enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses in standard form
contracts because of the Consumer Directive. Id. at 1281. See also Drahozal & Friel,
supra note 8, at 393 (summarizing differences between U.S. and E.U. mandatory con-
sumer arbitration).
121. See, e.g., Ponte, supra note 3 (suggesting revision of current Consumer Proto-
col to meet unique needs and challenges of online B2C environment); Drahozal &
Friel, supra note 8, at 384 (stating that Internet merchants vary standard form contracts
and dispute resolution procedures based on differing regulatory schemes and legal
rules); Martin, supra note 8, at 130-31 (advocating various methods of online ADR);
Stewart & Matthews, supra note 1 (concluding that there is no uniform system in place
for international online B2C disputes and development of independent, self-regulating,
and enforceable online process would provide stability needed for cross-border B2C
commerce to flourish).
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a. Arbitration Agreements are Contracts of Adhesion
Arbitration advocates assume that the agreement to arbi-
trate is voluntary122 but in today's market this assumption is not
always correct. 123 Many consumer contracts contain binding ar-
bitration agreements. 124  Such agreements are subject to the
same enforceability requirements as standard contracts. 25
Therefore, contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or uncon-
scionability, may invalidate such agreements. 126 Some scholars
122. See BoRN 1, supra note 4, at 155 (discussing presumptive validity of interna-
tional arbitration agreements). See also Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165,
1170-71 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (quoting Ajida Tech., Inc. v. Roos Instruments, Inc., 104 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 686 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding party cannot be required to submit to
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit).
123. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 107-08 (stating consumer transactions typically
involve form contracts and unequal bargaining power). It is presumed that the con-
sumer is free to shop around for better terms, but when all the businesses in the same
market impose similar terms on the consumer, shopping for more favorable contract
terms is impossible. Id. at 108. See also Alderman, supra note 16, at 124748 (noting
terms of agreement are typically set forth in standard form contracts and terms offered
on a take-it-or-leave it basis and such contracts of adhesion bear little resemblance to
consensual agreements); Ponte, supra note 3, at 449-50 (discussing adhesion contract
concerns in development of consumer protocols for online dispute resolution efforts).
But see Brafford, supra note 116 (proposing that common arguments that consumer
arbitration is unfair from contractual standpoint are incorrect).
124. See generally Schwartz, supra note 16, at 56 (stating pre-dispute arbitration
clauses are typical of the kinds of form terms in adhesion contracts that have long
troubled courts and commentators). Pre-dispute arbitration clauses make the typical
problems found in adhesion contracts worse. Id. at 59. Post-dispute arbitration agree-
ments are generally considered acceptable. See, e.g., Joder Bldg. Corp. v. Lewis, 569
A.2d 471, 472 (Vt. 1989) (involving homeowner and contractor's claim to arbitrate con-
tract dispute after dispute arose). See generally Schwartz, supra note 16, at 105 (stating
that arbitration of existing disputes is similar to settlement, where private agreement
allows parties to reach binding resolution of their dispute out of court).
125. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (stating written arbitration provision shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
revocation of any contract). See, e.g., Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarott, 517 U.S. 681, 687
(1996) (holding contract defenses do not contravene section 2 of FAA); Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1989); Shearson/
Amer. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987). Federal courts look to State
law when addressing issues of contract validity and enforceability. See, e.g., Lozano v.
AT&T Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that federal
courts look to State law to determine issues of contract validity and enforceability).
126. See Blake v. Ecker, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (describing
unconscionability as having both procedural and substantive components, where proce-
dural component involves unequal bargaining positions and hidden terms common to
adhesion contracts.) See also Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 731 (Ala. 2002) (hold-
ing procedural unconscionability can include deception or refusal to bargain over con-
tract terms, today often analyzed in terms of whether imposed-upon party had meaning-
ful choice about whether and how to enter into transaction). See also Comb v. PayPal,
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contend that consumer arbitration agreements should be per se
unconscionable adhesion contracts, and therefore unenforce-
able. 127  Courts, however, treat such agreements as presump-
tively valid even where there is a significant difference in bar-
gaining power.
128
b. Repeat-Players Fare Better in Arbitration
Some commentators acknowledge the difference between
consumers and parties that frequently arbitrate ("repeat-play-
ers") .129 Evidence that repeat-players have an advantage in arbi-
Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding substantive unconscionabil-
ity concerns fairness and exists when overly harsh or one-sided results "shock the con-
science").
127. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 55 (discussing typical definition of adhesion
contracts). Adhesion contracts are generally understood as: (1) standardized form
documents (2) drafted by, or on behalf of, one party which (3) participates routinely in
similar transactions and (4) presents the form to the other party on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis; (5) the adhering party enters into few transactions of the type in question, and
(6) the adhering party signs the form after dickering over the few terms, if any, that are
open to bargaining. Id. See also Robson v. E.M.C. Ins. Cos., 785 A.2d 507, 510 (P.A.
Super. Ct. 2001) (defining adhesion contract as standard form contract prepared by
one party, to be signed by party in weaker position, usually consumers, who have little
choice about terms); Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding adhesion contract is standardized contract which, imposed and drafted by
party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to subscribing party only opportunity to
adhere to contract or reject it). But see Lozano, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1074 (holding both
procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present for unconscionability).
If an agreement is procedurally unconscionable, it may still be enforceable if the sub-
stantive terms are reasonable. Id. For example, an arbitration clause that prevents a
party from seeking punitive damages or that prevents class actions is not substantively
unconscionable. Id. at 1075; Thicklin, 824 So. 2d at 731 (holding substantive unconscio-
nability can include terms that impair integrity of bargaining process or otherwise con-
travene public interest or public policy and terms that attempt to impermissibly alter
fundamental duties otherwise imposed by law, fine-print terms or provisions that seek
to negate reasonable expectations of non-drafting party, or unreasonably and unexpect-
edly harsh terms having to do with price or other central aspects of transaction); Comb,
218 F.Supp. 2d at 1173-75 (holding substantive unconscionability existed in case where
mutuality was lacking, there was no right to consolidate claims, there were high arbitra-
tion costs for customers, and any litigation to secure relief pending arbitration was re-
quired to be brought in inconvenient forum).
128. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (holding
mere inequality in bargaining power is not sufficient reason to hold that arbitration
agreements are never enforceable); Hughes Training Inc., 254 F.3d at 593 (holding there
is nothing per se unconscionable about arbitration agreements). See also Drahozal &
Friel, supra note 8, at 374 (discussing enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments); Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 835 (discussing U.S. policy enforcing pre-dispute
arbitration agreements with consumers and employees).
129. See Cole 1, supra note 31, at 12 (suggesting parties should be separated into
two groups based on how frequently they are subjected to arbitration). The first group
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tration tends to show that business parties may fare better than
consumers."' Arbitration also limits a consumer's ability to util-
ize the legal system, which would normally provide some offset
to a repeat-players' advantage. 131
c. Incorrect Application of Statutory Protections Threatens
Consumer Due Process
Arbitrators are not required to decide according to estab-
is traditional arbitration practiced among repeat players such as merchants and labor
unions. Id. The second group is modern arbitration that is practiced between repeat
players and one-shot players, such as employees and consumers. Id. See also Sarah Ru-
dolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: One Size Fits All Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. DisP. REs.
759 (2001) (identifying and discussing cases and commentary supportive of theory of
separating consumers and repeat players). See also Schwartz, supra note 16, at 60-61
(suggesting that repeat players may have advantage over consumers and plaintiff's attor-
neys in arbitration cases); PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 20, at 74 (stating there is tremen-
dous difference between arbitration agreements that bind "one-shot" litigants and those
entered into by more sophisticated parties).
130. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 60-61 (citing study determining employees re-
cover lower proportion of claims in repeat player cases than non-repeat player cases).
Businesses also take advantage of the arbitrator's desire to build its track record of
decisions favorable to business and favorable decisions provide a potential future
source of business for the arbitration community. Id. at 61. See also IAN R. MACNEIL,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAw: REFORMATION-NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION
7, 58 (1992) (stating AAA received over USD 32 million in fees in 1990, excluding fees
paid to arbitrators themselves); Sabin, supra note 89, at 1344 (stating claims that arbitra-
tors pander to repeat players are supported by recent studies); Kelly, supra note 16
(stating ABA complains certain types of matters favored repeat defendants, and that
frequent arbitrations allow defendants to develop defenses and strategies); Alderman,
supra note 16, at 1253-58 (discussing benefits of arbitration to repeat-players). See, e.g.,
Lisa Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration: A Look at Actual
Cases, 47 LAB. L.J. 108, 113-16 (1996) (finding that in study of AAA employment arbitra-
tions repeat-players achieved better results than those who were not repeat-players);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?:
Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 19, 58-61 (1999) (referring to
studies in employment arbitration and litigation context that attempt to determine if
repeat-players have advantage).
131. See Alderman, supra note 16, at 1255-56 (stating mandatory arbitration allows
business parties to avoid court system that gives consumers some ability to offset repeat-
player advantage). Devices such as class action suits allow consumers to increase finan-
cial incentives of a lawsuit and specialized legal organizations can offer expertise and
resources to individual players and help determine which claims should be appealed to
establish the best precedent. Id. at 1254-55. Consumers may also have access to attor-
neys that specialize in consumer claims due to fee-generating statutes and substantial
damage awards. Id. at 1255. Small claims courts also allow consumers access to simpli-
fied procedures and rules that minimize attorney involvement and keep costs down. Id.
See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 130, at 58-61 (referring to studies in employment
arbitration and litigation context that attempt to determine if repeat-players have ad-
vantage).
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lished principles of law.' 3 2 Even a clear mistake of law or a mis-
application of the law to the facts is not grounds to vacate an
arbitration award.' 33 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, an
arbitrator's failure to properly apply the law in statutory claims is
not a sufficient cause for concern.'
For an award to be overturned, it must be found that the
arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law. 135 Critics note, how-
132. See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 103, at 344-45 (stating arbitration is
often conducted by nonlawyers from organizations founded and supported by
merchants and traders, and even if qualified to decide legal issues there is no duty to
resolve dispute in compliance with legal rights). See also Carrington, supra note 98, at
283 (stating arbitrators need not be lawyers and are not required to know or enforce
law). See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (holding errors in
interpretation of law are not enough to vacate arbitrator's award, but manifest disre-
gard of law would be).
133. See, e.g., Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436 (holding errors of law, unless manifest disre-
gard of law, are not enough to vacate arbitrator's award); United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v. Misco, Inc. 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987) (holding courts are not authorized to re-
consider merits of award even though parties may allege award rests on errors of fact or
misinterpretation of collective bargaining contract). See also DiRussa v. Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 822 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding arbitrator's award in Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") action even where clear arbitrators did
not apply statutory law correctly). In DiRussa, the Second Circuit agreed with the Dis-
trict Court that the governing ADEA mandated the award of attorney's fees to success-
ful claimants such as the plaintiff. Id. The Second Circuit, however, found that the
plaintiff could not prove he clearly communicated the mandatory requirements of the
ADEA to the arbitrators. Id. Therefore, the court could not infer that the arbitrators
consciously disregarded the ADEA's fee provisions. Id. at 823; Carrington, supra note
98, at 283 (stating that arbitrators do not need to know or enforce the law); Sabin, supra
note 89, at 1350 (noting vacation for disregarding applicable law is "virtually pre-
cluded").
134. See Green Tree Financial Corp-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-90
(2000) (holding claims resting on suspicion arbitration weakens protections afforded in
substantive law to would-be complainants are rejected by U.S. Supreme Court); Shear-
son/American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) (holding there is no
reason to assume arbitrators will not follow law, but even if they did, court review is
sufficient to ensure statutory compliance).
135. See DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 821 (defining manifest disregard standard). The fol-
lowing demonstrates manifest disregard of the law: (1) the arbitrators knew of a gov-
erning legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law
ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.
Id. See also Schwartz, supra note 16, at 89-90 (discussing manifest disregard standard set
out by U.S. Supreme Court in Wilko). See, e.g., Goldman v. Architectural Iron Co., 306
F.3d 1214 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that homeowner could not demonstrate arbitrator
manifestly disregarded law). In Goldman, a homeowner sought to vacate an arbitration
award made in favor of a contractor who installed a conservatory atop her house. Id.
The decisive issue of law in the case was whether the Home Improvement Law allowed
an unlicensed contractor to enforce a home improvement contract against a home-
owner who also acted as the general contractor on the project. Id. at 1217. Since there
858 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:823
ever, that vacation for manifest disregard is rare. 3 6 It is difficult
to prove an arbitrator intentionally disregarded applicable law
when no explanation for the award is required.13
7
d. Arbitration is Too Expensive for Consumers
One of the most touted benefits of arbitration is its reduced
was no well-defined, explicit, and clearly applicable principle, the court ruled that the
resolution of the controversy in arbitration required application of "an unclear rule of
law to a complex factual situation," and therefore the arbitral decision could not have
been in manifest disregard of the law. Id.
136. See Sabin, supra note 89, at 1350 (noting vacation for manifest disregard is
"virtually precluded"). See also Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 240
(1st Cir. 1995) (holding where arbitrators do not explain reasons justifying their award
it is nearly impossible for court to determine whether they acted in disregard of law).
Even though nonstatutory vacatur is rare, it is not impossible. See, e.g., Halligan v. Piper
Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (reversing refusal to vacate arbitration
award in ADEA claim because arbitrators ignored law or evidence or both); Montes v.
Shearson Lehman Bros, Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1464 (11th Cir. 1997) (reversing confirma-
tion of arbitration award because arbitration board was urged to deliberately disregard
law, and there was lack of support in facts for ruling and no indication in record or
ruling to indicate that arbitrators rejected plea to disregard law).
137. See, e.g., Halligan v. PiperJaffray, 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (recogniz-
ing Second Circuit repeatedly held arbitrators have no obligation to explain award).
However, the court held that when a reviewing court is inclined to hold that an arbitra-
tion panel manifestly disregarded the law, the failure of the arbitrators to explain the
award can be taken into account. Id.; Sargent v. Paine WebberJackson & Curtis, Inc.,
882 F.2d 529, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding explanation requirement would unjustifi-
ably undermine speed and thrift sought to be obtained by arbitration). This does not
apply in cases where the parties agree that the arbitrator will explain the award, but
such a requirement is the exception, and not the rule, and the parties must make sure
the requirement is specified in the arbitration agreement. Id.; Stehli v. Action Custom
Homes, Inc., 761 N.E.2d 129, 133 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (upholding arbitration award
in favor of homeowners in action against contractor because contract did not specify
arbitrator had to explain award). The court held the arbitrator was not required to
provide a written explanation of the award, even when both parties requested one after
the award was rendered because the contract did not specify that that arbitrator was to
explain the award. Id. The parties claimed that Rule 42 of the Construction Industry
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association required that the arbitrator
provide an explanation upon written request by the parties, but the court found that
under the plain language of the rule, an arbitrator is not required to provide a written
explanation of the award unless all the parties made such a request prior to the appoint-
ment of the arbitrator. Id. See also Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial
Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards
for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443, 450 (1998) (stating that value of nonstatutory
vacatur is illusory because arbitrators are not required to issue formal opinion even
when recognized as ground for vacatur and that absence of substantive reasoned awards
revealing manner in which arbitrators have decided cases before them has been major
factor in effectively insulating challenged arbitration awards from vacatur on basis of
non-statutory grounds).
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cost compared to litigation. 38 Recent evidence shows, however,
that arbitration may not provide the cost savings parties typically
expect.1 3 1 Consumer disputes generally involve small dollar
amounts140 and consumers may choose not to pursue claims
when the cost of seeking redress is greater than the amount in
dispute. 41 When adding up administrative costs and arbitrator
and attorney's fees, arbitration costs may approach thousands of
dollars in some cases. 14 2 This is typically a substantial cost differ-
138. See Alderman, supra note 16, at 1249 (stating one argument supporting policy
favoring mandatory arbitration is that arbitration is less costly than traditional litiga-
tion). See also PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 20, at 1 (quoting Ed Anderson of NAF who
stated arbitration can save parties 70-80% of cost of litigating these cases); Hearing
Transcript, Fairness and Voluntary Arbitration Act, House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Commercial and Administrative Law (June 8, 2000) (stating speed and affordability of
arbitration are perhaps its most discussed benefits); AAA Consumer Rules, supra note
44 (stating arbitration is usually faster and cheaper than going to court).
139. See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 20, at 1 (stating cost to plaintiff of initiat-
ing arbitration is almost always higher than cost of instituting lawsuit). The report com-
pared the forum costs of arbitration to court fees and determined that arbitration costs
can be up to 5,000% higher. Id. See also Kelly, supra note 16 (stating arbitration partici-
pants are not convinced that in certain cases arbitration is cheaper or shorter than
litigation and that increased hearings and procedures has further reduced cost savings
of arbitration). Another potential problem is that consumers do not know up front
how much the arbitration will cost. See, e.g., Camacho v. Holiday Homes, Inc., 167 F.
Supp. 2d 892, 897 n.4 (W.D. Va. 2001) (indicating it is impossible to establish exact
amount consumer would have to pay because arbitrator sets amount after arbitration is
initiated).
140. See Alderman, supra note 16, at 1250 (discussing costs of arbitration in con-
sumer cases may greatly exceed litigation costs especially where small disputes would
normally be eligible for small claims court). Small claims court access may be available
for less than USD 100 in many states. Id. Arbitration often involves substantial fees, and
costs of USD 1,000 per day are not unusual. Id. See also Ponte, supra note 3, at 467-70
(explaining how online world has allowed participation by parties who cannot afford
direct participation in many traditional markets, causing greater incidence of small
transactions); Martin, supra note 8, at 132 (noting current median B2C transaction is
valued at approximately USD 300).
141. See Ponte, supra note 3, at 469 (stating high transaction costs of dispute reso-
lution can make it less likely victims will seek vindication of their rights). Low transac-
tion value, combined with high transaction costs also means consumers victimized by
unscrupulous or incompetent sellers are unlikely to devote the resources necessary to
vindicate their rights. Id. at 470. See also Geraint Howells, Litigation in the Consumer
Interest, 9 ILSAJ. INr'L & COMP. L. 1, 7 (2002) (stating that consumers often have small
claims but such claims can have significant impact on consumer welfare, especially for
disadvantaged consumers who ironically are less likely to seek redress); Alderman, supra
note 16, at 1250 (stating costs for arbitration may greatly exceed costs of litigation espe-
cially where small disputes that may be eligible for small claims court are involved).
142. See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 20, at 5 (providing example where con-
sumers had to pay high arbitration costs to have dispute addressed). A couple pur-
chased new home under contract that contained a mandatory arbitration clause. Id.
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ence between arbitration and adjudication, especially when a
consumer could file a complaint in small claims court without
the aid of counsel.'4 3 The cost disparity is especially true in in-
ternational arbitrations, where arbitration fees and costs tend to
be more expensive than domestic arbitrations.144
The cost associated with arbitration is frequently litigated in
U.S. courts.1 4 5 Courts have held that excessive arbitration costs
After finding numerous defects, they chose to make a claim against the seller, which
eventually went to arbitration. Id. They paid an initial filing fee of USD 1,500 to cover
AAA's administrative costs, and were required to advance USD 7,563.75 for the arbitra-
tor's compensation. Id. USD 2,580 was later refunded when the hearing was completed
one day earlier than anticipated. Id. These fees were in addition to the couple's attor-
ney fees and expert consultant fees. Id. See also Alderman, supra note 16, at 1250 (stat-
ing participants in arbitration must pay fee for process itself as well as daily fee to arbi-
trator and costs in excess of USD 1,000 are not unusual).
143. See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 20 (comparing costs of litigation and costs
of arbitration for four hypothetical cases). The report indicates that arbitration costs
will likely always be higher than court costs because the expenses of a private legal
system are so substantial. Id. at 2. The costs of administering a case in the Circuit Court
of Cook County average USD 44.20, while the AAA's administrative cost per case aver-
ages 340.63. Id. The extra fees in arbitration can also be substantial, such as issuing
subpoenas, discovery requests, and the use of hearing rooms. Id. Such fees are not
charged if the dispute went to court. Id. It should be noted that the Public Citizen
report only compares forum costs, which do not include costs such as attorney's fees for
adjudication. Id. at 42. See also Howells, supra note 141, at 18 (stating U.S. small claims
courts typically have highly simplified procedures and no need for representation and
in some states there is even prohibition on use of lawyers in small claims courts). See,
e.g., Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, 45 P.3d 594, 604-05 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (hold-
ing arbitration provision of sales contract with mobile home purchaser unenforceable
because cost prohibitive where USD 2,000 filing fee, requirement for three arbitrators,
and purchaser's desperate economic status was cost prohibitive, considering amount in
dispute was only USD 1,500 and cost of court filing fee was only USD 110).
144. See BoRN 2, supra note 90, at 8 (discussing that cost of international arbitra-
tion is seldom cheap and parties have to pay arbitrator fees and usually arbitral institu-
tion as well). Logistical expenses such as hearing room rental, travel to the arbitral
situs, and lodging are also incurred. Id. See also BoRN 1, supra note 4, at 911 (stating
arbitral tribunal may allocate costs at conclusion of proceedings, but this is not guaran-
teed and may depend on factors such as express grant of such costs in agreement,
differing legal rules at arbitral situs regarding allocation of legal fees, and arbitrator
discretion). Statutory provisions in national substantive laws may also apply. Id.
145. See, e.g., Green Tree Financial Corp-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-90
(2000) (holding existence of large arbitration costs could preclude litigant from effec-
tively vindicating federal statutory rights in arbitral forum); Camacho v. Holiday
Homes, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 892, 897 (W.D. Va. 2001) (holding arbitration clause in
contract for purchase of manufactured home was unenforceable because arbitral forum
was financially inaccessible to purchaser and prevented vindication of statutory rights
under TILA); Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, 45 P.3d 594 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (de-
clining to compel arbitration of mobile homeowner's claim because filing and adminis-
trative costs of AAA arbitration would be prohibitively high).
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may render an agreement unenforceable," 6 and the U.S. Su-
preme Court decision in Green Tree Financial Corp-Alabama v. Ran-
dolph"'4 7 supports this. In Green Tree, the Court considered a mo-
bile home purchaser's claims that the seller could not force her
to arbitrate her federal TILA and ECOA claims against the
seller, even though her contract provided for arbitration. 4 " She
argued that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable be-
cause it failed to affirmatively protect her from potentially steep
arbitration costs.' 49 The Court reaffirmed that federal statutory
claims may be arbitrated 5 ° and upheld the arbitration agree-
ment. t51  The Court held that in this case, the "risk" that the
buyer would be saddled with prohibitive costs was too speculative
to justify invalidation of the arbitration agreement. 152 The bur-
den of proving prohibitive costs, therefore, is on the con-
sumer. ' 5 ' Arbitration filing fees and costs over USD 1,000 have
been held prohibitive, '1 5' and a recent California appellate deci-
146. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1st Dept. 1998)
(holding cost of USD 4,000 for consumer arbitration through ICC was unconscionable
given cost of dispute and USD 500 filing fee through AAA likely to be unconscionable
as well). See also Mendez, 45 P.3d at 604-05 (holding arbitration provision of sales con-
tract with mobile home purchaser unenforceable because cost prohibitive). The court
found that the USD 2,000 filing fee, the requirement for three arbitrators, and the
purchaser's desperate economic status was cost prohibitive, considering the amount in
dispute was only USD 1,500 and the cost of the court filing fee was only USD l10. Id.
147. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 (holding existence of large arbitration costs could
preclude litigant from effectively vindicating federal statutory rights in arbitral forum).
148. Id. at 83.
149. Id. at 89.
150. Id. at 90.
151. Id. at 92.
152. Id. at 91.
153. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 90 (discussing Green Tree decision and fact that
burden of proving prohibitive costs is on consumer). See, e.g., Gateway 2000, 676
N.Y.S.2d at 575 (holding arbitration agreement with consumers enforceable because
consumers failed to prove prohibitive costs). The court remanded the Gateway 2000
case to the trial court for substitution of an arbitrator and left an open question
whether AAA costs were equally as oppressive as the ICC rules. Id. See also Walton v.
Experian, No. 02 C 5067, 2003 WL 22110788, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2003) (holding
consumer failed to meet burden necessary to invalidate arbitration agreement where
she did not establish financial status or show how NAF arbitration fees of USD 310 were
prohibitive).
154. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 92 (holding that costs may be prohibitive, but fail-
ing to reach that question because it determined that purchaser did not meet its bur-
den of showing likelihood of prohibitive costs). See also Alderman, supra note 16, at
1252-53 (stating even after Green Tree decision, it is still unclear exactly how high costs
must be to invalidate an arbitration agreement, whether decision of cost is objective or
subjective, and whether rationale of Green Tree applies to situations other than assertion
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sion indicates a pre-dispute arbitration clause may be uncon-
scionable if the fees required to initiate the process are unafford-
able, and the agreement fails to provide the consumer with an
effective opportunity to seek a fee waiver.' 55
e. Limited Appeal and Review Threatens Due Process
Courts overturn awards in very limited circumstances 56 and
of federal statutory rights). But see Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S. 2d at 575 (holding cost of
USD 4,000 for consumer arbitration through ICC was unconscionable given cost of
dispute and that USD 500 filing fee and costs in excess of USD 1,000 through AAA
likely to be unconscionable as well); Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, 45 P.3d 594, 604-
05 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (holding arbitration provision of sales contract with mobile
home purchaser unenforceable because USD 2,000 filing fee, requirement for three
arbitrators, and purchaser's desperate economic status was cost prohibitive, considering
amount in dispute was only USD 1,500 and cost of court filing fee was only USD 110).
155. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., No. A098704, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 1817,
at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2003) (holding that where consumer brought cause of
action against car dealership alleging violation of California Vehicle Leasing Act, Cal.
Civ. Code § 2985.7, pre-dispute arbitration clause may be unconscionable if fees to initi-
ate process are unaffordable and agreement fails to provide waiver). The course fur-
ther held that where the consumer sues under a state consumer statute providing un-
waivable rights, as in the California statute, it is implied in the arbitration clause that
unaffordable fees will not be allocated to the consumer at any point in the arbitration
process. Id. In Gutierrez, the consumer claimed he was victimized by a "bait and switch"
fraud that caused him to pay a higher lease price than that advertised. Id. at *4-5. The
lease contract contained an arbitration clause that referred to the AAA rules. Id. at *5,
n.3. Because the amount in controversy had a potential value of USD 500,000, the AAA
Commercial Arbitration Rules applied, which would require plaintiffs to expend more
than USD 10,000, exclusive of attorney's fees to arbitrate. Id. at *8. In this case, the
consumer provided proof disclosing their monthly net income, expenses, and savings.
Id. at *7. See also Kelly Cramer, Consumer Arbitration Fees Must Be Affordable, California
Court Says, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec 15, 2003, at 4 (discussing California appel-
late court decision in Gutierrez that held consumer contracts that require private arbitra-
tion instead of courts cannot burden plaintiff with expensive costs). But see Walton v.
Experian, No. 02 C 5067, 2003 WL 22110788, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2003) (holding
that NAF arbitration fees of USD 310 are "certainly not prohibitive").
156. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) (establishing four statutory grounds for vacation of
arbitration awards). See also Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (ruling that section 2 of FAA creates body of federal substantive law
applicable to any arbitration agreement under FAA which requires that questions of
arbitrability be addressed with healthy regard for federal policy favoring arbitration and
that any doubts concerning scope of arbitrable issues be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985) (holding that in construing arbitration agreement under FAA, parties' inten-
tions control, but those intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability);
Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1989) (holding due
regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to
scope of arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration); Hoffman v. Cargill
Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that courts tread lightly in reviewing
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apply a standard of review recognized as "among the narrowest
known to the law."' 57 Once an award is confirmed in the courts,
any dissatisfied party may appeal the award.15 Upon review, the
appellate court does not review an award on the merits,1 59 and
will not vacate it unless the award meets the statutory or limited
common law grounds for vacation.160
The FAA provides four federal statutory grounds for vaca-
tion of arbitration awards, which courts interpret narrowly.1 6 1 In
arbitration awards and review of arbitration awards is extremely narrow). See also
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 235 (stating that both FAA and UAA make agree-
ments to arbitrate specifically enforceable and there is strong public policy in favor of
arbitration). Both federal and state courts will interpret agreements to arbitrate
broadly and exceptions narrowly. Id.
157. See Sabin, supra note 89, at 1348-49 (stating that FAA provides four statutory
grounds for vacation of arbitration award, but they are interpreted in "extraordinarily
narrow" fashion favoring upholding arbitrator's award). There are also nonstatutory
grounds for vacatur, such as manifest disregard of the law, but such vacatur is "virtually
precluded." Id. at 1349-50. See, e.g., ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455,
1463 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that court's power to overturn arbitrators' decision is
among the narrowest known to law); Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate &
Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1960) (stating court's function in con-
firming or vacating arbitration award is severely limited).
158. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (stating that if parties agree, court judgment shall be entered
upon award made pursuant to arbitration and any party to arbitration may apply to
court for order confirming award); 9 U.S.C. § 16 (stating when appeals may be taken
under FAA); RUAA, supra note 29 (stating RUAA contains similar provision in section
22 that after party to arbitration proceeding receives notice of award, it may make court
motion for order confirming award at which time court shall issue confirming order
unless award is modified or corrected pursuant to sections 20 or 24 or is vacated pursu-
ant to section 23). See also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 235-36 (discussing award
confirmation process under FAA).
159. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc. 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)
(stating courts are not authorized to reconsider merits of award even though parties
may allege that award rests on errors of fact or misinterpretation of contract); Flexible
Mfg. Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Super Products Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
parties are not entitled to reargue claims in proceeding to vacate arbitral award because
such litigation defeats goal of arbitration to provide quick and cheap decision). See also
Sabin, supra note 89, at 1347 (stating arbitration awards are not subject to general ap-
pellate review and FAA limits courts' ability to review merits of award even where erro-
neous decisions on facts or law exist).
160. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (setting out four statutory standards for vacation under
FAA); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 439 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, Rodriguez de
Quijas, 490 U.S. 477 (establishing "manifest disregard of the law" as grounds for vaca-
tion). See also Sabin, supra note 89, at 1348-50 (stating that in addition to four statutory
reasons for vacation of arbitration award under FAA, federal circuits recognize several
nanstatutory grounds such as "manifest disregard of the law," "public policy," "arbitrary
and capricious," "completely irrational," or contrary to essence of arbitration agree-
ment).
161. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). Section 10 states:
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addition, the Supreme Court decision in Wilko v. Swan 16 2 estab-
lished a "manifest disregard of the law" standard for vacation,
now applied in all Circuits. 163 The standard involves more than
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration-
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to.hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter sub-
mitted was not made.
Id.; RUAA, supra note 31 (containing similar grounds for vacation in § 23). See also
Sabin, supra note 89, at 1348-50 (discussing that grounds for review are interpreted in
'extraordinarily narrow" fashion); MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 30, at 40:13 (stating pro-
award stance of courts was preserved by Congress in FAA § 10 and.is consistently nur-
tured by courts).
162. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, Rodriguez de Quijas, 490
U.S. 477 (1989) (holding agreement to arbitrate unenforceable, but establishing "mani-
fest disregard of the law" standard for overturning award).
163. See, e.g., Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 239 (1st Cir.
1995) (recognizing "manifest disregard of the law" standard but declining to find it
existed in this case); Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, B.V. v. Standard Microsystems
Corp., 103 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that arbitrators had "barely colorable"
justification for their decision that satisfies manifest disregard standard); United
Transp. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 1995)
(recognizing that only where there is manifest disregard of agreement, totally unsup-
ported by principles of contract construction and law of shop, may reviewing court
disturb award); Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 31, 933 F.2d
225, 229 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding not only is arbitrator's fact finding and contract inter-
pretation accorded great deference, but its interpretation of law is accorded deference
as well and legal interpretation of arbitrator may only be overturned where in manifest
disregard of law); Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 762 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that arbitrators did not act in manifest disregard of applicable law in rejecting
ADEA claims); M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., K.G., 87 F.3d 844, 851 (6th
Cir. 1996) (recognizing manifest disregard doctrine applicable in domestic arbitration
cases but denying its extension to violation of public policy necessary to deny confirma-
tion of foreign arbitral award); Nat'l Wrecking Co. v. Int'l Bros. Of Teamsters, Local
731, 990 F.2d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that when arbitrators demonstrate mani-
fest disregard for applicable law courts will not enforce award); Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d
883, 885 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 906 (1993) (recognizing arbitration award will
not be set aside unless completely irrational or evidences manifest disregard for law);
Barnes v. Logan, 122 F.3d 820, 821 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing award will not be set
aside unless manifests complete disregard of law and must be confirmed if arbitrators
even arguably construed or applied contract and acted within scope of their authority);
Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting
courts' recognition of manifest disregard standard and likening it to ensuring arbitra-
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an error or misunderstanding of the law, clear or gross factual or
legal errors, or the erroneous rejection of legal defenses. 16 4 A
court must find that the arbitrator knew the law and intention-
ally ignored it.'6 5 Some Circuits have expanded the non-statu-
tory standard to vacate awards that are "arbitrary and capri-
cious," contrary to public policy, "completely irrational," or "fun-
damentally unfair."' 66
tor's decision relies on his interpretation of contract as contrasted with his own beliefs
of fairness and justice); Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461
(11th Cir. 1997) (stating that for manifest disregard one must be conscious of law and
deliberately ignore it); Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1182
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding panel did not manifestly disregard law where award stated
that where questions of substantive law arose, panel looked to law of State of Ohio in
reaching its determination).
164. See, e.g., DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 821 (2d Cir.
1997) (requiring that arbitrators knew governing legal principle yet refused to apply it
or ignored it altogether); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.2d 925, 932 (10th Cir.
2001) (holding manifest disregard means that record shows arbitrators knew law and
explicitly disregarded it); Flexible Mfg. Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Super Products Corp., 86 F.3d
96, 100 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that arbitrators mistake by erroneously rejecting valid,
or even dispositive legal defense does not provide grounds for vacating award unless
arbitrator deliberately disregarded what she knew to be law).
165. See DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 821 (stating "manifest disregard of the law" would
exist where (1) arbitrators knew of governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or
ignored it altogether, and (2) law ignored by arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and
clearly applicable to case). See, e.g., Goldman v. Architectural Iron Co., 306 F.3d 1214,
1217 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding resolution of controversy in arbitration required applica-
tion of unclear rule of law to complex factual situation and therefore arbitral decision
could not have been in "manifest disregard of the law"). Goldman involved a home-
owner who sought to vacate an arbitration award made in favor of a contractor who
installed a conservatory atop her house. Id. The decisive issue of law in the case was
whether the Home Improvement Law allowed an unlicensed contractor to enforce a
home improvement contract against a homeowner who also acted as the general con-
tractor on the project. Id. at 1217.
166. See Sabin, supra note 89, at 1348-50 (stating that in addition to four statutory
reasons for vacation of arbitration award under FAA, federal circuits recognize several
nonstatutory grounds such as "manifest disregard of the law," "public policy," "arbitrary
and capricious," "completely irrational," or contrary to essence of arbitration agree-
ment). See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 941 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 915 (1993) (holding decision of arbitration panel refusing to award mandatory
statutory damages under Florida securities laws was arbitrary and capricious and unen-
forceable); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 861 F.2d 665, 671 (11th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989) (holding unenforceable arbitrator's decision
that airline had no just cause for discharging pilot who flew passenger plane while in-
toxicated violated clearly established public policy, but admitting that examples of arbi-
tration results so offensive to public policy that they should be set aside are not readily
found); Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., 783 F.2d 743, 749-50 (8th Cir. 1986)
(stating an arbitration decision may only be irrational where it fails to draw its essence
from agreement); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding arbitrator's decision must be upheld unless it is "completely irra-
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3. Criticisms of E.U. Consumer Directive
Even though the Consumer Directive provides some con-
sumer protection measures in arbitration,1 67 it is not without
criticism. For example, the good faith standard applicable to
terms in consumer contracts is not adequately defined in the
Consumer Directive and leads to inconsistent application within
Member States.'68 The Consumer Directive also requires an op-
portunity for the consumer to review contract terms, but what
actually constitutes an adequate review is not clear.'69 Most no-
tably, the Consumer Directive's explicit allowance of more strin-
gent national legislation regarding unfair terms in consumer
contracts170  encourages inconsistent consumer protection
tional" or constitutes "manifest disregard of the law"); Hoffman v. Cargill Inc., 236 F.3d
458, 462 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating in dicta possibility of vacating arbitration award on
grounds that proceedings were "fundamentally unfair").
167. See Consumer Directive, supra note 9, at annex (q) (referring to exclusion or
hindrance of consumer's right to take legal action or exercise other legal remedies).
See also Locyrr & EGAN, supra note 6, at 48-49 (stating restrictions on legal remedies
provision is most applicable to arbitration agreements and provision does not prohibit
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, but places restrictions on their use); Ster-
nlight 2, supra note 29, at 844-48 (stating Consumer Directive includes non-enforce-
ment of contractual provision excluding or hindering consumers' right to take legal
action or other legal remedy, particularly by requiring consumer to take disputes exclu-
sively to arbitration). It appears that if an arbitration agreement refers to a body not
governed by legal provisions, or restricts the use of evidence normally available to the
consumer, it might be deemed unfair. Id. at 845. Unfair clauses could also be where
sellers or suppliers seek to reverse the legal burden of proof to their own advantage,
even where sellers or suppliers attempt to argue such clauses were individually negoti-
ated. Id.
168. See also LocKrrr & EGcA, supra note 6, at 22-23 (pointing out that preamble
provides definition of good faith which is further supported by list of potentially unfair
terms indicated in Consumer Directive annex). The good faith test does not seem to be
affected by the honesty or dishonesty of the supplier or seller, but rather measures
unfairness by whether the contractual term causes a significant imbalance in the par-
ties' rights and obligations. Id.; Drahozal & Friel, supra note 8, at 364 (stating concept
of unfairness is nebulous but is detailed further in regulations and in Consumer Direc-
tive). Different meanings may be attached to it by law in Member States. Id. In the
United Kingdom, for example, good faith refers to whether a thing is in fact done
honestly. Id.
169. See Consumer Directive, supra note 9, pmbl. (stating that consumer should
actually be given an opportunity to examine all terms). See also LocEr-r & EGAN, supra
note 6, at 25 (stating that what constitutes an examination under Consumer Directive is
not clear, and lack of clarification may be source of confusion throughout Member
States). It could be construed as requiring the seller or supplier to provide copies of all
contract terms, or ensuring that the consumer actually understands the effect of the
relevant terms. Id.
170. See Consumer Directive, supra note 9, art. 8 (providing that Member States
may adopt or retain most stringent provisions compatible with Treaty in area covered by
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among Member States. 17 1
B. Arbitration is Even More Difficult in Cross-Border
Consumer Transactions
Increased consumer arbitration difficulties in cross-border
consumer transactions may be attributable to the N.Y. Conven-
tion's limited application of the non-arbitrability doctrine and
limited public policy and unconscionability defenses to arbitra-
tion agreements. 172 Furthermore, the lack of separate consumer
protocols in international arbitration providers' rules 1 73 and the
Consumer Directive, to ensure maximum degree of protection for consumer). The
preamble further states that Member States may continue or introduce national legisla-
tion which affords consumers a higher level of protection than that stipulated in the
Directive. Id. at pmbl. See also LOCK ETr & EGAN, supra note 6, at 31 (discussing that
Consumer Directive permits more stringent national legislation and addressing poten-
tial problem of allowing individual Member States to develop more stringent require-
ments); Stephen Weatherill, Article in Honor of Professor Alan Watson: Can There be Com-
mon Interpretation of European Private Law?, 31 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 139, 154-55 (2002)
(discussing implementation of Consumer Directive in Member States, and noting that
the accommodation of European Community minimum standards within national sys-
tems is not straightforward).
171. See LOCKErr & EGAN, supra note 6, at 29-30 (stating that one problem with this
approach is that it might be adopted differently in each Member State and noting that
recommendations were made to avoid this problem, including notice of decisions on
implementation to Commission, involvement by European Court ofJustice in determin-
ing test of fairness, and establishment of Ombudsman institution, but none were
adopted). See also Weatherill, supra note 170, at 156 (stating that Consumer Directive is
attempt to create E.U. legislative harmonization, and acknowledging that one criticism
is that intervention in name of harmonization may fail to take sufficient account of
complex functions performed by private law in mature national legal system and ac-
cordingly destabilize integrity of national systems).
172. See ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF
1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 360-66 (1981) (citing jurisdictions
that differentiate between domestic and foreign public policy and stating that matters
considered to pertain to public policy in domestic relations do not necessarily pertain
to public policy in international relations and number of matters considered to fall
under public policy in international cases is smaller than that in domestic cases); BORN
1, supra note 4, at 824-25 (discussing narrow interpretation of public policy exception
in developed trading states and citing to decisions that demonstrate such interpreta-
tion); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, at 473-74 (citing Swiss decision KS. A.G. v.
CC. SA., (1995) XX Y.B. COM. ARB. 762, 763-64, and stating this decision, as well as
others from courts in different parts of world show readiness to limit, even at times
severely, public policy defense to enforcement). See also BoRN 1, supra note 4, at 228
(discussing unconscionability claims and national courts' reluctance to find interna-
tional arbitration agreements unconscionable); Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 835 (dis-
cussing U.S. policy enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements with consumers and
employees despite claims of unconscionability).
173. See, e.g., ICC Rules, infra note 186 (providing for no special consumer proto-
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uncertain laws and treaties governing Internet commerce fur-
ther complicate the picture for consumers.
174
1. N.Y. Convention Restricts Ability to Control
Consumer Arbitration
The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards175 ("N.Y. Convention")
is a treaty that governs non-domestic arbitration between coun-
tries such as the United States and E.U. Member States.176 The
N.Y. Convention requires national courts to recognize and en-
force foreign arbitral awards and arbitration agreements. 177 Na-
cols); LCIA Rules, supra note 186 (providing no reference to separate rules or proce-
dures when consumers involved). But see AAA Consumer Rules, supra note 44 (apply-
ing consumer rules when agreement stipulates AAA rules apply and agreement is be-
tween consumer and business); NAF Consumer Rules, supra note 44 (establishing
procedures for NAF arbitrations when consumers involved); JAMS Consumer Rules,
supra note 44 (stating JAMS will only administer arbitrations between companies and
individual consumers if arbitration clause and specified rules comply with minimum
standards of fairness).
174. See Martin, supra note 8, at 145-46 (discussing draft Hague Convention and its
protection of consumer's right to sue in home state and contrasting this approach to
that of United States). See also FTC Workshop Comments, supra note 5 (expressing E.U.
opposition to binding consumer arbitration in online disputes in response to June 2000
FTC workshop); Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 846-47 (discussing E.U. response to FTC
workshop that binding pre-dispute consumer arbitration is disfavored); Stewart & Mat-
thews, supra note 1, at 1119 (stating that agreement on Hague Convention proposals
dealing with consumer Internet commerce is unlikely because E.U. and U.S. have very
different attitudes toward issue).
175. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 21 U.S.T. 2518 (1970) [hereinafter "N.Y. Con-
vention"] (establishing N.Y. Convention).
176. See id. art. I(1) (stating that N.Y. Convention applies to recognition and en-
forcement of arbitral awards made in territory of State other than State where recogni-
tion and enforcement of such awards are sought and that it shall also apply to arbitral
awards not considered as domestic awards in State where their recognition and enforce-
ment are sought). See also VAN DEN BERG, supra note 172, at 1-6 (discussing history of
N.Y. Convention as probably most significant contemporary international agreement
relating to commercial arbitration, and noting it has been regarded as cornerstone of
current international commercial arbitration). See also BoRN 1, supra note 4, at 3 (stat-
ing N.Y. Convention was signed in 1958 in New York under U.N. auspices and has been
ratified by more than 120 Nations, including all significant trading States and most
major developing States). The U.S. entered the treaty into force on December 29,
1970. Id. at 992; Gibbons 1, supra note 1, at 49 (stating that if consumer dispute is
commercial in nature and is between parties in different countries or parties in same
country seeking to enforce award in third country, then arbitration may result in "for-
eign" arbitration award for purposes of N.Y. Convention).
177. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. III (stating each Contracting State
shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them); id. art. 11(1) (stating each
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tional legislation codifies the principles of the N.Y. Conven-
tion17 8 and may overlap with various sources of national law that
affect international arbitration agreements and awards.1 7 9
For the N.Y. Convention to apply: (1) the agreement must
have some foreign or international connection;18 0 (2) it must be
in writing;18" ' (3) there must be a reciprocity requirement relat-
Contracting State shall recognize agreement in writing under which parties undertake
to submit to arbitration). But see id. art. V (stating when recognition and enforcement
may be refused). See also BORN 1, supra note 4, at 704-11 (discussing in detail enforce-
ment and recognition of awards under N.Y. Convention); id. at 155-61 (discussing pre-
sumptive validity of arbitration agreements under N.Y. Convention).
178. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2000) (codifying N.Y. Convention in FAA); En-
glish Arbitration Act, supra note 73, Ch. 23, Part III, §§ 100-104 (codifying N.Y. Conven-
tion in United Kingdom). See also MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 30, at 44:34 (stating that
United States acceded to N.Y. Convention in 1970 and Congress enacted FAA §§ 201-
208 providing for enforcement of N.Y. Convention in American courts).
179. See BORN 1, supra note 4, at 38 (stating there is considerable overlap among
various sources of U.S. law because arbitration agreements and awards falling under
N.Y. Convention are governed by N.Y. Convention and second chapter of FAA, but they
may also be governed by domestic chapter of FAA to extent it does not conflict with
N.Y. Convention). See also MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 30, at 44:35 (stating legal basis of
private international arbitration is amalgam of treaties and national law of various
States, such as United States, where amalgam consists of N.Y. Convention, Inter-Ameri-
can Convention and FAA, both domestic and international provisions); Park 2, supra
note 105, at 809-10 (stating that N.Y. Convention promotes international currency of
commitments to arbitrate by requiring deference to valid arbitration agreements and
allowing courts to enforce foreign awards as they would domestic ones). Several de-
fenses to enforcement exist, however, such as allowing a court to reject awards tainted
with excess of authority and procedural irregularity. Id. at 810. The forum's own inter-
ests are also protected by withholding support for awards that deal with non-arbitrable
subjects or violate public policy. Id.
180. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. I (stating that N.Y. Convention shall
apply to recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in territory of State
other than State where recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and
arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal and shall also ap-
ply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in State where their recogni-
tion and enforcement are sought). See also BORN 1, supra note 4, at 119-26 (discussing
in further detail "foreign" or "international" requirement). Such a requirement is con-
sistent with the facilitation of the international arbitral process, without disturbing local
domestic arbitration legal rules. Id. at 119.
181. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. II (stating that each Contracting
State shall recognize agreement in writing which may include arbitral clause in contract
or arbitration agreement, signed by parties or contained in exchange of letters or tele-
grams). See also BORN 1, supra note 4, at 127 (discussing further requirement for writ-
ten agreement but noting that national courts have not interpreted Art. 11(2) uni-
formly). U.S. courts have taken a fairly expansive view of the writing requirement, up-
holding exchanges of telexes containing arbitration clauses to which the parties did not
object, arbitration clauses exchanged in letters or unsigned forms, and those contained
in written offers pursuant to which the offeror commenced performance that the of-
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ing to the arbitration award; 182 (4) there must be some commer-
cial relationship between the parties 8" and a dispute that arises
from defined legal relationships, such as a contract or transac-
tion.114 The N.Y. Convention codifies the presumptive validity of
arbitration agreements. 185 As is generally the case in the interna-
tional context, arbitration agreements are separable from the
feree accepted. Id; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, at 14143 (stating that there
must be an agreement to arbitrate in writing).
182. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. I(3) (stating that any State may de-
clare on basis of reciprocity that it will apply N.Y. Convention). But see id. art. XIV
(stating Contracting State is not entitled to avail itself of present N.Y. Convention
against other Contracting States except to extent that it is itself bound to apply N.Y.
Convention). See also BORN 1, supra note 4, at 140-41 (citing 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 of FAA
and stating U.S. reservation provides that United States will apply N.Y. Convention on
basis of reciprocity to recognition and enforcement of only those awards made in terri-
tory of another Contracting State). Such reservation is determined by reference to the
place where the arbitration is conducted and the award is made, not by the parties'
nationalities. Id. at 141. It is not as clear whether reciprocity applies to arbitration
agreements, as distinguished from awards. Id. See also id. at 14048 (discussing further
the reciprocity requirement); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, at 456 (stating reci-
procity reservation of N.Y. Convention has effect of applying only to awards in States
that are party to N.Y. Convention instead of all foreign awards).
183. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. 1(3) (establishing State may also de-
clare that it will apply N.Y. Convention only to differences arising out of legal relation-
ships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under national
law of State making such declaration). See also BoRN 1, supra note 4, at 149-50 (discuss-
ing further commercial relationship requirement and stating requirement is generally
interpreted broadly, and has produced few difficulties in most national courts); RED-
FERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, at 457 (stating that commercial reservation narrows
scope of application of N.Y. Convention, but recognizes that difficulties arise because
each State may determine that certain relationships are not commercial); Gibbons 1,
supra note 1, at 56 (stating that some States may limit the definition of "commercial" to
exclude consumer transactions, but recognizing that redefining term to exclude such
contracts would violate spirit if not letter of N.Y. Convention unless Member State will-
ing to exclude consumer contracts from all forms of arbitration).
184. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. 11(3) (requiring arbitration agree-
ment be in respect of defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not). See also
BoRN 1, supra note 4, at 152-53 (discussing existing or future differences and defined
legal relationship requirements and stating Aticles I(1) and 1(3) have been interpreted
as implying requirement that difference exist between parties); REDFERN & HUNTER,
supra note 27, at 139 (stating that distinction between existing dispute and future dis-
pute is only important in few States that insist that parties cannot agree in advance to
submit dispute to arbitration but can only agree to arbitrate once dispute has arisen).
185. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. 11(1) (stating each Contracting State
shall recognize arbitration agreements in writing concerning subject matter capable of
settlement by arbitration); id. art. 11(3) (stating that when parties have made agreement
within meaning of this Article, court of Contracting State shall at request of one of
parties refer them to arbitration, unless it finds that agreement is null and void, inoper-
ative or incapable of being performed). See also BORN 1, supra note 4, at 158 (stating
Articles 11(1) and 11(3) of N.Y. Convention impose basic obligation to recognize arbitra-
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underlying contract t"6 and the arbitral tribunal has the authority
to decide disputes over the interpretation and enforceability of
the arbitration agreement." 7 National courts have limited dis-
cretion to stay arbitration proceedings where the arbitration
agreement is enforceable under the N.Y. Convention. 88 Judicial
tion agreements); id. at 157-67 (discussing further the presumptive validity of interna-
tional arbitration agreements).
186. See BORN 1, supra note 4, at 57 (discussing doctrine of separability as allowing
continued validity of arbitration clause when underlying contract contains defects). It
also permits application of different substantive laws to the arbitration agreement and
the underlying contract. Id. at 68. If however, the arbitration clause is defective, the
result would be judicial and arbitral proceedings where the scope or enforceability of
the provision as well as merits of the dispute must be litigated. Id. at 8. The leading
institutional rules also support separability. See, e.g., Rules of Arbitration of the ICC, art.
6(4) (effective Jan. 1, 1998), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitra
tion/rules.asp#article_6J2 [hereinafter ICC Rules] (stating tribunal continues to have
jurisdiction to determine rights of parties and adjudicate claims even though contract
itself may be non-existent or null and void); London Court of International Arbitration
("LCIA) Rules, art. 23.1, (effective Jan. 1, 1998), available at http://www.lcia-arbitra
tion.com/lcia/arb/uk.htm [hereinafter LCIA Rules] (stating arbitration agreement
that is part of another agreement shall be treated as independent, and tribunal's juris-
diction is not affected if other agreement is non-existent, invalid or ineffective); United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules,
art. 21, available at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm [hereinafter UNCITRAL
Rules] (stating arbitration agreement is treated as independent of other terms of con-
tract); AAA International Dispute Resolution Procedures, art. 15(2), (effective July 1,
2003) available at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747&JSPsrc=Upload\
LIVESITE\RulesProceduresM4ationalInternational .\ .\focusArea\internationarNAAA
175current.htm#IntlArbitration [hereinafter AAA International Rules] (stating arbi-
tration clause is treated as agreement independent of other terms of contract).
187. See BoRN 1, supra note 4, at 85 (discussing competence-competence doctrine
where arbitrators generally have broad powers, absent clear agreement to contrary, to
determine challenges to their own jurisdiction). This practice is supported by the insti-
tutional arbitration rules of the major arbitration providers. See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra
note 173, art. 6(2) (stating any decision as to tribunal's jurisdiction shall be taken by
tribunal); LCIA Rules, supra note 173, § 23.1 (stating tribunal has power to rule on its
own jurisdiction); UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 186, art. 21(1) (stating tribunal has
power to rule on objections to its jurisdiction); AAA International Rules, supra note
186, art. 15 (stating tribunal has power to rule on its own jurisdiction). But see First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (holding courts should
not assume parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clear and unmistaka-
ble evidence that they did so); BORN 1, supra note 4, at 92 (discussing in further detail
competence-competence issue and First Options decision, but stating lower U.S. courts
have held various institutional arbitration rules commit issues of arbitrability to arbitra-
tors). First Options reflects the current law under the FAA regarding allocation be-
tween arbitrators and courts to resolve disputes over the arbitration agreement. Id. at
90. See generally Adriana Dulic, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan and the Kompetenz-
Kompetenz Principle, 2 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 77 (2002) (analyzing doctrine of compe-
tence-competence and critically analyzing First Options opinion).
188. See BoRN 1, supra note 4, at 159 (stating most national courts have empha-
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review of the merits of an award is very limited.1 89 Arbitrators
are also not required to correctly apply the law to a particular
dispute and they may even apply lex mercatoria (a non-national
system of law)."'0 Articles II and V of the N.Y. Convention, how-
ever, do provide grounds on which a court of a signatory nation
may decline to enforce an arbitration agreement or foreign arbi-
tration award.191
sized pro-arbitration policies of N.Y. Convention, and narrowly interpret N.Y. Conven-
tion's exceptions to enforceability of such agreements). See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Cul-
ver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 n.10 (1974) (holding goal of N.Y. Convention was to en-
courage recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in
international contracts and to unify standards by which arbitration agreements are ob-
served).
189. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. V (establishing grounds when recog-
nition and enforcement of arbitration award may be refused); REDFERN & HUNTER,
supra note 27, at 460 (stating that grounds for refusal of enforcement of award as enu-
merated in Article V have to be construed narrowly and recognizing that most national
courts recognize this standard). But see BORN 1, supra note 4, at 809-10 (stating there
may also be non-statutory reason for refusing recognition and enforcement of N.Y.
Convention award and citing U.S. cases that suggest "manifest disregard" defense is
available). See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 638 (1985) (reasoning that there is substantive review at award-enforcement stage,
but stating that it remains minimal).
190. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, at 433-44 (stating that there is no provi-
sion in Model Law for any form of appeal from arbitral award on law or on facts or for
any judicial review of merits of award and recognizing that internationally, balance has
come down strongly in favor of finality, and against judicial review, except in very lim-
ited circumstances). Each State, however, may adopt its own standards for reviewing an
award on the merits. Id. at 434-35; BORN 1, supra note 4, at 797 (stating that N.Y. Con-
vention does not contain exception permitting non-enforcement of arbitral award sim-
ply because arbitrators got their decision wrong and recognizing that most developed
national arbitration statutes omit any provision for judicial review of merits of award in
action to enforce). See also Gibbons 1, supra note 1, at 11 (stating that in contrast to
courts, arbitrators draw their authority and sources of law from contract so they are not
necessarily bound to base their decision on particular domestic law and tribunals have
no mandate to follow statutes of various countries); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27,
at 126 (discussing lex mercatoria and noting that some jurisdictions allow arbitrators to
decide according to "rules of law" as opposed to law of particular jurisdiction). The
ICC rules allow the parties to choose the application of "rules of law" to govern the
dispute, but in the absence of such an agreement, the arbitrators may apply the rules of
law it deems appropriate, affording the arbitrators great flexibility. Id.
191. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. V(2) (stating recognition and en-
forcement of arbitral award may also be refused if competent authority in country
where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: (a) subject matter of differ-
ence is not capable of settlement by arbitration under law of that country; or (b) recog-
nition or enforcement of award would be contrary to public policy of that country);
BORN 1, supra note 4, at 160 (stating Article 11(3) typically refers to, among other things,
defenses such as fraud, duress, unconscionability, illegality, mistake, lack of capacity,
and defects in formation). See alsoJay R. Sever, The Relaxation of Inarbitrability and Public
Policy Checks on U.S. and Foreign Arbitration: Arbitration Out of Control?, 65 TUL. L. REv.
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An arbitration agreement or award under the N.Y. Conven-
tion may be refused enforcement (1) where there are unconscio-
nability defenses that make the arbitration agreement null and
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, 19 2 (2) the
subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbi-
tration ("non-arbitrability") and instead must be resolved by a
court of law,193 or (3) enforcement is contrary to public pol-
icy.19
4
Objections to the validity of an arbitration agreement may
include contract law challenges such as fraudulent inducement,
1661, 1665-66 (discussing application of inarbitrability and public policy to interna-
tional arbitration and noting that these challenges remain most important checks on
arbitration that international community has accepted),
192. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. 11(3) (stating that where parties
agreed to arbitrate, court of Contracting State shall refer parties to arbitration unless it
finds agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed). See also
BoRN 1, supra note 4, at 160 (stating Article 11(3) typically refers to, among other things,
defenses such as fraud, duress, unconscionability, illegality, mistake, lack of capacity,
and defects in formation); VAN DEN BERG, supra note 172, at 123-24 (discussing that N.Y.
Convention leaves such matters to municipal law).
193. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. 11(1) (stating that arbitration agree-
ments shall be recognized if they concern subject matter that can be settled by arbitra-
tion); id. art. V(2) (stating additional ground for refusal of recognition and enforce-
ment of arbitral award may be found if subject matter of difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration, or recognition or enforcement of award would be contrary to
public policy). See also BoRN 1, supra note 4, at 245 (stating together such provisions
allow assertion of Non-Arbitrability Doctrine as defense to enforcement of arbitration
agreements and awards under N.Y. Convention); id. at 243 (stating Non-arbitrable
claims differ from nation to nation, but generally include claims, that because of their
perceived public importance or need for formal judicial procedures and protections
are incapable of resolution by arbitration); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, at 471
(stating that arbitrability under art. V(2) (a) of N.Y. Convention is issue for law of en-
forcement State and varies from State to State because governed largely by questions of
public policy).
194. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. V(2) (b) (stating that recognition
and enforcement of arbitral award may also be refused if competent authority in coun-
try where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that recognition or enforcement
of award would be contrary to public policy of that country). See also REDFERN &
HUNTER, supra note 27, at 472 (stating that public policy referred to in N.Y. Convention
is public policy of enforcement state, and it appears to apply differently to international
awards and purely domestic awards); VAN DEN BERG, supra note 172, at 376 (discussing
public policy exception to enforcement under Article V(2) (b) and stating it basically
concerns fundamental moral convictions and policies of forum). The public policy ex-
ception works with Article V(1) (b) concerning violation of due process, and Article
V(2) (a) regarding questions of non-arbitrable subject matters. Id. It is frequently in-
voked, but mostly cited for situations where there is a lack of impartiality of arbitrators
and lack of reasoned awards. Id. at 377. See generally BORN 1, supra note 4, at 815-32
(discussing public policy exception under N.Y. Convention).
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fraud, illegality, unconscionability or duress, and waiver. 195 Na-
tional laws, such as the English Arbitration Act, may also deny
recognition of agreements to arbitrate particular types of claims
and impose restrictions on the validity of arbitration agree-
ments.
19 6
a. Non-Arbitrability/Public Policy Challenge is
Rarely Successful
It is possible to challenge an arbitration agreement as non-
arbitrable.' 97 Enforcement of the award may also be challenged
where it would be contrary to public policy.1 98 Non-arbitrability
195. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. 11(3) (stating that where parties
agreed to arbitrate, court of Contracting State shall refer parties to arbitration unless it
finds agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed). See also
BoRN 1, supra note 4, at 195 (stating arbitration agreements may be challenged using
grounds parallel to those available under generally-applicable contract law to contest
validity of any contract such as fraudulent inducement, fraud, illegality, unconscionabil-
ity or duress and waiver); id. at 160 (stating Article I1(3) typically refers to, among other
things, defenses such as fraud, duress, unconscionability, illegality, mistake, lack of ca-
pacity, and defects in formation); VAN DEN BERG, supra note 172, at 123-24 (discussing
that N.Y. Convention leaves such matters to municipal law).
196. See Bo.N 1, supra note 4, at 209 (stating illegality challenges raise issues such
as separability doctrine, allocation of power between national courts and arbitrators,
and choice of applicable law). The national law in many countries also imposes various
restrictions on legality and validity of arbitration agreements which may not be applica-
ble to other types of contracts. See, e.g., Consumer Directive, supra note 9, ann. (q)
(establishing Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts that considers binding
pre-dispute arbitration clauses as unfair in certain situations); English Arbitration Act,
supra note 73, § 91 (establishing that compulsory arbitration clause that applies to
amount less than certain pecuniary amount is automatically unfair). See also Ponte,
supra note 3, at 461-62 (discussing how national laws in countries such as England allow
consumers to only agree to use ADR after conflict arises).
197. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. 11(1) (referring to recognition of
agreement to arbitrate subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration); id. at art.
V(2) (a) (referring to refusal of recognition and enforcement of award where subject
matter of difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration). See also vAN' DEN BERG,
supra note 172, at 368-75 (discussing non-arbitral subject matter as grounds for refusal
to enforce award under N.Y. Convention); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, at 471
(discussing that arbitrability governed by each State's own concept of what disputes
should be reserved for courts of law and what disputes may be resolved by arbitration);
BoRN 1, supra note 4, at 243 (stating N.Y. Convention contains exceptions to general
obligations in Articles II and V(2) (a) to enforce written arbitration agreements, specifi-
cally where arbitration of disputes not capable of settlement by arbitration or subject
matter of difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under law).
198. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. V(2)(b) (stating that recognition
and enforcement of arbitral award may also be refused if competent authority in coun-
try where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that recognition or enforcement
of award would be contrary to public policy of that country). See also REDFERN &
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may apply to the arbitration agreement 99 or the arbitration
award.200 Public policy concerns the fundamental moral convic-
tions and policies of the forum and works with Article V(1) (b)
concerning violations of due process and Article V(2) (a) regard-
ing questions of non-arbitrable subject matters.20' Scholars have
suggested that the public policy exception to enforcement may
be cited where there are concerns that acceding to the N.Y. Con-
vention would disable lawmakers from protecting weaker par-
ties. 20 2 Even though it is recognized, the public policy exception
HUNTER, supra note 27, at 472 (stating that public policy referred to in N.Y. Convention
is public policy of enforcement State, and it appears to apply differently to international
awards and purely domestic awards); VAN DEN BERG, supra note 172, at 376 (discussing
public policy exception to enforcement under Article V(2) (b) and stating that it basi-
cally concerns fundamental moral convictions and policies of forum). The public pol-
icy exception works with Article V(1) (b) concerning violation of due process, and Arti-
cle V(2) (a) regarding questions of non-arbitrable subject matters. Id. It is frequently
invoked, but mostly cited for situations where there is a lack of impartiality of arbitra-
tors and lack of reasoned awards. Id. at 377. See also BORN 1, supra note 4, at 815-32
(discussing public policy exception under N.Y. Convention).
199. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. 11(1) (referring to recognition of
agreement to arbitrate subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration); id. art. 11(3)
(stating parties do not have to be referred to arbitration if agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed). See also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note
27, at 148 (discussing arbitrabiltiy with respect to validity of arbitration agreement and
stating involves which disputes may be resolved by arbitration and which are reserved
for courts); VAN DEN BERG, supra note 172, at 152-54 (discussing non-arbitrability doc-
trine with respect to arbitration agreement).
200. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. V(2) (a) (referring to refusal of rec-
ognition and enforcement of award where subject matter of difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration). See also VAN DEN BERG, supra note 172, at 368-75 (discussing
non-arbitral subject matter as grounds for refusal to enforce award under N.Y. Conven-
tion).
201. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. V(2) (b) (establishing public policy
exception to enforcement of arbitration award). See also VAN DEN BERG, supra note 172,
at 376-82 (discussing public policy exception to enforcement under Article V(2) (b));
BORN 1, supra note 4, at 815 (stating that national legislation uniformly permits the
non-recognition of arbitral awards because they violate public policy, and even where
national legislation such as FAA in United States does not expressly provide for public
policy exception, principle is well-settled).
202. See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 103, at 363 (comparing N.Y. Conven-
tion's grounds for not enforcing foreign award with principles of Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)). Carrington & Haagen opine that it was never sug-
gested that acceding to the N.Y. Convention would disable Congress or state legislatures
from protecting weaker parties from overbearing use of arbitration by those endowed
with economic power. Id. Indeed, other signatory nations had asserted that foreign
awards presuming to adjudicate liabilities under their regulatory laws would not pro
tanto be recognized in their courts. Id. See also VAN DEN BERG, supra note 172, at 360
(stating public policy exception applies to enforcement of foreign judgments and appli-
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to enforcement under the N.Y. Convention is interpreted more
narrowly than in domestic situations.2 °3 U.S. courts, for exam-
ple, frequently hold that the public policy exception to enforce-
ment does not apply.204 There is a fair amount of scholarly de-
bate as to whether the narrow application of the public policy
defense is harmful to a forum's regulation of public law mat-
ters.205
cation of foreign law and its function is to guard fundamental moral convictions or
policies of forum)
203. See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 172, at 360-66 (citing jurisdictions that differen-
tiate between domestic and foreign public policy and stating that matters considered to
pertain to public policy in domestic relations do not necessarily pertain to public policy
in international relations and number of matters considered to fall under public policy
in international cases is smaller than that in domestic cases). See also BORN 1, supra note
4, at 824-25 (discussing narrow interpretation of public policy exception in developed
trading states and citing to decisions that demonstrate such interpretation); REDFERN &
HUNTER, supra note 27, at 473-74 (citing Swiss decision K.S. A.G. v. CC. SA., (1995) XX
Y.B. COM. ARa. 762, 763-64, and stating this decision, as well as others from courts in
different parts of world show readiness to limit, even at times severely, public policy
defense to enforcement). In KS. A.G. v. CC. SA., the court held that the narrower
concept of public policy as applicable in the field of public international law should be
applied, as opposed to the wider concept of public policy in the field of municipal law.
Id. at 474.
204. See, e.g., Fritz Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (distinguish-
ing arbitration agreement to arbitrate SEA claims in international contract and those
domestically); Parsons & Whittmore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie
Du Papier, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding N.Y. Convention's public policy de-
fense should be construed narrowly and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be
denied on this basis only where enforcement would violate forum State's most basic
notions of morality and justice). See also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, at 472
(stating that U.S. courts have left practitioners with no doubts as to whether public
policy differentiates between international and purely domestic awards); Bremen v.
Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (stating that we cannot have trade and com-
merce in world markets and international waters exclusively on U.S. terms, governed by
U.S. laws and resolved in U.S. courts).
205. See Philip J. McConnaughay, Reviving the "Public Law Taboo" in International
Conflict of Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 285 (1999) (stating that erosion of public law
defenses creates risk of underregulation that flows logically and naturally from displace-
ment of forum public law). Different Nations have vasty different regulatory objectives
and needs, and as international commerce expands to include less developed Nations,
vastly different capacities to promulgate and enforce regulations also exist. Id. Dis-
placement of public law allows precisely the harm that forum public law was intended
to prevent. Id. at 286. Recognition of foreign public law, however, tends to advance the
goals and purposes of economic regulation, while the displacement of forum public law
tends to diminish them. Id. at 290. But see VAN DEN BERG, supra note 172, at 367 (sup-
porting U.S. narrow application of public policy exception and refuting allegations that
U.S. courts' narrow interpretation of public policy exception leaves it "pragmatically
useless if not altogether nonexistent"); W. MICHAEL REISMAix', SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 111 (1992)
(stating public policy exception to enforcement acts as safety valve by making explicit
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b. It is Unclear Which Law Governs Non-Arbitrability and
Public Policy Defenses if the Arbitration Agreement
is Challenged
Article V(2) of the N.Y. Convention explicitly provides that
the law of the country where enforcement of the arbitration
award is sought is the applicable law.2 6 The N.Y. Convention,
however, is silent as to which law applies to enforcement of the
arbitration agreement and non-arbitrability determinations.20 v
It is presumed the law of the country where arbitration is sought,
or the lexfori, applies, but this may depend on whether the chal-
lenge is made to the arbitration agreement or the award. 20  Is-
sues may also surface about whether the arbitral tribunal or a
national court determines issues on non-arbitrability. 20 9
what national courts would probably be pressed to do anyway under pressure of endog-
amous political pressures, and makes adherence to N.Y. Convention easier and rein-
forces expectations of enforceability).
206. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. V(2) (a) (referring to law of country
where recognition and enforcement is sought as law which applies to determine if sub-
ject matter of difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration). See also VAN DEN
BERG, supra note 172, at 369 (recognizing that Article V(2) (a) refers to law of place
where recognition and enforcement of arbitration award is sought); REDFERN &
HUNTER, supra note 27, at 471 (stating issues of arbitrability under Article V(2) (a) are
issues for law of enforcement state).
207. See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 172, at 152 (stating internal consistency requires
that presume law of country where arbitration is sought applies); BORN 1, supra note 4,
at 244-45 (stating there is little agreement among commentators as to what governing
law should apply to non-arbitrability).
208. See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 172, at 152 (stating internal consistency requires
that it be presumed law of country where arbitration is sought, or lexfari, is applicable
law). Id. art. V(2) (a) explicitly refers to the law of the country where enforcement of
the award is sought. Id. at 369. See Sever, supra note 191 at 1666 (suggesting non-
arbitrability issues are determined by forum law but recognizing that some argue that
arbitrability may be determined under some other law). See, e.g., BORN 1, supra note 4,
at 244-45 (stating there is little agreement among commentators as to what governing
law should apply). There are several choices, including a uniform international defini-
tion of non-arbitrability, the law governing the parties' arbitration agreement, the law
of the place where the arbitration is conducted and the award made, the law of the
nation in which enforcement of an award will eventually be sought, the law of the judi-
cial forum where an arbitration agreement is sought to be enforced, or the law that
provides the basis for the relevant substantive claim. Id. at 244-45. Proceedings to en-
force the arbitration agreement may also encourage different choices of law than pro-
ceedings to enforce the arbitration award. Id. at 245.
209. See generally BORN 1, supra note 4, at 74-95 (discussing allocation of authority
to decide disputes over interpretation and enforceability of arbitration agreements and
referencing national laws, including FAA, that clarify whether court or arbitrator de-
cides). See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-44 (1995)
(holding that determination of whether court or arbitrators decide arbitrability turns
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c. Limits on Unconscionability Defense
An unconscionability defense, including fraud, duress, ille-
gality, mistake, lack of capacity, and defects in formation, is avail-
able under the N.Y. Convention to prevent enforcement of an
arbitration agreement. 210 Unconscionability may apply to the
underlying contract, in which case the arbitration agreement
may still be enforceable because it is a separate and autonomous
agreement. 21' For the same reason, an arbitration agreement
may be invalidated but the underlying contract may still be en-
forced.212 Depending on national law, unconscionability deter-
minations may be made by either a court or the arbitration tribu-
nal,21 3 but it is a defense that is rarely accepted.214
on what parties agreed about that matter and that for courts to assume that parties
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability, there must be "clear and unmistakable" evidence that
they did so). See also BORN 1, supra note 4, at 85 (discussing competence-competence
doctrine where arbitrators generally have broad powers, absent clear agreement to con-
trary, to determine challenges to their own jurisdiction).
210. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 175, art. 11(3) (stating that court does not
have to refer parties to arbitration if agreement found null and void, inoperable, or
incapable of being performed); id. art. 11(1) (stating that arbitration agreements have
to be recognized if subject matter is capable of settlement by arbitration). See also BORN
1, supra note 4, at 160 (expanding upon definition of "null and void," "inoperable," and
"incapable of being performed" under Article 11(3) of N.Y. Convention and non-arbi-
trability exception under Article 11(l)); VAN DEN BERG, supra note 172, at 123-28 (dis-
cussing further exceptions to enforceability of arbitration agreements under N.Y. Con-
vention).
211. See BORN 1, supra note 4, at 57 (discussing doctrine of separability as allowing
continued validity of arbitration clause when underlying contract contains defects);
REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, at 156 (stating that survival of arbitration clause
even where contract null and void depends on reason for which contract found to be
void and providing example that where party claims it did not sign contract, no insis-
tence upon autonomy of arbitration agreement can make agreement valid). See, e.g.,
English Arbitration Act, supra note 73, § 7 (stating arbitration agreement which forms
or was intended to form part of another agreement shall not be regarded as invalid,
non-existent or ineffective because that other agreement is invalid, or did not come
into existence or has become ineffective, and it shall for that purpose be treated as
distinct agreement); ICC Rules, supra note 173, art. 6(4) (stating tribunal continues to
have jurisdiction to determine rights of parties and adjudicate claims even though con-
tract itself may be non-existent or null and void).
212. See BORN 1, supra note 4, at 68 (stating that when arbitration agreement is
invalid or illegal, spearability doctrine says it does not affect validity of underlying con-
tract). See also ICC Rules, supra note 173, art. 6(4) (stating that arbitral tribunal's juris-
diction does not cease if contract claimed to be null and void or non-existent, provided
that tribunal upholds validity of arbitration agreement).
213. See BORN 1, supra note 4, at 213-14 (stating that U.S. courts generally hold that
claims of illegality of arbitration agreement itself require judicial resolution under § 4
or § 203 of FAA but issues relating to validity of underlying contract, however, are for
arbitral tribunal to decide); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLIcT OF LAws § 202(1)
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2. International Arbitration Providers Do Not Have
Consumer Protocols
Similar to domestic arbitration, parties frequently agree to
use the rules or services of a particular arbitration provider as
opposed to an ad hoc tribunal.21 5 One of the most notable orga-
nizations involved in international arbitration is the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), which follows the ICC
(1971) (stating effect of illegality upon contract is determined by law selected by appli-
cation of rules of§§ 187-188). See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967) (holding that where no claim of fraud applies to arbitration
clause, broad arbitration clause encompasses arbitration of claim that contract itself was
induced by fraud); Soleimany v. Soleimany [1998] 3 WLR 811 (reasoning that just be-
cause arbitration clause not normally infected by illegality of contract, does not mean
that separate arbitration agreement may not be void for illegality because arbitration
agreement to arbitrate illegal or immoral dealings according to English law should not
be recognized).
214. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 575 (1st Dept. 1998)
(holding arbitration agreement with consumers enforceable despite contract of adhe-
sion and unconscionability claims by consumers). The Gateway 2000 court cited the
requirements for unconscionability under N.Y. law, which included substantive and pro-
cedural unconscionability. Id. The court determined that the inequality in bargaining
power between the computer manufacturer and the consumer did not amount to such
a lack of meaningful choice as to make the agreement procedurally unconscionable. Id.
The possible inconvenience of the arbitration site (Chicago) was not substantively un-
conscionable. Id. However, the court ruled that the excessive costs entailed in arbitrat-
ing before the ICC is unreasonable and acted as a deterrent to the consumer. Id. The
court cited precedents that demonstrated excessive fees have been grounds for finding
arbitration provisions unenforceable. Id. Gateway 2000 offered to arbitrate under AAA
rules. Id. The court remanded to the trial court for substitution of an arbitrator and
left the question whether AAA costs were equally as oppressive as the ICC rules open.
Id. See also BORN 1, supra note 4, at 228 (discussing unconscionability claims and na-
tional courts' reluctance to find international arbitration agreements unconscionable).
The U.S. is also reluctant to find arbitration agreements unconscionable under the
FAA. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (hold-
ing mere inequality in bargaining power is not sufficient reason to hold that arbitration
agreements are never enforceable and dismissing unconscionability claims by em-
ployee); Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 835 (discussing U.S. policy enforcing pre-dispute
arbitration agreements with consumers and employees despite claims of unconsciona-
bility).
215. See BORN 1, supra note 4, at 11 (stating that international arbitrations may be
institutional or ad hoc and that there are important differences between them). In ad
hoc arbitration agreements parties generally agree to arbitrate, and may select a preex-
isting set of procedural rules, such as the UNCITRAL Rules. Id. at 12. See also REDFERN
& HUNTER, supra note 27, at 44 (stating that ad hoc arbitrations are conducted under
procedural rules adopted for purposes of that arbitration and institutional arbitration is
administered by one of many specialist arbitral institutions under its own arbitration
rules). See generally THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION GROUP OF SIMPSON THAcHER &
BARTLETT, COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES (2d ed. 2002) (providing
comparison of various international arbitration organizations' rules).
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Rules of Arbitration ("ICC Rules"). 216  There are also several
other organizations involved in international arbitration, such as
the London Court of International Arbitration ("LCIA")2 1 7 and
the AAA, 2 18 and each promulgates its own set of rules.
2 19
There are advantages to using institutional rules, including
structure, predictability, credibility, and additional institutional
services not found in ad hoc arbitrations. 220 There are also disad-
216. See BORN 1, supra note 4, at 14 (stating ICC is world's leading international
commercial arbitration institution and has less of national character than any other
arbitral institution). In 1997 ICC arbitrations were conducted in more than 35 differ-
ent countries. Id. It handles more than 500 cases per year, mostly international and
located in many nations throughout the world. Id. The most common countries for
ICC arbitrations are France, Switzerland, England, other Western European states, and
the U.S. Id. The ICC also consists of an International Court of Arbitration, which does
not decide substantive legal disputes or serve as an arbitrator. Id. at 13. See also RED-
FERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, at 50 (stating that ICC is one of world's leading organi-
zations in arbitration of international commercial disputes). See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra
note 173 (establishing rules and procedures for arbitrations conducted under auspices
of ICC).
217. See BORN 1, supra note 4, at 15 (stating LCIA is second most popular Euro-
pean arbitration institution). The LCIA Rules generally provide a sound, neutral basis
for international dispute resolution and are generally administered less comprehen-
sively than ICC arbitrations. Id. In contrast to other rules, the LCIA Rules set out the
powers of the tribunal in detail. Id. See also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, at 51
(stating that LCIA aims to provide comprehensive service for disputes arising out of
commercial transactions, irrespective of nationality of those involved and its "Arbitra-
tion Court" consists of practitioners drawn from major trading nations such as China
and Japan); LCLA Rules, supra note 173, arts. 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, and 22 (setting out
specific powers of tribunal in LCIA arbitrations).
218. See BORN 1, supra note 4, at 16 (stating AAA International Rules are based on
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and were intended to permit maximum flexibility and
minimum administrative supervision). The AAA administrative staff plays a less signifi-
cant role than the ICC Secretariat. Id. Non-U.S. parties are reluctant to use the AAA
International Rules, but the AAA is working to overcome this, Id. at 17. See also REDFERN
& HUNTER, supra note 27, at 52 (stating AAA is independent, non-governmental not-for-
profit organization dedicated to promotion of alternative forms of dispute resolution
and it administers many types of arbitration without limitation as to trade, geographical
area, or nature of case); AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures
(effective July 1, 2003) at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747&JSPsrc=
upload\LlVESITE\RulesProcedures\NationalInternational\..\ .\focusArea\commer-
cialNAAA235current.htm [hereinafter AAA Commercial Rules] (pertaining to arbitra-
tions conducted under AAA auspices); AAA International Rules, supra note 186 (estab-
lishing rules and procedures for arbitrations conducted under auspices of AAA for in-
ternational disputes).
219. See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 173 (establishing rules and procedures for arbi-
trations conducted under auspices of ICC); LCIA Rules, supra note 173, (establishing
rules and procedures for LCIA arbitrations); AAA International Rules, supra note 186
(establishing rules and procedures for arbitrations conducted under auspices of AAA
for international disputes).
220. See BORN 1, supra note 4, at 12 (stating that more structure and predictability
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vantages, namely that the institutional rules' formality and ad-
ded services equate to additional administrative fees and hefty
costs. 2 2 1 Most notable to consumers, the ICC and LCIA rules do
not contain separate consumer protocols. 2 22 The AAA, in com-
parison, allows substitution of the AAA Consumer Rules when-
ever the arbitration agreement is between a consumer and a bus-
iness.223
3. Internet Commerce Provides An Additional Wrinkle
The online marketplace adds a new wrinkle to resolution of
consumer disputes. An ever-increasing number of cross-border
may help reduce risks of breakdown between parties and technical defects in award,
and credibility increases likelihood that award will be accepted and judicially enforced).
The rules also usually provide procedures for choosing arbitrators, and are particularly
useful where the parties cannot agree. Id. See also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, at
45 (stating that rules laid down by established arbitral institutions generally have been
proven in practice and have undergone periodic revision to take account of new devel-
opments in law). Another advantage is that trained staff is usually provided to adminis-
ter the arbitration, so that the arbitral tribunal does not have to administer the arbitra-
tion as well as preside over it. Id.
221. See BORN 1, supra note 4, at 11 (stating administrative fees can sometimes be
substantial and are in addition to compensation paid to arbitrators). One of the great-
est criticisms of the ICC Rules is the substantial administrative fees and costs. Id. at 15.
For commercial parties needing extensive administration assistance during the arbitra-
tion, however, such drawbacks may be justified. Id. See also REDFERN & HUNTER, Supra
note 27, at 46 (stating that major disadvantage of institutional arbitration is that it may
prove expensive and suggesting that if amounts at stake are considerable and parties
are represented by advisers experienced in conduct of international commercial arbi-
tration, then may be worthwhile to conduct arbitration ad hoc). Another disadvantage
is the delay which results from formality of arbitral proceedings and necessity to process
steps through bureaucratic machinery of arbitral institution. Id.
222. See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 173 (providing for no special consumer proto-
cols); LCIA Rules, supra note 173 (providing no reference to separate rules or proce-
dures when consumers involved). But see AAA Consumer Rules, supra note 44 (apply-
ing consumer rules when agreement stipulates AAA rules apply and agreement is be-
tween consumer and business, which provides separate procedures for costs and small
claims court option); NAF Consumer Rules, supra note 44 (establishing procedures for
NAF arbitrations when consumers involved, and allowing for some due process protec-
tions); JAMS Consumer Rules, supra note 44 (stating JAMS policy that it will only ad-
minister arbitrations between companies and individual consumers if arbitration clause
complies with minimum standards of fairness such as reasonable costs).
223. See AAA Consumer Rules, supra note 44 (discussing AAA Consumer Rules and
stating that in consumer cases, AAA substitutes its Consumer Rules for Commercial
Rules or other AAA rules, such as AAA International Rules). See also NAF Consumer
Rules, supra note 44 (establishing procedures for NAF arbitrations when consumers
involved);JAMS Consumer Rules, supra note 44 (statingJAMS will only administer arbi-
trations between companies and individual consumers if arbitration clause and speci-
fied rules comply with minimum standards of fairness).
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B2C transactions are attributable to the Internet, but many of
the traditional methods of dispute resolution, such as court liti-
gation, are not appropriate.224 Jurisdictions such as the Euro-
pean Union have legislation governing such transactions or sup-
port guidelines similar to those of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") to govern
Internet commerce. 225 The draft Hague Convention addresses
them as well. 2 26 The different national ideologies, however,
mainly between the E.U. and the United States, have stalled at-
224. See, e.g., How Many Online, supra note 1 (reporting there are 605.60 million
people on Internet worldwide); Stewart & Matthews, supra note 1, at 1111 (predicting
revenue generated by B2C commerce will approach that generated by B2B commerce);
Gibbons 1, supra note 1, at 2 (stating B2C commerce will be worth estimated USD 250
billion by end of 2003); ABA Task Force on Electronic Commerce and ADR in Cooper-
ation with the Shidler Center for Law, Commerce and Technology, University of Wash-
ington School of Law, Addressing Disputes in Electronic Commerce: Final Recommendations
and Report, 58 Bus. LAW. 415 (2002) [hereinafter ABA Task Force on E-Commerce and
ADR] (noting difficulties associated with resolving disputes arising from cyberspace
transactions where transactions are not tied to any particular geographical location and
recognizing that Internet needs new forms of dispute resolution to help reduce transac-
tion costs for small value disputes and to erect structures that work well across national
boundaries); Gibbons 1, supra note 1, at 4-5 (stating that arbitration may offer alterna-
tive to state sponsored court problems in B2C commerce because it is potentially fast,
convenient, inexpensive, and permits parties to contract around jurisdictional and
choice of law questions). Arbitration is frequently offered as a panacea to B2C dispute
resolution because it is fast, inexpensive and promotes privacy, certainty, and predict-
ability. Id. at 12.
225. See, e.g., Council Regulation No. 44/01, O.J. L12/6, at 7 (2001) [hereinafter
Brussels I], arts. 15-17 (establishing Regulation on Jurisdiction and Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial matters which permits consumers
in E.U. Member States to sue foreign operators of e-commerce sites who market directly
to consumer's home country, in consumer's home country); Distance Selling Directive,
supra note 9 (dealing with steps by European Union to protect consumers in distance
selling). See also Martin, supra note 8, at 142-43 (discussing Brussels I regulation with
respect to online consumer transactions and stating that measure codifies and updates
E.U. position on recognition and enforcement of judgments); Stewart & Matthews,
supra note 1, at 1115 (discussing Distance Selling Directive that reaffirms European
Union's prolific course of drafting laws designed to protect online consumers); Pappas,
supra note 104, at 339 (stating that Distance Selling Directive has been used to regulate
electronic contracts and that it imposes several requirements on businesses with regard
to consumers); Gibbons 1, supra note 1, at 21 (discussing how OECD Guidelines for
Consumer Protection in Context of Electronic Commerce represent consensus among
major e-commerce global trading nations as to floor on rights of e-consumers to ADR).
226. See Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters (Oct. 30, 1999), at http://www.hcch.net/e/conven-
tions/draft36e.html [hereinafter Hague Convention] (providing provision that guaran-
tees consumer's right to sue in their home country). See also Martin, supra note 8, at
145-46 (discussing draft Hague Convention and its protection of consumer's right to
sue in home State and contrasting this approach to that of United States).
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tempts to institute uniform protections and standards.227 Many
scholars have suggested changes such as amending the FAA or
the N.Y. Convention, online arbitration regulations, or new trea-
ties, to avoid the problems of arbitrating in cross-border dis-
putes, but none have been instituted.22' The E.U. trend of ap-
plying domestic laws to online transactions is also problem-
227. See Hague Convention, supra note 226, art. 7 (allowing consumers to bring
claim in courts of State in which it is habitually resident if certain criteria are met). See
also Martin, supra note 8, at 136 (discussing draft Hague Convention and proposed
changes that incorporate proposed alternatives to art. 7). One proposal would allow
Member States to declare or reserve the right to refuse enforcement ofjudgments de-
pending on whether the State's law permits the use of pre-dispute "choice of forum"
clauses in consumer contracts. Id. Another proposal, however, would expressly exclude
consumer contracts from the Hague Convention. Id. Article 7 of the Hague Conven-
tion has generated controversy, especially from the United States. Id. at 139; Stewart &
Matthews, supra note 1, at 1119 (discussing stalled Hague Convention negotiations and
attributing such disagreement on fact that Hague Convention borrows heavily from
Brussels I which is based upon European view of how disputes should be settled).
228. See, e.g., Park 2, supra note 105, at 820 (suggesting international arbitration
statute for commercial parties that removes consumer and employment arbitration).
Explicitly excluding such contracts from the statute's scope would reduce the conflict
that has arisen abroad when international arbitration statutes were not clear about their
coverage. Id. at 821; Gibbons 1, supra note 1, at 790-92 (suggesting reforms to commer-
cial arbitration in cyberspace to level playing field for participation of non-commercial
parties and discussing disadvantages of each proposal). The options include laissez-faire
attitude toward regulating arbitration, but that waiting until critical mass of cyberian
consumers have been injured by ill considered arbitration clauses, procedures, and
awards, and that this only works when consumers have complete information. Id. at 791.
Another suggestion includes requiring institutional arbitration, but that does not ad-
dress that merchants will draft mass market contracts to maximize their legal protec-
tions and those are the same merchants who control arbitration. Id. Finally, arbitration
in cyberspace between merchants and consumers could be banned or aggressively regu-
lated, but that could result in consumers losing communicative advantages of cyber-
space for purposes of dispute resolution and would deny parties of benefits of arbitra-
tion. Id. at 792; Stewart & Matthews, supra note 1, at 1137-38 (discussing suggestions for
regulation of cyberspace using online arbitration of B2C disputes). One suggestion
includes amending the N.Y. Convention to account for online dispute resolution proce-
dures, but such attempts may jeopardize the level of success that has been achieved
since its enactment. Id. at 1137. A new document could also be created, but that could
take considerable time and current national policies that only enforce post-dispute arbi-
tration agreements with consumers make it unlikely that a treaty that provides for
mandatory enforcement of pre-dispute agreements would be ratified. Id. at 1138; Al-
derman, supra note 16, at 1266 (suggesting amendment to FAA that defines consumer
transaction and prohibits pre-dispute arbitration agreements with consumers); Richard
E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration Of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute (Mandatory) Arbitra-
tion Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1069, 1082-83 (1998) (stating that despite
limited judicial review of arbitration awards under FAA, there is growing evidence that
in statutory claims courts find way to subject decision to judicial review or embrace
manifest disregard standard of review).
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atic,229 especially where the domestic laws conflict between the
parties.23 ° One of the leading cases demonstrating this is Yahoo!
Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme ("LICRA "1).231
Yahoo! Inc. involved an Internet provider, headquartered in the
United States, that was sent a cease and desist order from
LICRA, a French not-for-profit organization.23 2 LICRA wanted
Yahoo! to stop allowing end users to post Nazi memorabilia on
its online auction site, which was a violation of French law.233 A
French Court entered an order directing Yahoo! to remove the
material from its sites and threatened a penalty of USD 13,300
per day for noncompliance.23 4 Yahoo! refused, claiming that
such a ban violated the right to free speech guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution.235 Yahoo! then sought a declaratory judg-
ment in the U.S. District Court in California declaring the
229. See Stewart & Matthews, supra note 1, at 1116 (stating European Union has
adopted country of destination approach which makes law of consumer's domicile ap-
plicable as law governing online B2C transactions). See also Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue
Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp.2d 1168 (N.D. Ca. 2001) (holding
U.S. court could not enforce order by French court ordering Internet company head-
quartered in United States to remove Nazi-related materials from its website because it
violated French statute).
230. See Drahozal & Friel, supra note 8, at 374 (discussing enforceability of pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in United States); Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 835
(discussing U.S. policy enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements with consumers
and employees). See also FTC Workshop Comments, supra note 5 (expressing E.U. op-
position to binding consumer arbitration in online disputes in response to June 2000
FTC workshop); Sternlight 2, supra note 29, at 846-47 (discussing E.U. response to FTC
workshop that binding pre-dispute consumer arbitration is disfavored); Stewart & Mat-
thews, supra note 1, at 1119 (stating that agreement on Hague Convention proposals
dealing with consumer Internet commerce is unlikely because E.U. and United States
have very different attitudes toward the issue).
231. 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1192 (N.D. Ca. 2001) (holding judgment issued by
French court against Internet company headquartered in United States for violating
French statute forbidding display of Nazi-related materials unenforceable). See also
Stewart & Matthews, supra note 1, at 1116-18 (discussing Yahoo! Inc. and its demonstra-
tion of difficulties in European courts trying to apply country of destination policy to
online disputes); Lewis R. Clayton, Yahoo!: A French Court Order's Power in the U.S., N.Y.
LJ., 3 (2001) (stating that court declared unenforceable in United States French court
order directing that Internet portal Yahoo! prevent auction of Nazi artifacts and block
access to pro-Nazi web sites).
232. See Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1184 (stating that La Ligue Contre Le Racisme
Et l'Antisemitisme ("LICRA") sent cease and desist letter to Yahoo! in California in-
forming it that sale of Nazi and Third Reich related goods through its auction services
violated French law and threatened legal action).
233. Id. at 1184.
234. Id. at 1185.
235. Id. at 1186.
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French order unenforceable. 36 The District Court granted the
declaratory judgment, reasoning that even though France has
the sovereign right to pass laws for the benefit of its citizenry, a
U.S. court could not enforce a foreign order that violated the
U.S. Constitution by chilling protected speech that occurs simul-
taneously within U.S. borders.2 37 Additionally, the court held
that absent a body of law that establishes international standards
with respect to speech on the Internet and an appropriate treaty
or legislation addressing enforcement of such standards to
speech originating within the United States, the Court was obli-
gated to uphold the U.S. Constitution over comity.
23 8
I1. PUT THE LID ON PANDORA'S BOX: LEAVE THE
ARBITRATION OF CROSS-BORDER DISPUTES TO
COMMERCIAL PARTIES AND KEEP IT
AWAY FROM CONSUMERS
Arbitration is an effective and reasonable alternative for
business parties seeking to resolve disputes, especially in the
cross-border or international context.2 39 Just because arbitration
may be a better choice than litigation in those situations, how-
ever, does not mean that arbitration is appropriate for consum-
ers involved in cross-border transactions.
Arbitration is not an appropriate form of dispute resolution
for consumers in domestic cases. 240 In its binding pre-dispute
form and with the conflicting national policies on its use, reli-
ance on arbitration to resolve consumer disputes in cross-border
transactions is even more dubious. First, it allows inconsistent
treatment of the parties based upon which jurisdiction they
come from. Second, the purported savings in transactional costs
to both consumers and commercial parties are not realized by
using arbitration in cross-border disputes. Third, by allowing ar-
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1192.
238. Id. at 1193.
239. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text (discussing purported benefits
of arbitration such as expert decisionmakers, procedural simplicity, flexibility, confiden-
tiality, and reduced costs).
240. See, e.g., supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text (stating some negative
aspects of arbitration for consumers, such as adhesive agreements and requirement that
arbitrators do not need to correctly apply law). See also supra notes 153-57 and accom-
panying text (recognizing that narrow review of awards and consumer's burden to
prove prohibitive costs also make arbitration inappropriate for consumer disputes).
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bitration of consumer cross-border disputes, arbitration's effec-
tiveness to resolve commercial B2B disputes may be diminished.
A. Using Arbitration To Resolve Cross-Border Consumer Disputes
Means Most Consumers Will Not Be Able to Seek Redress
There is a greater chance of abuse when arbitration is used
in cross-border consumer disputes.241 Most likely, cross-border
consumer transactions will occur online.2 42 The consumer can-
not be sure which laws apply to the transaction because regula-
tions or treaties governing Internet commerce are lacking.245
The European Union has instituted some regulation, but it only
applies to transactions between merchants and consumers in the
European Union. 24 4 Not only are consumers effectively shut out
from redress, but arbitration allows inconsistent treatment of the
parties based on which jurisdiction they come from.2 4 5
1. Consumers Will Not Be Able to Seek Redress
At the outset of a dispute involving an arbitration clause, the
consumer should challenge the arbitration agreement to avoid
arbitration in the first place. An arbitration agreement that in-
volves a cross-border transaction will likely come under the N.Y.
Convention, 246 but national law may play a part as well.2 4' The
241. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing potential for de-
frauding cross-border consumers). See also supra note 224 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing how e-commerce dispute resolution is more complicated and no standards are
currently in place).
242. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing potential for abuse in
consumer cross-border transactions). See also supra note 224 and accompanying text
(discussing increase in B2C Internet commerce).
243. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (providing examples of E.U. legis-
lation, as well as OECD guidance, that sets standards for B2C online commerce).
244. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing draft Hague Conven-
tion and protections it offers consumers).
245. See supra notes 77-86 (establishing that United States has pro-arbitration pol-
icy for consumer disputes but European Union is more protective of its consumers by
allowing Member States to pass more restrictive legislation).
246. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing when N.Y. Convention
applies and stating that it may apply to consumer disputes of commercial nature). See
also supra note 183 and accompanying text (suggesting what definition of "commercial"
relationship is under N.Y. Convention and noting that Member State could exclude
consumer transactions under definition).
247. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text (discussing that N.Y. Conven-
tion is codified in national legislation such as FAA and English Arbitration Act and
recognizing that N.Y. Convention may overlap with national sources of law as to en-
forceability and recognition).
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consumer could challenge the agreement as a violation of public
policy or that the subject matter is inarbitrable.248 Unfortu-
nately, under the N.Y. Convention and the ICC rules, for exam-
ple, challenges to the arbitration agreement are decided by the
arbitral tribunal. 49 So even if the consumer challenged the
agreement, the arbitral tribunal at a minimum would be impan-
eled to determine arbitrability, if not to rule on the entire dis-
pute.2
50
If the consumer was not discouraged by this fact and went
forward with challenging the agreement, the chance of success is
minimal. Public policy, non-arbitrability and unconscionability
defenses to enforcement of arbitration agreements are rare
under both U.S. arbitration law and the N.Y. Convention.25
Also, because the dispute is between parties from different Na-
tions and legal jurisdictions, it is not clear which jurisdiction's
laws apply to determine challenges to the arbitration agree-
ment.25 2 For example, a U.S. consumer would not fare well if it
challenged the agreement because the agreement is probably
enforceable under U.S. law. 253 An E.U. consumer, in contrast,
might have a better opportunity to get the arbitration clause re-
moved from the contract because such agreements are deemed
unfair terms under the Consumer Directive. 25 4 That may not
248. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text (discussing that public policy
and non-arbitrability of subject matter may be defenses to enforcement under N.Y. Con-
vention).
249. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text (discussing that arbitrators
have authority to determine disputes over validity and enforceability of arbitration
agreements and that it is very difficult for national courts to stay arbitration proceedings
under N.Y. Convention).
250. See id.
251. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text (recognizing that some jurisdic-
tions, such as United States, apply public policy defense to arbitration agreements and
awards more narrowly in foreign public policy situations under N.Y. Convention). See
also supra note 214 and accompanying text (recognizing that courts are reluctant to
find international arbitration agreements under N.Y. Convention unconscionable).
252. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text (discussing that N.Y. Conven-
tion is silent as to law that applies to arbitration agreement and non-arbitrability deter-
minations but that presumption is law of country where arbitration applies).
253. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text (discussing that arbitration
agreements in United States are subject to same enforceability requirements as regular
contracts, but that U.S. courts treat arbitration agreements presumptively valid). See
also supra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing that public policy and non-arbi-
trability are limited defenses under N.Y. Convention and U.S. law).
254. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text (discussing how binding pre-
dispute consumer arbitration is not banned explicitly by Consumer Directive but that
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even matter though, because the arbitrators making such a de-
termination do not have to apply any particular law.255 They
may choose an equitable remedy that does not result from the
laws of either the consumer's or the merchant's jurisdiction.256
Even the U.S. Supreme Court, which consistently upholds con-
sumer arbitration agreements, maintains that statutory rights
should be vindicated,257 but it is unlikely that arbitration pro-
ceedings can offer this level of protection without some substan-
tive review of arbitrators' decision in statutory matters.
Even if the arbitration agreement is found unenforceable,
the picture for the consumer is still bleak. The underlying con-
tract would likely remain intact because the arbitration agree-
ment is separable from the contract.258 The result would be a
contract with an uncertain dispute resolution method, likely de-
faulting to local court procedures. 25" The arbitration agreement
was at least in part meant to avoid this result in the first place.2 6 °
If the consumer did go forward with the arbitration and an
award was rendered, the consumer would have to argue the
practice has effectively been adopted). See also supra note 76 and accompanying text
(discussing that English Arbitration Act seems to ban binding pre-dispute arbitration
agreements with consumers).
255. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text (recognizing that arbitrators do
not need to correctly apply laws, and that arbitration award may be overturned under
U.S. law for manifest disregard, which is rare). See also supra notes 189-90 and accompa-
nying text (discussing limits on judicial review of merits of arbitration awards and how
arbitrators are not required to correctly apply law of any jurisdiction).
256. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing that arbitrators do not
have to decide according to particular law and may even apply lex mercatoria for
whatever rules of law they deem appropriate).
257. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (discussing cases where courts
held that prohibitive arbitration costs could preclude vindication of statutory rights).
258. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (describing what separability of
arbitration agreement means and how institutional arbitration rules support doctrine).
259. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing separability doctrine
and arbitration provider rules that treat arbitration agreement separate from underly-
ing contract and fact that underlying contract is not affected by unenforceability of
arbitration agreement and vice versa). If the arbitration clause is defective, however,
there may be judicial and arbitral proceedings where the scope or enforceability of the
provisions and the merits of the dispute have to be litigated. Id. See also supra note 62
and accompanying text (stating that unfair terms under Consumer Directive are not
enforceable, but that this does not invalidate underlying contract).
260. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing disadvantages to cross-
border litigation that encouraged commercial parties to arbitrate). See also supra notes
109-115 and accompanying text (discussing arbitral advantages over litigation to com-
mercial parties that do not necessarily transfer to consumers).
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award was unenforceable.2 61  This would be done in the court
where enforcement was sought, and that could mean litigation
in a foreign court and under foreign law. 26 2 Both the United
States and European Union limit the grounds for appeal of an
arbitrator's award and decisions on arbitrability. 263 In the Euro-
pean Union this is not necessarily fatal to consumers because the
Directive makes the arbitration of consumer disputes all but
non-existent. 264 The limited review in the United States, how-
ever, combined with a lack of reasoned awards, creates the risk a
dispute may be decided incorrectly with no remedy for those
protected by the legislation.265
Furthermore, consumers may find that arbitration is an
overly burdensome way of resolving their disputes. The amounts
involved in such disputes are typically small, averaging around
USD 300.266 A consumer could be faced with paying filing fees
and administrative costs, arbitrator compensation, and attor-
ney's fees in order to proceed with the arbitration.2 67 If the arbi-
tration agreement provides for rules that utilize consumer proto-
cols, the consumer's arbitration costs may be capped at several
261. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text (discussing public policy ex-
ception to enforcement of arbitral award under N.Y. Convention art. V and its narrow
application).
262. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (referring to N.Y. Convention art.
V(2) (a) as providing that law of country where recognition and enforcement is sought
as law which applies to determine if subject matter of difference is not capable of settle-
ment of arbitration).
263. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing very limited opportu-
nity to overturn arbitration awards in United States). See also supra note 191 and accom-
panying text (discussing limited review of awards under N.Y. Convention).
264. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing that Eqropean
Union does not allow binding pre-dispute consumer arbitration).
265. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (discussing that arbitrators
need not decide according to law and even clear errors in interpretation of law are
insufficient to overturn arbitration awards, unless manifest disregard is shown). See also
supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text (discussing that vacation of arbitration award
for manifest disregard of law is very rare especially since arbitrators are not required to
give reasoned awards). The European Union does not even allow pre-dispute binding
arbitration with its consumers. See, e.g., supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing that European Union does not allow binding pre-dispute consumer arbitra-
tion).
266. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing relatively small dollar
amount of consumer claims as compared to costs of arbitrating or filing in small claims
court and noting that average consumer claim is USD 300).
267. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text (discussing how arbitration is
usually more expensive than litigation for consumer claims because small claims court
consists only of filing fee and no attorney fees).
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hundred dollars.26 8 The consumer could also incur attorney's
fees if he feels he wants representation. The small amount of
money at stake in the dispute compared to the costs of arbitra-
tion may deter the consumer from pursuing the action in the
first place. 26
9
Consumers may also find that the lack of judicial involve-
ment in arbitration puts them at a disadvantage. Business par-
ties prefer arbitration because its simplified process is not ham-
pered by court rules and procedures.270 Court rules and proce-
dures, however, are precisely what ensure due process for
consumer dispute resolution. 2 7' Truncated proceedings, limited
discovery, and limited review of the arbitrator's decision do not
help consumers and may actually interfere with their statutory
rights. 27
2
2. Arbitration Allows Inconsistent Treatment of the Parties
Based Upon which Jurisdiction They Come From
The U.S. and E.U. policies on consumer arbitration are gen-
erally opposed to each other.273 It is unclear how a consumer
will be treated when one party comes from a pro-arbitration ju-
risdiction and the other doesn't.
The fact that some of the major computer manufacturers
268. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text (discussing arbitral providers
such as AAA, NAF, and JAMS adoption of Consumer Rules that provide reduced fees).
269. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (discussing viability of ODR for
B2C transactions and recognizing that it is intrinsically multi-jurisdictional and exceed-
ingly complex, yet subject to severe financial limitations because many B2C disputes
involve dollar values that are relatively low). See also supra notes 14142 and accompany-
ing text (discussing that victims are less likely to seek vindication of rights when high
transaction costs and highlighting that consumers typically face large arbitration costs
in comparison to value of claims).
270. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (noting arbitration generally elimi-
nates pretrial motion and discovery practice, and informality of arbitration means less
time preparing for hearings and presenting evidence).
271. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing how arbitration's proce-
dural informality as compared to litigation appeals to business parties).
272. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (discussing how disputes in
consumer cases are not really helped by arbitration and that simplified arbitration pro-
cedures such as informal discovery can harm consumers). See also supra note 206 and
accompanying text (discussing that erosion of public policy defenses under N.Y. Con-
vention displaces public law).
273. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. pro-arbitration
stance regarding consumer disputes and contrasting it with European Union policy of
allowing Member States to pass more restrictive consumer legislation).
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specifically do not include arbitration clauses in their contracts
with E.U. customers indicates that the E.U. will probably not en-
force a binding pre-dispute arbitration agreement against an
E.U. consumer,274 or at least merchants seem to think so. In
contrast, a U.S. consumer may be forced to arbitrate a dispute
with an E.U. merchant. Unless the agreement is unenforceable
under normal contract standards, it will be enforced.275 If the
consumer participated in the arbitration and an award was
made, the award will be recognized unless it meets a statutory
exception under the FAA or the award was made in manifest
disregard of the law.276 This creates an unlevel playing field not
only between merchants and consumers, but also between con-
sumers purchasing in the cross-border market as well.
In the European Union, legislation prohibits arbitration
agreements that require consumers to arbitrate in a distant fo-
rum. 277 The United States, however, does not have correspond-
ing legislation, and instead a consumer would have to demon-
strate unconscionability for the agreement to be unenforceable,
and inconvenience of forum alone does not meet this require-
ment.278 The consumer may also find that the costs of arbitrat-
ing in the distant forum are not worth the trouble. 2 79 Litigation
in this instance in inevitable because the consumer must chal-
lenge the arbitration agreement in court and prove prohibitive
costs.
28 0
274. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing survey that determined
top computer manufacturers modify arbitration clauses based on consumer's locality).
275. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text (discussing that arbitration
agreements are presumptively valid in United States unless demonstrate contract de-
fenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability).
276. See supra notes 156-165 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. court's reluc-
tance to overturn arbitration awards or find agreements unenforceable and discussing
narrow statutory and common law grounds for vacation of arbitration awards under
FAA).
277. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (discussing Brussels I and Distance
Selling Directive that offer protections for E.U. consumers).
278. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (discussing Gateway 2000 decision
that found inconvenience of forum selection clause not unconscionable).
279. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (recognizing inadequacy of current
ADR methods and discussing new forms of dispute resolution to help reduce transac-
tion costs for small value disputes and to erect structures that work well across national
boundaries). See also supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (discussing how trans-
action costs of arbitrating consumer claims compared to amount in dispute discourages
consumers to seek redress).
280. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (noting that burden is on con-
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Furthermore, the Internet is the most likely place for a
cross-border consumer transaction to occur, 2 8 1 and it compli-
cates determining which laws apply and which approach governs
282transactions. For example, the United States' insistence on
pre-dispute mandatory consumer arbitration has so far stalled at-
tempts at unified dispute resolution procedures in the online
marketplace.28 3 The absence of guidelines for dispute resolu-
tion in such transactions only makes the situation more uncer-
tain for both consumers and merchants. 284 This clearly will not
increase consumer confidence in cross-border shopping.
B. The Purported Savings in Transactional Costs are Not Realized
Another purported benefit of arbitration is that it is cheaper
and faster than litigation. 28 5 When utilized in consumer dispute
resolution, however, the cost savings are not really present for
consumers. In contrast to arbitration in B2B transactions, the
cost savings are not necessarily realized by the merchant either.
1. Arbitration is Not Necessarily Cheaper for Consumers
Supporters of arbitration argue that because businesses cut
down on transaction costs by using arbitration, such savings are
passed on to consumers in lower prices. 286 For consumers in
cross-border transactions, however, arbitration is not really a
good bargain. The consumer sacrifices the due process protec-
sumer to prove prohibitive costs in arbitration if he seeks to invalidate arbitration agree-
ment).
281. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing potential for abuse in
consumer cross-border transactions). See also supra note 224 and accompanying text
(discussing increase in B2C Internet commerce).
282. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (contrasting U.S. policy of pro-
arbitration in consumer transactions and E.U. policy that disfavors it). See also supra
note 232 and accompanying text (discussing Yahoo! case and demonstration of difficul-
ties of E.U. courts trying to apply domestic laws to Internet disputes).
283. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (describing stalled Hague Con-
vention negotiations and offering suggestions for uniform regulation).
284. See supra notes 5, 8, 23, 24 and accompanying text (discussing current lack of
consumer confidence in online shopping and recognizing that no current uniform sys-
tem exists for online B2C dispute resolution).
285. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (stating that one of arbitration's
purported benefits is its cost savings).
286. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (suggesting that consumers may be
better off participating in binding pre-dispute arbitration because they ultimately bene-
fit). See also supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing how consumers benefit
from standardized contracts).
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tions of a court.287 The consumer however, does not experience
the benefits typically associated with arbitration such as expert
decision-making, procedural simplicity and flexibility, finality,
confidentiality, and cost savings. 288 The proceedings may be gov-
erned by a consumer protocol that provides due process protec-
tions such as lower costs, expanded authority of the arbitrator to
award any remedy available in court, reasoned awards, and the
option to go to small claims court after an award is rendered.289
Such protections, however, are not automatic and a merchant
may choose to use different rules that do not offer such protec-
290tions.
Prohibitive costs so far seem to be the only aspect that the
courts entertain to refuse enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments. 29 ' If the arbitration does not use separate consumer
rules that cap the costs of arbitration, the consumer may chal-
lenge the agreement based upon the Green Tree decision.29 2 This
of course consists of litigation in a court, and the consumer
probably should have a lawyer.2 93 It is also the consumer's bur-
den to prove prohibitive costs.2 94  Most likely, however, the
287. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of arbitra-
tion as possibly displacing government's role in consumer protection and resulting in
unconscionable transactions and dispute resolution methods).
288. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of arbitra-
tion, such as expert decision-making, procedural simplicity and flexibility, finality, con-
fidentiality, cost-savings, and avoidance of forum selection and litigation bias). See also
supra note 118 and accompanying text (asserting that typically cited benefits to arbitra-
tion do not transfer to consumers).
289. See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text (discussing AAA, NAF, andJAMS
consumer protocols that provide protections such as lower costs, expanded authority of
arbitrator to award any remedy available in court, reasoned awards, and option to go to
small claims court).
290. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing how business may
choose not to use consumer protocols in arbitration agreement).
291. See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text (discussing Green Tree and Gu-
tierrez decisions and courts' holdings that prohibitive arbitration costs may make arbitra-
tion agreement unenforceable but burden of proving such costs is on consumer).
292. See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. courts' hold-
ings that arbitration agreement may be held unenforceable if consumer can prove pro-
hibitive costs).
293. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases where
consumers or employees challenged arbitration agreements as unenforceable). See also
supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text (discussing additional cases where consum-
ers challenged arbitration agreements an unenforceable because arbitration was cost
prohibitive).
294. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text (discussing Green Tree, Gateway
2000, Gutierrez, and Mendez cases and consumer's burden of proving prohibitive costs).
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amount in dispute does notjustify spending thousands of dollars
on attorney's fees to demonstrate that costs are actually prohibi-
tive. 295 Also because the burden is on the consumer, one won-
ders what would happen to a consumer that has the misfortune
of not being poverty stricken. In such instances, the Green Tree
decision and its progeny infer that the more means a consumer
has to pay costs, the higher the arbitration costs can be before a
court will refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement. 29 6 It
seems like an expensive bargain to just save a few dollars when
the product or service was purchased. Of course, E.U. consum-
ers should not fret such matters, because the arbitration agree-
ment would probably not be enforced in the first place.297
2. Arbitration is Not Necessarily Cost-Effective for Businesses
The business community should also question the cost effec-
tiveness of using binding arbitration clauses in consumer trans-
actions. There is a risk of enforceability challenges, which re-
suits in litigation costs anyway.298 Consumer advocate groups
and legislators are also aware of arbitration's controversy, 2 9 and
a business risks becoming the poster representative of all that is
wrong with consumer arbitration.
If merchants hope to reach the cross-border markets, they
will also have to consider jurisdictions such as the European
295. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text (stating that most consumer
complaints are for small dollar amounts and that consumers may be discouraged to
pursue claims).
296. See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions that
evaluated consumers' ability to pay arbitration costs in determination of whether arbi-
tration agreement was enforceable).
297. See supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text (discussing how practice of en-
forcing binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements against consumers in European
Union and Member States is effectively non-existent).
298. See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text (providing examples of con-
sumer challenges to arbitration agreements that were litigated in court, even up to U.S.
Supreme Court). See also supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (discussing chal-
lenges to arbitration agreement and arbitration award under N.Y. Convention). Even
if, because of the separability or competence-competence doctrine, the arbitral tribunal
instead of a court determines issues of enforceability, additional arbitration costs may
be incurred through a longer or more involved arbitration proceeding.
299. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. legislative at-
tempts to restrict arbitration agreements with consumers). See also supra notes 100-03
and accompanying text (noting unsuccessful U.S. House and Senate bills attempting to
restrict arbitration's use and legal commentators' recognition of arbitration contro-
versy).
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Union that do not allow the binding pre-dispute consumer arbi-
tration agreements typically included in contracts. 30 0 This may
mean that the merchant has to draft different contracts for use
in different jurisdictions and become familiar with the national
laws regarding arbitration of each jurisdiction it does business
in.30 1 There is also more uncertainty when dealing with cross-
border consumers. There is no uniform set of laws in place to
govern such transactions, and there is considerably more uncer-
tainty how disputes will be handled, even with binding arbitra-
tion agreements. 0 2 The merchant also risks incurring litigation
expenses, because the consumer or an agency authorized to
bring an action on behalf of the consumer may challenge an
agreement or an award.30 3 Such a possibility threatens the bind-
ing and final nature of arbitration. 0 4 This seems like a lot of
additional risk for the merchant, especially when it could be
avoided by using a non-binding ADR method other than arbitra-tion.305
300. See supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text (stating unfair terms under Con-
sumer Directive are void and recognizing that even though binding pre-dispute con-
sumer arbitration is not banned explicitly by Consumer Directive, practice has effec-
tively been adopted). See also supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing survey
that determined top computer manufacturers modify arbitration clauses based on con-
sumer's locality and they did not include binding arbitration agreements in contracts
with E.U. consumers).
301. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing survey that determined
top computer manufacturers modify arbitration clauses based on consumer's locality
and they did not include binding arbitration agreements in contracts with E.U. consum-
ers). See, e.g., supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text (recognizing that United States
and European Union approach consumer arbitration and consumer protection issues
differently).
302. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing potential for abuse in
consumer cross-border transactions). See also supra notes 224-32 and accompanying text
(discussing increase in B2C Internet commerce and contrasting U.S. policy of pro-arbi-
tration in consumer transactions and E.U. policy that disfavors it). See, e.g., supra notes
281-282 and accompanying text (discussing lack of legislation or uniform rules for In-
ternet transactions).
303. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing that defective arbitra-
tion agreement can result in judicial and arbitral proceedings that determine enforce-
ability of provision and merits of dispute). See also supra note 83 and accompanying text
(describing that E.U. agencies such as OFT may bring actions on behalf of consumers).
304. See supra notes 90, 112 and accompanying text (discussing preference of inter-
national arbitration because of final and binding nature of decisions that avoid review
by national courts, but also recognizing problematic if agreement is defective because it
results in judical or arbitral determination of dispute on merits).
305. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (discussing differences between
arbitration and other ADR methods).
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The consensus is that cross-border commerce, especially in
the e-commerce context, is far below its potential. 3°6 By elimi-
nating consumer distrust, consumers are more likely to purchase
products and services from retailers in distant forums.3 °7 Having
an understandable and fair process for dispute resolution goes a
long way to eliminating the distrust. A merchant could greatly
increase its potential customer base if consumers have more con-
fidence in purchasing from a cross-border merchant.
C. Allowing Arbitration of Cross-Border Consumer Claims Threatens
Arbitration's Use for Commercial Disputes Between
Business Parties
Arbitration traditionally offered business parties a way to
maintain control over their dispute resolution. 0 It also offered
a way to keep courts and regulators out of a business' affairs. 0 9
The use of binding arbitration in consumer disputes, however,
has shone the spotlight right where merchants do not want it to
be. Federal and state legislators are already attempting to pass
laws that limit the use of arbitration in consumer agreements. 310
So far, they have not been successful.3 1  Creative legislative
drafting, however, may soon get around the FAA's preemption
problem. 12 The Green Tree decision and pressure on the pri-
mary arbitration providers has already resulted in changes to ar-
306. See supra notes 23-24, 35 and accompanying text (discussing lack of consumer
confidence in cross-border transactions and its negative effect on commerce).
307. Id. (discussing how current consumer distrust of online shopping hampers
growth of Internet commerce).
308. See supra notes 87-107 and accompanying text (discussing historical prefer-
ence for arbitration and offering statistics that demonstrate arbitration's popularity).
309. Id. (explaining how arbitration allowed commercial parties to resolve dis-
putes within their own industries and without typical litigation complications).
310. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing that state efforts to
restrict use of arbitration in consumer transactions are preempted by FAA and provid-
ing examples of Congressional attempts to pass protective legislation). See also supra
notes 100-02 and accompanying text (providing examples of failed U.S. state legislation
that attempted to restrict arbitration).
311. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (recognizing that FAA preempts
state legislative efforts to protect consumers in arbitration). See also supra notes 100-02
and accompanying text (providing examples of failed U.S. legislation in Montana and
Vermont that attempted to restrict arbitration and cases that found such legislation
preempted by FAA).
312. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (referring to New Mexico's recently
adopted Fair Bargain Act, which applies to all standard form contracts or leases and its
attempt to make arbitration fairer to consumers). Because it applies across-the-board to
form contracts, whether they include a mandatory arbitration clause or not, the act is
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bitration rules that were tailored to business disputes. 3  The
E.U. has effectively banned pre-dispute consumer arbitration
agreements, limiting the options for merchants in those jurisdic-
tions.3 14 There is also a movement under foot to amend the N.Y.
Convention and FAA to account for non-business parties, or pos-
sibly institute a different standard ofjudicial review in consumer
and employment arbitration awards. 313  The N.Y. Convention
has become a staple in the resolution of commercial disputes, 16
there is no need to interfere with its effectiveness because of the
emergence of B2C commerce.
CONCLUSION
Increased consumer participation in cross-border shopping
increases the need for an effective form of dispute resolution.
Arbitration cannot currently meet this need. To make arbitra-
tion an effective form of dispute resolution for all parties in-
volved requires extensive revisions to current national laws such
as the FAA, the N.Y. Convention, and arbitral provider practices.
Currently, there are opposing national policies regarding
whether binding pre-dispute consumer arbitration is appropri-
ate, and there does not seem to be any consensus on how to
make cross-border shopping fair for consumers and merchants
from different jurisdictions. More frequently, consumers will be
confronted with ineffective dispute resolution options when
their on-line shopping transactions go badly. This will continue
to hamper e-commerce and will negatively affect both consum-
ers and businesses that miss out on all that cross-border shop-
ping has to offer. By placing the lid back on the box, the bene-
not anti-arbitration, but pro-fair-arbitration, which is consistent with the philosophy of
the Federal Arbitration Act, and should survive pre-emption challenges. Id.
313. See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text (discussing implementation of
U.S. arbitration provider consumer protocols and additional protections to consumer
arbitration procedures).
314. See supra notes 72, 76 and accompanying text (noting that binding pre-dis-
pute consumer arbitration is effectively non-existent in E.U. and Member States such as
United Kingdom).
315. See supra note 228 and accompanying text (discussing dispute resolution op-
tions to account for online B2C commerce, such as amending N.Y. Convention creating
new legislation or treaties that address common concerns, or expanding judicial review
of arbitral awards).
316. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing history of N.Y. Conven-
tion and how it is regarded as most significant contemporary international agreement
relating to commercial arbitration).
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fits of arbitration that commercial parties have come to cherish
can remain intact. Arbitration has proven itself in B2B dispute
resolution, and it is unwise to attempt to morph it into some-
thing that would no longer serves the needs of cross-border com-
merce.
